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Abstract 
This thesis is an anthropological study of Sri Lankan 'guest' workers in the Middle East, focusing 
on the experiences of women who migrate to Jordan for employment in domestic service. More 
than 100,000 women depart Sri Lanka for such work each year, giving Sri Lanka one of the 
highest per capita rates of female migration in the world. A large body of literature exists 
concerning the growth of Asian migration to Arab countries, yet relatively little has been written 
about migrants' experiences in host countries. Based on dual-sited research conducted over the 
course of 24 months, the thesis provides an ethnographic contribution both at the point of origin 
and re-entry (i.e. Sri Lanka) and at the destination point (i.e. Jordan). It draws on research in a 
village in western Sri Lanka to examine the factors compelling women to migrate for these jobs 
and how they evaluate the consequences of doing so for themselves and their families. 
The second part of the thesis addresses migrants' experiences and working conditions during their 
sojourns. The analysis aims to move beyond typically one-sided accounts of domestic work by 
considering the perspectives of both workers and employers and probing the complex relations 
between them. In doing so, it considers the kafala (sponsorship) system by which guest workers 
are effectively bound to their employers for the terms of their service. According to its terms, 
migrants are dependent on local sponsors for their residence and work permits. Workers cannot 
change employers without the sponsor's written consent, and sponsors have the power to send 
workers back to their own countries at any time. The research focuses on the example of Sri 
Lankan domestic workers to illuminate workers' experiences of the kafala system and analyse the 
links between migration policies, guest worker programmes and unfree labour in the global 
economy. 
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Introduction 
The wheels touch down on a shimmering strip of black asphalt and within minutes the airplane 
pulls up to the gate. Clutching a small bag of clothing, a young woman joins a queue of 
passengers filing out of the aircraft and entering the terminal. Hours before, she bid goodbye to 
her husband and children and boarded this, her first flight, with a mixture of apprehension and 
excitement. This is her first journey alone, and she is now thousands of miles from family and 
home. Once inside the terminal she is met by a man who collects her passport and escorts her 
through immigration. After retrieving her luggage, she is taken to a sun-baked parking lot where 
she boards a bus along with several other women who have just arrived. As the bus pulls away 
from the airport on the next leg of her journey, the young woman sees a vast expanse of desert 
stretching out on both sides of the road, parched and barren compared to the tropical island she 
left behind. As the bus approaches the city, she sees large villas, hemmed in by high walls, and 
billboards with advertisements written in a language she cannot understand. The streets are wider 
than at home, the buildings taller. Row upon row of cement apartment blocks with shops on the 
ground floor line the road. When the bus reaches its destination, she and the other women get off 
and are led inside a small office. It is the recruitment agency that arranged her trip to this foreign 
place. She is told to wait there for the arrival of her new employers, the family with whom she 
will be expected to live for the next two years. 
This scenario is repeated every day as hundreds of thousands of women from South and Southeast 
Asia arrive in the Arab region to join a vast workforce that cleans houses, cooks meals and tends 
children. Many of them will work long hours with little time off and limited access to the outside 
world. Despite the conditions, these jobs are sought in the hopes that the earnings they will 
provide will change the lives offamilies back home. More than 100,000 such women come each 
year to the Middle East from Sri Lanka alone, giving the small island nation one of the highest 
rates of female migration per capita in the world. 
This thesis is an ethnographic account of the experiences and the intricate nature of the 
relationships between Sri Lankan domestic workers and their employers. It draws on field 
research conducted over the course of 24 months in Jordan and Sri Lanka to explore the causes, 
consequences and contradictions of women's migration from the perspectives of both migrants 
and the families who employ them. It investigates the constellation of social, political and 
economic factors at the national and household levels that have fuelled the demand for domestic 
workers in Jordan. It also examines the factors compelling so many women to migrate to take up 
jobs in domestic service and explores the intimate yet highly unequal nature of their relations with 
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employers. In addressing these issues, the thesis considers the role played by the state in brokering 
labour for export and analyses the links between migration policies, guest worker programmes 
and contemporary forms of unfree labour. 
Much of the literature on labour migration has focussed on movement from less industrialised 
countries to Europe and North America. This attention does not reflect the fact that considerably 
more people move within so-called 'less developed' areas in what has been termed 'South-South' 
migration (Bakewe112009: 1). Within the so-called 'South', the Middle East ranks as one of the 
top destinations for labour migrants.! As of 2005, the UN estimated that one in every ten 
international migrants in the world was in the Arab region (Dito 2006: 2). In the 1950s and 1960s, 
labour migrants to the Gulf states were predominantly Arab. The 1973 oil boom marked the 
beginning of an unprecedented influx of workers to the region, and from then on the migrant 
workforce became increasingly Asian. The proportion of Arab workers in the Gulf workforce 
declined from 72 percent in 1975 to 32 percent in the early 2000s (Kapiszewski 2006: 7, 9). The 
tum to Asian labour was driven by the fact that they were considered less of a political threat to 
ruling families, were less expensive to employ, easier to dismiss and thought to be easier to 
manage (ibid: 6-7). By the end of 2004, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
hosted 12.5 million foreign workers, making up 37 percent of the total population (ibid: 2). The 
proportion of women among these migrants has increased in the last two decades, in large part as 
a result of the demand for domestic workers.2 Among women migrants, domestic work is the most 
important category of employment (Chammartin 2005). Accurate statistics for the number of 
migrant domestic workers in the region do not exist, but according to one source they make up as 
much as 20 per cent of the labour force, or 6 million people (ICFTU 2002: 2). 
The Gulf states remain the most frequent destinations, but demand for migrant domestic workers 
has escalated dramatically in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. From the palatial abodes of the 
ultra-rich to modest apartment blocks in middle-class neighbourhoods, domestic workers have 
become ubiquitous in the homes of Jordanian families. The government reports that 70,000 are 
employed in the kingdom (Hazaimeh 2010), though given that many enter through unofficial 
channels and stay beyond the legal residence period, the actual popUlation is much greater. Jordan 
is less wealthy than its oil-endowed neighbours and has traditionally been regarded as a labour­
sending country and home for Palestinian refugees rather than a destination for migrant workers. 
Given high rates of unemployment and poverty among its own citizens, the recruitment of large 
1 According to the World Bank Development Index 2005, the regions with the highest rates of net in­

migration are North America, Western Europe and the Middle East. Collectively, these three regions 

account for 79.5 percent of net migration globally (World mapper 2006). These figures include all those 

living outside of the countries in which they were born, including refugees. 

2 The feminisation of labour migration to the region has been well documented (Calandruccio 2005: 273, 

Eelens and Speckmann 1990: 300, Esim and Smith 2004: 4, Sabban 2002: 9). 
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numbers offoreign workers for 'low-skiIled' work is somewhat puzzling. But for reasons that will 
be explored in the thesis, the government has facilitated the recruitment of increasing numbers of 
Arab and Asian expatriates to work in agriculture, the garment industry, construction, and the 
service sector. Those employed in domestic service come from Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the 
Philippines and are geographically clustered in the capital city of Amman, with smaller numbers 
working in Irbid, Aqaba and other towns. 
Migrant domestic workers are hired as temporary 'guest' workers under the ka/ala (sponsorship) 
system, whereby they are dependent on local sponsors for their residence and work permits. The 
sponsor serves as the worker's guarantor and sole employer. The worker cannot change 
employers without the sponsor's consent, and the sponsor has the power to send the worker back 
to his or her country at any time. Within the administrative framework of the sponsorship system, 
workers are effectively bound to their employers for the terms of their service. Employers pay 
significant sums to recruit domestic workers from Sri Lanka. During the period of research, 
Jordanian employers paid a minimum of $2,000 in recruitment agency and government fees.3 This 
makes the situation akin to debt peonage in that the worker is expected to repay the debt with her 
labour. However, the money paid by employers goes to recruitment agencies rather than the 
worker, and workers themselves may also pay recruitment agencies or the 'sub-agents' who work 
with them in order to migrate. Moreover, the worker is obliged to work for far longer than would 
be required simply to recoup the costs of her recruitment. Wages vary, but most Sri Lankan 
domestic workers earn the equivalent of between $125 and 200 per month. Due to the expense of 
recruiting them, there is a great deal of insecurity on the part of employers that domestic workers 
will run away. To minimize this risk, workers' passports are confiscated on arrival. They are 
forbidden by the terms of their employment contracts from leaving their employers' homes 
without permission, and most are discouraged from communicating with anyone outside the 
employers' household. 
• 
At the risk ofover-generalisation, the study of the Arab world over the last three decades has been 
characterised by a great deal of interest in political and religious formations to the neglect of 
labour and employment. Although a substantial body of academic work has emerged concerning 
Asian labour migration to the region, much of it has focussed on the economic and social impact 
of remittances on migrants' own countries and has been based on migrants' accounts once they 
3 This is a significant sum in local terms. During the same period, the director of a public school in Amman 
earned 280 JD per month, or $400. Per capita GOP per month was 163 JO, or $230. 
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return home. Studies of Sri Lankan migration reflect this pattem.4 Of anthropological accounts of 
Sri Lankan migrants, Gamburd's work (2000, 2004, 2005, 2008a) is perhaps the best known and 
focuses on the impact of women's migration on gender relations, class and caste hierarchies in a 
village on Sri Lanka's western coast. In comparison, little long-term empirical research on the 
subject has been carried out in Arab host states.s This has meant that important dimensions of 
migrants' experiences have been neglected, and that less attention has been paid to the ways 
labour migration has shaped the social, economic and political contours of the Middle East. In 
short, the study ofmigration has been impoverished by a lack of research carried out in the region 
itself, and the implications of migratory patterns have been insufficiently examined. 
Of that which has been written about migrant domestic workers specifically, the dominant focus 
has been on exploitation and abuse (e.g. Esim and Smith 2004, Haddad 1999, Human Rights 
Watch 2007, Jureidini and Moukarbel 2004, McMurray 1999, Sabban 2002). The lens has begun 
to widen over the last five years, as an expanding number of scholars have documented other 
aspects oflife, ranging from workers' religious ideas and practices to issues surrounding sexuality 
and intimate relationships. This includes research in Bahrain (Nagy 2008), Kuwait (Ahmad 2010), 
Lebanon (Jureidini 2009, Moukarbel 2007, 2009, Smith 2010), Israel (Liebelt 2008a, 2008b, 
2009,2010), Saudi Arabia (Johnson 2010, Pingo12010) and Yemen (De Regt 2008, 2009). These 
contributions provide a more comprehensive understanding of workers' lives, allowing them to be 
seen as more than simply victims. However, studies of domestic service have continued to focus 
either on the workers' viewpoints or the employers' but seldom both within the same frame. In 
comparison to the many intricate studies of mistress-maid relations in other regions, notably Latin 
America and southern Africa, the literature on these relationships in Arab countries is scanty at 
best. 
This thesis is motivated by a desire to move beyond typically one-sided accounts by inquiring 
about the perspectives of both employers and domestic workers. The aim is to unsettle the good 
employerlbad employer dichotomy which is set up in the rights-based approach by examining the 
broader social and cultural processes underlying labour relations. This study was also driven by an 
aspiration to situate the realities of contemporary migration within wider political, economic and 
social dynamics in Arab host states. Jordan was a logical place in which to undertake research for 
several reasons, one of which was the paucity of existing scholarship. When I began the project, 
aside from several policy-oriented reports (e.g. Solidarity Centre 2005, UNIFEM 2000), only a 
4 Contributions in this vein include work by Brochmann (1993), GunatiIleke (1992, 1998), Korale (1986) 
and Thangarajah (2004). Spencer (2003: 15) has also made the point that studies of Gulf migration have 
focused on the effects on 'home' communities in Sri Lanka, with little evidence of life in the Middle East. 
5 There are, of course, exceptions, notably studies by Chalcraft on Syrians in Lebanon (2009), Gardner on 
Indians in Bahrain (2010), Longva on expatriates in Kuwait (1997), and Moukarbel on Sri Lankans in 
Lebanon (2007). On the whole, however, relatively few in-depth, community-based studies have been done 
on migrant workers in Arab countries. 
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few studies were available. These included a survey in Amman in 1982-3 by Humphrey (1991) 
and two unpublished studies in Arabic (Ayoub 1996, AI-Raqeb undated). Ethnographic accounts 
of consumption among Amman's upper classes (Beal 1998, 2000, 200 I) are curiously silent about 
domestic workers, mentioning them only in passing despite the fact that they are employed in 
most affluent households. Jordan also makes for an interesting case study because with few 
natural resources and no oil, it has been more economically homogenous than many of its 
neighbours (Wilson 1987: 55). The rapid increase in demand for servants is a relatively new 
phenomenon, marking the beginning of economic and social transformations resulting from the 
kingdom's growing integration with global capitalism. The institution of domestic service 
provides a window onto broader issues relating to class formation and the production of elite 
status. The decision to focus on Sri Lankans as opposed to other groups of workers was 
influenced by practical considerations. Filipinos and Sri Lankans have been migrating to Jordan in 
larger numbers for longer than Indonesians and, for reasons which remain unclear, tend to live 
separately from their employers and to work as 'freelancers' in greater numbers. This made them 
easier for me to meet. The choice also was influenced by the fact that less had been written about 
Sri Lankan migrants in comparison to the Filipino diaspora. 
The demand for domestic workers in Arab countries correlates with dramatic shifts in the Sri 
Lankan labour force. While working abroad was once primarily a male preserve, women migrants 
have outnumbered men since 1988.6 Domestic work is the largest category of employment for Sri 
Lankans employed overseas. Sri Lankan domestic workers had a comparative advantage in the 
Arab world because many other migrant sending states, including Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, 
have restricted female migration (Brochmann 1993: 64).7 Today approximately one third of all 
women in formal employment in Sri Lanka are domestic workers employed abroad, the vast 
majority of whom work in the Middle East.s Smaller numbers of men are also employed as 
6 Women represented 24 percent oftotal migrants from Sri Lanka in 1986-87 and increased from 55 percent 
in 1988 to 75 percent in 1997 (SLBFE 2009: ii). The proportion of women departing for work from Sri 
Lanka now appears to be declining. As of 2007, 61 percent of the total 1.6 million Sri Lankan expatriate 
workers were women (SLBFE 2007). In 2009, the figure dropped to 52 percent (SLBFE 2009: ii). 
7 Pakistan banned the migration of women domestic workers under the age of 45 in 1979; Bangladesh 
followed suit in 1983 (Shah et a11991: 483). India imposed a similar ban, allowing only women above the 
age of 30 to emigrate as maids (ibid). All three countries imposed minimum wage restrictions for domestic 
workers. Nepal banned women from going to many Arab countries in 1998, when a Nepalese domestic 
worker who had been abused in Kuwait committed suicide, triggering a national scandal. The ban was lifted 
in December 2010. 
8 As of2007, the total number of employed women was estimated at 2,388,807 (Department ofCensus and 
Statistics 2008a: Summary Statistics on Labour Force Statistics). In the same year, the total number of 
women employed as domestic workers overseas was 810,500 (SLBFE 2007: Estimated Stock ofSri Lankan 
Overseas Contract Workers by Manpower Levels and Sex 2007). 
14 
domestic workers overseas, although they are not represented by Sri Lankan government statistics 
because they usually travel on visas for other occupations.9 
Migrant remittances are the backbone of Sri Lanka's economy, exceeding tea and garments in 
their contribution to foreign exchange. Though the influx of foreign currency has been regarded as 
a boon to the Sri Lankan economy, at the individual level experiences vary greatly. As this thesis 
will describe, it should not be assumed that migrants are 'better oir as a result of going abroad. 
Though seen as an economic necessity, the social effects attributed to women's migration have 
become a national preoccupation, sparking heated debates. Some herald it as a vital income 
generator and potential source of female empowerment, but more common are criticisms that the 
lengthy absence of migrants traumatises the families left behind and threatens the fabric of Sri 
Lankan society. The departure of so many married women to work overseas and the reversal of 
gender roles implied when women become the primary breadwinners is said to precipitate 
infidelity, divorce, alcoholism and even suicide. Concerns about these issues are addressed in 
chapters 2 and 3. 
Research in Jordan and Sri Lanka 
I first became interested in this topic while living in Amman in 2000, when I rented a flat in a 
building owned by a landlord who employed a Sri Lankan domestic worker. She slept in a 
ramshackle structure on the roof amidst water tanks and clothing lines. Our exchanges piqued my 
curiosity about the growing number of migrants from Asian countries who were working in 
Jordan. Research was carried out in three phases over the course of two years from July 2006 until 
August 2008. The first phase was for one year in the Jordanian capital of Amman. This was 
followed by nine months in a village in western Sri Lanka, followed by a final three months in 
Amman. I also made two shorter trips between the two countries during this time. Although 
seemingly worlds apart, my two 'field' sites are in fact connected by migrants' trajectories. In the 
wake of George Marcus's (1995) influential treatise on multi-sitedness, scholars of migration 
have increasingly adopted transnational research methods; examples include Lindquist (20 I 0) on 
Indonesian migrants, Stoller (2002) on West African immigrant street vendors in New York City, 
and Smith (2006) on migration from Mexico to the United States. Critics have warned of the 
danger that such research can produce shallow, less nuanced or less intimate accounts because the 
ethnographer's time and efforts are spread over a wider space. I shared these concerns but decided 
that given that the experiences of the women I hoped to understand had been shaped by life in two 
places, my research should also be informed by first-hand knowledge of those places. Spending 
time with both employers and workers in the places they call home generated insights that could 
not have been produced otherwise. Being neither from Jordan nor Sri Lanka but having lived in 
9 For an account of Sri Lankan men employed as domestic workers in Italy, see Nare (2010). 
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both places meant that I was keenly aware of multiple levels of interpretation - and the potential 
for misunderstanding - in employer-domestic worker interactions. First-hand knowledge of the 
realities of life in Amman also offered a perspective on experiences that are often left out of 
migrants' accounts when they return to Sri Lanka. When visiting the homes of women who had 
returned, we could communicate in a language unknown to those around us. If anything, multi­
sited research enabled greater intimacy because it allowed me to share more points of reference 
with my interlocutors. 
The greatest challenge in carrying out research in Jordan was getting to know and spend sustained 
periods of time with domestic workers who are cloistered in their employers' homes. During my 
first month in Amman, a Jordanian friend arranged for me to reside temporarily with a family who 
employed a Sri Lankan domestic worker. This gave me an initial glimpse of the inner workings of 
a household and interactions between a domestic worker and various members of her employer's 
family. But when I moved into my own flat, I was at a loss for ways to meet more migrants. I 
struggled to make inroads until a friend mentioned having seen South Asian women outside one 
of the churches and suggested that I attend a service. I did so and learned that churches are central 
nodes of social life for Sri Lankans of various faiths. As I discovered, some employers allow 
domestic workers out of the house only to go to church. This is in part because it is assumed they 
will not get into 'trouble' there, 'trouble' being meeting boyfriends or nefarious characters who 
may tempt them to run away or organise robberies. Attending church allowed me to meet 
routinely with women who had busy schedules and limited freedom to move about the city. Most 
services are held on Friday, the Muslim holy day, and so I spent Friday mornings at Pentecostal 
church services and afternoons at Roman Catholic Masses conducted by a Sri Lankan priest. I 
also accompanied migrants on pilgrimages and attended social gatherings outside of church. In 
addition, I volunteered to teach English to a small group of migrants at an NGO and in this way 
gradually built up a network of contacts outside ofchurch. 
Early in the course of research in Amman I was fortunate to meet and befriend an older domestic 
worker named Lucy. She became my Sinhala instructor and conduit into a loose-knit community 
of women who lived separately from their employers. Having spent more than a decade in 
Amman, Lucy had many friends, and with her assistance I was able to get to know most of them. 
Although the practice is prohibited by the terms of their employment contracts, increasing 
numbers of women opt to live separately from their employers and work on a freelance basis, 
though doing so runs the risk of detention and deportation. For several months, Lucy and I met 
once or twice a week in the evenings after she had finished work. Together, we visited women 
who lived on their own and collected life histories from those who were willing to be interviewed. 
Given that many of these women did not have valid residence permits, it was my policy not to ask 
for their full names. My interest in domestic workers' perspectives seemed to be taken in and of 
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itself as a demonstration of solidarity. The fact that I had been to Sri Lanka and was studying 
Sinhala also helped establish rapport. 
My interlocutors were predominantly Sinhalese Buddhists and Catholics. The dozen or so women 
with whom I forged the closest relationships included both those who lived with their employers 
and those who lived independently. Those who were 'live-in' domestic workers tended to have 
better relationships with their employers and more freedom to socialise than is perhaps the nonn. 
In general, my interactions with workers who were not allowed outside were limited, so I tried to 
learn about their situations through other workers who had managed to speak with them. In a few 
cases I was able to obtain pennission from employers to speak with such workers, but unless we 
had a chance to talk in private and I thought they would not feel compromised, I refrained from 
asking questions about their working conditions. Research in Sri Lanka was critical in enabling 
me to get to know women who had not been allowed out of their employers' homes during their 
sojourns abroad. It also gave me the opportunity to meet women who had worked in other Arab 
countries. 
Establishing contact with Jordanian employers was more straightforward. The friendships I had 
maintained from my previous time in Amman facilitated introductions. I also expanded my 
contacts by joining a Jordanian women's social club which met on a weekly basis. At first I feared 
that employers would consider the topic of my research invasive and be reluctant to speak with 
me. To my surprise, this rarely turned out to be the case. The trials and tribulations of dealing with 
the 'hired help' is a perennial subject of discussion amongst Jordanian elites, and many employers 
were happy to share their experiences. Regrettably, there were only a handful of homes in which I 
knew and interacted regularly with both employer and domestic worker. More often than not I 
knew one better than the other. The social hierarchy is such that in most households, it would be 
awkward for me to communicate in an intimate and casual way with both the 'madame' and the 
'maid'. Socialising with domestic workers and their employers meant negotiating two separate yet 
inter-connected worlds, and moving between them could be awkward. My interactions with 
Subashini, a live-in domestic worker, provide an example. Subashini was extremely busy cooking 
and cleaning whenever her employers were at home, so she tended to invite me to visit when they 
were out. One day we sat chatting at the kitchen table at the back of the house when Subashini's 
employer returned home. She had not known I would be coming and seemed surprised by my 
presence. I suddenly felt like an intruder, and though she knew the topic of my research I sensed 
she thought it odd that I had befriended a woman who in her eyes was a servant. She encouraged 
me to move out of the kitchen into the more fonnal living room, where she said I would be more 
comfortable. In fact I found this room far less comfortable, as it is carefully preserved to receive 
guests, and given the politics of space, was not a place in which Subashini felt free to sit and chat 
with me. However well-intentioned it may have been, the employer's intervention ruptured the 
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sense of intimacy that had emerged in our exchanges in the less formal atmosphere of the kitchen. 
On another occasion, I was invited to a dinner party by the employer of Rani, a Sri Lankan 
woman I knew from church. Sitting idly at the dining table while Rani served the guests felt like a 
betrayal, but leaving the party to join her in the kitchen would have raised eyebrows. In cases in 
which employers and the women who worked for them had congenial relations, I could socialise 
with both parties with ease. But more often than not, the social gulf that divided them meant that 
it was more feasible for me to cultivate separate spheres of contacts - one with Jordanians, and 
another with Sri Lankans. This created a limitation in that it meant I had privileged access to 
either the employer's perspective or the worker's but rarely both within the same house. But it 
had the advantage of reducing the likelihood that I would be drawn into disputes between the two 
parties. Disputes were not infrequent. On one occasion, for example, a domestic worker had 
become pregnant out of wedlock and her employer, knowing I spoke with her regularly, 
questioned me about who the father was and how she had met him. I responded with feigned 
ignorance. While perhaps less than ideal from a research perspective, the fact that my research 
contacts tended to be bifurcated meant that I could avoid situations that might compromise my 
own position and, more importantly, that of the worker. 
Research involved un-structured and semi-structured, in-depth interviews with employers and 
domestic workers. Individual migration histories were elicited from migrants in order to gain a 
deeper sense of their lives prior to departure, motivations for migrating, experiences in Jordan, 
and aspirations for the future. Interviews were also conducted with recruitment agencies, embassy 
staff, labour ministry officials, lawyers, and staff at non-governmental organisations. Most of my 
time, however, was spent doing participant observation, which in this case consisted of house 
visits, sharing meals, attending social gatherings, and generally passing time with people in their 
homes as regularly as possible. Employers and domestic workers confided to me about their 
private lives and difficulties, and in order to protect their privacy and honour their trust I have 
changed their names. In the case of migrants, I have avoided specific reference to their home 
towns to prevent identification. Place names have not been changed. 
During the Sri Lankan phase of the research, I resided in the village of Watinapaha with the 
family of Soma, a woman I had met in Jordan. When I was preparing to leave Jordan to conduct 
research in Sri Lanka, Soma arranged for me to meet her daughter Malini, who had also 
previously worked in Jordan. I eventually chose Watinapaha as a base for my research because of 
its location in Gampaha District, which had the second-highest recorded departures of women 
migrants in the country, and because of its location an hour and a half outside of the capital, 
Colombo, which meant I could easily reach the homes of other women I'd come to know in 
Jordan, most of whom were from the greater Colombo area. Equally if not more important was 
the fact that I quickly established friendly rapport with Malini and her siblings. Two of Soma's 
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children had migrated abroad and two had not; living with them introduced me to both 
perspectives. Although I slept in Soma's house, I ate meals and spent most evenings next door 
where Malini's sister Jeevani, a nurse and mother of three, lived together with her family. Mid­
way through my stay in Watinapaha. Soma's son Tissa returned after a stint working on an 
American military base in Iraq and joined me and Malini in Soma's house. Soma herself then 
returned after nearly two decades abroad. My relationship with her family has influenced my 
analysis, and my understanding of village life is largely informed by the time I spent in 
Watinapaha. 
I carried out interviews, observed and took part in daily activities, rituals, festivals and family 
gatherings in Watinapaha as well as the neighbouring village of Nilpanagoda. Nilpanagoda was 
selected because it had a relatively high concentration of women migrants according to the 2001 
Housing and Population Census, whereas Watinapaha had an unusually low number. Out of a 
population of 1,003 people, there were reportedly only 8 migrants (5 men, 3 women). The 
Watinapaha Grama Sevaka (local level village administrator) told me he carried out his own 
census of the village and counted 11 former and current migrants. Given that within a few weeks I 
had been introduced to five women from Watinapaha who had migrated, I was sceptical of the 
validity of the statistics. Nevertheless, I chose to collect data in Nilpanagoda in addition to 
Watinapaha because of its higher reported percentage of migrants, and because Malini's family 
had kin links there that would facilitate the research. In addition to fieldwork in the two villages, I 
also travelled to other parts of the island to visit returnees and migrants' families. I gained 
introductions to women who had worked abroad from other migrants and collected their life 
histories and accounts of migration. Less easy to learn about were the perspectives of husbands 
who stay behind. While I have tried to present the views of those who migrated as well as those 
who did not, the women I knew best had themselves been migrants, and my account is in this way 
biased. For an account of men's perspectives on the social effects of women's migration, see 
Widger (2009: Chapter 7). 
One of the aims of the research was to better understand the role of the Sri Lankan state in relation 
to women's migration. Since the 1980s, the Sri Lankan government has promoted women's 
migration for domestic work in the Middle East by training potential recruits in pre-departure 
courses. The training is intended to equip women from rural areas with the skills necessary to 
work in 'modern', affluent households abroad. The training has been compulsory for all women 
migrating overseas as domestic workers since 1996, and more than 30,000 women complete the 
course each year. I attended a 13-day housemaid training course at the Sri Lankan Bureau of 
Foreign Employment's main training facility in Colombo. I interviewed training centre staff and, 
with the help of a research assistant, carried out interviews with 245 women attending housemaid 
training programmes at several other facilities throughout the island. The findings of these 
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interviews are discussed in chapter 2. I also collected statistical and other material from 
government institutions, including the Bureau of Foreign Employment and the Department of 
Census and Statistics. 
During formal interviews, I took notes and tried to record quotes verbatim as often as possible. In 
casual conversations and during social visits or outings, I waited until I was alone to type up 
recollections of what had been said or done. In instances in which interviewees agreed and did not 
seem put ofT by the presence of a tape recorder, I recorded formal interviews so that I could re­
play them later and check exact phrases. Conversations with Jordanians were held in Arabic or 
English. I had studied Arabic for more than four years prior to beginning the research and 
continued with private lessons throughout my time in Amman. I had only a minimal knowledge of 
Sinhala when I began the research and took lessons from a domestic worker throughout the first 
year of fieldwork. Although my comprehension was far from optimal my fledgling Sinhala 
produced amused smiles and helped break the ice when I met migrants for the first time. Most of 
the domestic workers I encountered spoke either Arabic or English, and so we spoke in those 
languages or in some cases a mixture of Arabic, English and Sinhala. I initially relied on the 
assistance of a Sri Lankan interpreter in Amman in instances in which migrants spoke neither 
Arabic nor English. This was not ideal, as a fear of judgement and gossip amongst fellow 
migrants sometimes created a hindrance, and so I tried to avoid involving a third person whenever 
possible. I later gained a firmer grasp of Sinhala grammar and structure in Sri Lanka, where I 
enrolled in formal classes with a language instructor. My own struggle to communicate and 
understand the cultural nuances of two different languages over the course of the research was 
productive because it mirrored, and hence helped me to better appreciate, the daily difficulties 
experienced by Sri Lankan workers and their Jordanian employers as they endeavour to make 
themselves understood. 
The role of emotion is often left out of accounts of research methods, but if the production of 
ethnographic knowledge is an embodied process, it is worth mentioning the way I inhabited my 
role as a researcher. Many domestic workers have positive relationships with their employers, but 
I also encountered cases of cruel physical abuse, and even more instances of women being held 
captive or not being paid for their work. I struggled to square the generosity, warmth and 
hospitality I so often encountered among Jordanian hosts with the inhospitable treatment 
experienced by some of my Sri Lankan interlocutors. When faced with instances of mistreatment, 
I could not help but share the anger and sadness expressed by the workers. At times, I was even 
more outraged than they were. This posed a predicament: how could I be both angry and 
objective? The emotions could be overwhelming, yet I also felt compelled to distance myself in 
order to maintain an analytical perspective and adequately explain the perspectives of workers and 
employers. The need to make both characters part of the story may seem obvious but is something 
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few accounts of contemporary domestic service have managed to do. The ambivalence I felt is 
part and parcel of participant observation, something Hage calls 'ethnographic vacillation', the 
dialectic between emotional and analytical domains, between 'being part of and not being part of' 
the worlds we study (Hage 2009: 76). One of the challenges of fieldwork was managing this 
dialectic and trying not to allow my own feelings to impede my ability to understand complex 
social interactions. This did not mean that I tried to be dispassionate. But while at times I shared 
the emotional states of my interlocutors, at others repressing my own response was key. When 
encountering attitudes and practices I disagreed with - particularly those involving treatment that, 
to me, seemed inhumane - I was not always entirely forthcoming with employers about my own 
opinions. I did not, however, remain passive if asked for help by someone who needed it urgently. 
At times I stopped being an 'observer' and participated directly, for example accompanying 
migrants to the Sri Lankan embassy in the hopes that their cases would be dealt with in a more 
timely manner, or putting them in touch with lawyers and NGOs who were better positioned to 
help them. These engagements, too, played a role in the research by giving me insights into the 
limited means of redress available to migrant workers. 
Map of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 poses the question of what has compelled so many Sri Lankan women to seek jobs as 
domestic workers in Arab countries? To address this, I interpret migration in light of the wider 
political economy, considering resources and their use, economic opportunities and the lack 
thereof, and power relations at various levels, from the household up to the nation state. The 
chapter discusses the structure in which Sri Lankan state policies, particularly post-1977 
economic reforms and military expenditures, have fuelled migration. It also present a finer­
grained analysis of the various factors influencing individuals' decisions about migration given 
the available options. Labour migration from 'poor' countries is often perceived to be the result of 
poverty, but a mixture of social and cultural factors coupled with economic need influence 
decisions about going abroad. Drawing on individual accounts, this chapter describes the goals, 
intentions and expectations of those who migrate and those who stay put. 
Chapter 3 looks at the role played by the Sri Lankan state in encouraging out-migration through 
pre-departure training programmes for domestic workers. The focus of the thesis then shifts to 
Jordan. Following on from the analysis of political economy in the migrant-sending context, 
chapter 4 analyses the nature and structure of demand for migrant workers in Jordan. Why does 
this small, oil-poor kingdom with high rates of unemployment and poverty among its own 
workforce recruit such large numbers of workers from other countries? The chapter explores the 
interplay of social, political and economic factors fuelling demand for foreign workers. The 
discussion then turns specifically to domestic workers and why they have become ubiquitous in 
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the homes of the wealthy. In addressing this, the household and the labour needed to sustain it are 
considered in relation to class differentiation, state policies and Jordan's wider economy. The aim 
in this chapter on the demand for labour, as with chapter 2 on the supply, is to use ethnography to 
bring culture and political economy together. 
The latter sections of the thesis address migrants' working conditions and experiences in Jordan. 
Chapter 5 deals with the legal and administrative framework of the kafala system through which 
guest workers are recruited and bound to their employers. It is motivated by three guiding 
questions: First, how did the kafala system in its contemporary fonn come about? Second, what 
are the contractual terms governing relations between employers and migrant domestic workers? 
And third, as a corollary to this, what do these tenns mean in practice? How are they enforced, 
and what happens when the bond between worker and employer is broken? 
The law, itself the result of social, political and economic processes, is only one of several 
nonnative frameworks governing relations between domestic workers and their employers. 
Chapter 6 moves on to consider the social and cultural nonns and practices governing employer­
domestic worker relations in everyday life. While in some cases they are able to forge 
hannonious, mutually-beneficial relationships, the road is bumpy and conflict-ridden, and in 
many cases the household becomes a battlefield. This chapter investigates why this is so often the 
case by exploring the contradictions inherent to domestic worker-employer relations. 
Chapters 7 and 8 take as their starting point migrants' experiences beyond their working lives. 
While there has been ample research on religion in general and Islam in particular in the Middle 
East, the role of religion and spirituality in the study of migrant domestic workers in this region 
has attracted less scholarly attention. As a minority in a predominantly Muslim country, Buddhist 
migrants lack many of the supernatural and social resources they would otherwise tap into in 
times of need. But as chapter 7 illustrates, this does not mean they forgo ritual activities. Indeed 
for many migrants, the need to access the sacred may be heightened as they encounter trials away 
from home. This chapter shows how ritual practice and participation in faith-based groups play 
important roles, both moral and material, for Sri Lankans in the diaspora. 
Chapter 8, the final ethnographic chapter, looks at the long-tenn consequences of migration. 
Much of the academic and policy-oriented literature assumes that individuals benefit from 
working abroad without considering migrants' own perspectives on the matter. This chapter 
brings their views into focus by posing questions about how they judge the material, social and 
emotional implications of their sojourns. The reflections of four women who have spent 
substantial amounts of time abroad are used to illustrate the contradictions and ambiguities that 
arise in relation to this question. By way of concluding, I return to the central issue of labour 
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relations and the position of migrant workers in Jordan and discuss how their status may be 
understood analytically. 
Transliteration, Terminology and Currency 
I have adopted the system of Arabic transliteration found in the International Journal ofMiddle 
Eastern Studies (IJMES). Diacritics have been left out. Place names and proper nouns in Arabic 
and Sinhala are written as they usually appear in English. 
Permanent residents of Jordan may identify themselves as Jordanian and/or Palestinian depending 
on the context and whether they trace their roots to the western or eastern banks of the Jordan 
River. I appreciate the historical and political implications of the distinction, but for the sake of 
simplicity I have used the term'Jordanian' to refer to both groups of residents. 
Financial costs are given in the original currency, either Jordanian dinars (JD) or Sri Lankan 
rupees (Rs), along with the US dollar ($) equivalent according to exchange rates at the time. US 
dollars are used because the Jordanian dinar and Sri Lankan rupee are pegged to the dollar, and 
migrants often refer to amounts in dollars. 
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The Political Economy ofMigration from Sri Lanka 
Growing up on Beach Road in the seaside town of Halawata, Nira enjoyed a comfortable 
childhood. Her father and aunt (FZ) owned a thriving prawn farm. As a teenager, she fell in love 
with her massina (male cross-cousin, FZS), Kapila. It was assumed they would marry, at which 
time Nira's father would transfer his share of the prawn business to Kapila's family as a dowry. 
Nira's future seemed secure. 
I first met Nira at a pre-departure training facility for migrants, and she told me why she had 
decided to go abroad. She began her account with the first of her regrets: neglecting her 
education. She had been a clever student and excelled in school. But as her Advanced Level 
exams approached, Kapila urged her not to study, fearing that if she did well, she would go to 
university and leave him behind. Nira conceded and did not sit for the exams. Not long 
afterwards, a disease struck the prawn farm, wiping out the crop and, with it, their livelihood. A 
family feud erupted; given the changed financial circumstances, her aunt opposed the marriage. 
Unable to bear being apart, Nira and Kapila eloped and started a family of their own. But their 
relationship soon soured. 
Nira's father had built a house for her before her marriage to Kapila. But when the prawn business 
faltered, he mortgaged it without her knowing. Years later, when Nira received a notice from the 
bank that the house was due to be auctioned, she borrowed 20 Lakh ($20,725) from three sources 
to buy it back. to Although by that time she was married to Kapila, she said he did not lift a finger 
to help her collect the money. Nevertheless after purchasing the house she agreed to transfer 
ownership to Kapila to spare him embarrassment should people discover he was living in his 
wife's family's home. This, she said, was her second mistake. 
In an attempt to payoff the debt, Nira worked selling dried fish, but without Kapila's help she 
could not earn enough. According to Nira, Kapila lacked the drive to work. At the age of 16, he 
had gone to Korea for three years, where he earned good money but also acquired a drinking 
habit. After they married, Kapila spent a second stint working abroad, this time with his brother in 
Japan. But he sent no money home to Nira and their children and returned empty-handed after six 
months. Since that time, he had not found ajob because he refused to work under someone else's 
10 One lakh equals 100,000 rupees. The sale took place sometime in 2003, when the average annual 
exchange rate was 1 USD = 96.5 LKR. 
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supervision. I I He had a wild temper when under the influence of alcohol, and his reputation as a 
tippler made it even harder for him to find work. Kapila racked up his own debts on top of the 
money Nira owed for the house, and she feared he would sell their home to pay his creditors. 
Desperate to avoid homelessness and fed up with Kapila's inaction, Nira decided to go abroad 
herself. Kapila objected and, in fighting with her over the matter, beat her so badly that she was 
hospitalised on two occasions. Nira stood firm, resolved that it would be her only chance to save 
their home. While her chief goal in going abroad was financial, an added benefit would be 
escaping Kapila. She had grown to loathe him but feared she would be unable to raise their 
children alone and so would not divorce him. Nira explained, 'I can find a man [spouse]. But I 
cannot find another father for my children.' 
Nira's story may appear unique, but many of the themes it conveys, including her sense of 
desperation, lack of options and hope that migration would provide a solution, are far from 
unusual. Nira was one of more than 100,000 Sri Lankan women to go abroad to work as domestic 
workers in 2007. Sri Lanka's migrant domestic workers number over 800,000 and comprise half 
of the total 1.7 million Sri Lankans working overseas. 12 These figures have earned the country a 
reputation for being a 'nation of housemaids,.13 Why is it such a significant supplier of domestic 
labour for Arab countries? What has compelled so many women to seek menial jobs abroad? 
These issues are the subject of this chapter. 
Theorising Migration: Towards a Return to Political Economy 
The question of what propels people to migrate has been well-trodden theoretical terrain. 
Neoclassical theories and push-pull models emphasise the rational, self-interested strategies of 
individuals migrating in response to inequalities in wages and living standards (e.g. Harris and 
Todaro 1970, Todaro 1969). Critics of such approaches note that while most migrants leave their 
homes voluntarily, to view migration as a result of individual choice obscures the wider national 
and international socio-economic forces by which their choices are constrained. These concerns 
are addressed in Marxist approaches, including dependency theory, which highlight the structural 
determinants of migrants' choices as a result of global inequalities in the distribution of resources 
(Truong 2000: 69). Dependency theory locates migration within a more generalised extraction of 
surplus from the less developed periphery to the more industrialised core, enabling an ever­
increasing exploitation of less developed regions. Although jettisoned by some for its failure to 
11 Her words were: 'Eyata rassawak karanna uwamanawak neha. Kawruwath yatahe weda karanna 
kemathi ne.' [He has no desire to work. He doesn't want to work under someone.] 
12 According to the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment (2007), the estimated stock of housemaids 
employed overseas in 2007 was 810,500, al\ of whom were women. 
\3 Sri Lanka was referred to in this way in an article by Ameen Izzadeen in the Khaleej Times entitled 'Why 
Sri Lankans are shaken by the war on Lebanon' (July 18, 2006) and as a 'country of housemaids' in an 
article by Amy Waldman in the New York Times entitled 'Sri Lankan maids pay dearly for perilous jobs 
overseas' (May 8, 2005). 
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account for nuanced political, economic and social differences at the local level (Kearney 1986: 
339), and for viewing 'migrants not as active agents but as passive reactors manipulated by the 
world capitalist system' (Brettell 2000: 104), the attention such analyses devote to the ways 
economic disparities are perpetuated by flows of resources and people has remained influential. 
Another approach - the modes of production theory - refutes dependency theory's insistence on a 
single global capitalist system. Instead, it proposes that rather than replacing non-capitalist modes 
of production, capitalism has fed off them (Kearney 1986: 342). It suggests that in order to 
understand the accumulation of surplus value, one must study not only the exchange of goods and 
services but also the systems that produce and reproduce labour (Kearney 1986: 342). One of the 
most provocative contributors in this vein is the French anthropologist Claude Meillassoux. 
Meillassoux criticised dependency theorists such as Samir Amin for seeking to understand under­
development strictly in terms of unequal economic exchange, thereby ignoring the political and 
social conditions perpetuating the domestic reproduction of labour (1981: 93). In Meillassoux's 
conception, capitalism derives profit from circular labour migration by paying migrant workers 
from non-industrialised areas hourly wages that do not cover the cost of maintaining and 
reproducing labour (1981: 101). These costs are absorbed by the workers' domestic community, 
particularly through the institution of the family, to which workers inevitably return in old age or 
in the event of infirmity or job loss. Thus, non-capitalist modes of production in the domestic 
community not only survive but are perpetuated by, and also degraded by, capitalism. 
An engagement with questions of economic production and capitalist exploitation in migrant­
sending and receiving countries continues to guide anthropological thinking about labour 
migration. One example is Ballard's work (1987), which situates migration from northern Pakistan 
to the UK and Middle East within a broader context of political and economic developments and 
considers the crucial yet often overlooked role of the state. In spite of migrants' best efforts, 
Ballard writes, their overseas work has had mostly negative long-term consequences at home: rises 
in wages and expectations, a depression in agricultural activity, over-dependence on remittances 
and little 'productive' investment in infrastructure and industry (1987: 34-35). Ballard presents a 
convincing account of the role of the state in facilitating migration and, in so doing, transferring 
resources from rural to urban areas. The Pakistani state promotes out-migration because it 
provides a chief source of foreign exchange (1987: 37). But because the proceeds are not 
reinvested in basic public goods and services in the rural and politically marginal areas from which 
migrants originate, migrant-sending communities have reaped few long-term benefits. The 
availability of foreign exchange serves the interests of urban elites by enabling the easy import of 
luxury goods, of which they are the biggest consumers. As Ballard writes, 'It is only when placed 
in this very broad context that the full extent of the exploitation to which overseas migrants may 
be subjected, often by means of the hidden transfer of resources, begins to emerge' (1987: 37). 
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Despite such contributions, an analytical tendency privileging individual choice persists in both 
policy-oriented reports and academic studies of migration. One example is research on the role of 
networks in migrants' decision-making processes. In one study, Winters et a!. (2001) analyse the 
role played by family and community-based networks in encouraging Mexico-US migration. They 
conclude that migrant networks playa prime causal role in increasing the propensity to emigrate 
(2001: 181-182). Absent are considerations of inequalities between the United States and Mexico. 
While the authors explicitly endeavour to move beyond neoclassical approaches (Winters et al 
2001: 159-160), the model they put forth suffers from some of the same problems - emphasising 
rational choice while obscuring the macro-level context. Another example is a survey-based study 
by De Jong (2000) suggesting that individual expectations and family norms are 'major predictors' 
of migration. De Jong presents 'empirical evidence that intentions, expectations, norms and gender 
roles are key elements inside the "black box" of migration decision making' (2000: 318). I do not 
dispute the proposal that these elements playa role; indeed many of them are described in my 
account of Sri Lankan migration below. What I contest is analyses of migration that take as their 
starting point a 'black box' devoid of wider political and economic constraints. 14 Data at the level 
of the individual, household and community are clearly needed to explain who decides to move 
and where. But sociological explanations prioritising individual or household-level agency risk de­
politicising and de-historicising our understanding of migration. Such approaches result in a view 
of migration as spontaneous and self-prompted, a perspective that fits neatly alongside restrictive 
immigration regimes that portray people on the move as 'problems' and skirt questions of global 
inequality and exploitation. IS 
There are important analytical reasons, then, for maintaining a broader perspective on the field in 
which migration occurs. With this in mind, this chapter seeks first to interpret migration in light of 
the wider political economy. It considers resources and their use, economic opportunities and the 
lack thereof, and power relations at various levels, from the household up to the nation state. In 
particular, it discusses the structure in which state policies, particularly post-1977 economic 
reforms and spending on the conflict, have fuelled migration. Recognising that political economy 
alone does not explain who migrates and who does not and how flesh and blood individuals fare 
when they venture abroad, this chapter also presents a finer-grained analysis of the social and 
cultural factors influencing decisions about migration. Drawing on individual accounts, it 
describes the goals, intentions and expectations of those who migrate and those who choose not to. 
It considers how women frame the decision to leave home in terms of social relations and 
14 More recent literature on migration has suggested that, rather than individuals, it is 'households 

themselves that are the decision-making agents behind this economic calculus' (Stecklov et al 2008). Again, 

such approaches result in too narrow a view. 

IS This point is made by Chalcraft, who has written that migrant-centred accounts of migration have over­

emphasised agency while effacing structures of power, inequality and coercion (2009: 2, 221). 
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conceptions of the person. Moreover, it shows how for most women, migration is viewed as a 
means to fulfil, or more rarely to evade, obligations to family. 
Post-Independence Economic Policies 
While rice had historically been the lifeblood of pre-colonial Sri Lankan society, under British rule 
(1796-1948) commercial agriculture was encouraged through the profitable export of tea, rubber, 
coconut, cinnamon and coffee, and rice was imported from India and Burma (Wickramasinghe 
2006: 303).16 The economy fared well when market prices were high but was battered when they 
dropped, as has often been the case since the 1950s. Towards the end of British rule and after 
independence, policies aimed at supporting the Sinhalese 'sons of the soil' boosted paddy 
cultivation (Wickramasinghe 2006: 304). This continued in the 1950s and 60s, and the new Sri 
Lankan state pursued a welfare-oriented agenda through import substitution and the provision of 
free education, health services, and subsidies on food and other consumer goods. But the slow­
growing economy was unable to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding population. l7 
Unemployment was rife, particularly among the youth. 18 The era of welfare statism officially came 
to an end with the 1977 elections, a watershed moment in Sri Lankan history. The left-leaning Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party-led government was ousted by the United National Party (UNP), ushering in 
a period of economic liberalisation, foreign investment and loans. Imports were liberalised, 
industries privati sed, and free trade zones were set Up.19 As Spencer describes, under the new UNP 
government, "'Development" and the "open economy" replaced the "socialism" and "self­
sufficiency" of the previous government's rhetoric' (1990: 1 0). 
While agricultural production has remained a major source of employment, the post-1977 period 
witnessed an increased reliance on waged labour?O In addition to tea production, two main sources 
16 At independence in 1948, Sri Lanka was more prosperous than many of its neighbours and had relatively 
high standards of living (Abeyratne 2004: 1297). 
17 The extensive welfare system boosted the country's population, which nearly doubled from 7.S million in 
1950 to 14.7 million in 1980 (Abeyratne 2004: 1301). As of 2008, the total population was estimated at 
19.4 million. 
18 This gave rise to the failed Marxist youth rebellion led by the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) in 1971. 
On the economic roots of political and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, and their relation to militant Sinhala 
youth struggles and the growth of the Tamil separatist movement, see Abeyratne (2004). Tambiah (1992) 
also describes how welfare state policies and the promise of social mobility produced disappointment and 
resentment that helped fuel both the JVP riots and the Tamil insurgency. According to Tambiah, these 
problems were exacerbated by the country's limited industrial base and have helped fuel the ethnic conflict, 
which has in turn further compromised economic growth. 
19 These policies were not uncontested and kicked off Marxist insurrections in the late 1970s and 1980s 
(Wickramasinghe 2006: 302). While the welfare state was effectively dismantled under the new UNP 
government, cracks in the system had begun to appear earlier, and due to an overstretched budget, cuts in 
welfare spending and food subsidies started as early as 1972 (Wickramasinghe 2006: 305-6). 
20 An ethnographic illustration of this trend is providcd in Spencer's account (1990) of a village in 
Ratnapura District based on fieldwork from 1982 to 1984. He shows how in place of paddy and chena 
(slash-and-burn) cultivation, greater numbers of villagers had begun earning livelihoods from cash­
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of employment were promoted to tackle poverty in rural areas - the garment industry, and foreign 
employment. In 1978, a predominantly female labour force was recruited for Sri Lanka's first Free 
Trade Zone, in Katunayake (Lynch 2007: 23, 61). In the subsequent two decades, incentives were 
offered to private entrepreneurs to set up export-oriented garment factories in villages throughout 
the island. These initiatives, namely Premadasa's "200 Factories Programme", which set up 
factories in rural areas, were geared towards encouraging investment and job creation in the areas 
hit hardest by poverty and, in so doing, heading off political unrest (Lynch 2007). Women 
comprised 90 percent of the workforce in the factories (ibid: 31). 
Large-scale migration from Sri Lanka to Arab countries also began in the late 1970s and increased 
throughout the 1980s and 90s. This was part of a deliberate strategy promoted by the government 
to alleviate poverty and reduce unemployment. The rupee was steeply devalued, controls on travel 
were loosened, and workers earning money abroad were entitled to tax-free interest on foreign 
currency accounts (Gunati11eke 1998: 72). Overseas employment has also been promoted as a 
strategy to generate access to hard currency. In 2009, migrant remittances totalled $3.33 billion, 
which was enough to offset the country's $3.12 billion trade deficit. Remittances now exceed 
export earnings from tea, rubber and all agricultural exports combined and surpass earnings from 
the main industrial export, garments (Sanderatne 2011). 
The potential for migration has been heightened by worsening economic conditions. While it is 
clear that unemployment and deprivation were problems before the introduction of market 
liberalism in 1977, there is ample evidence to suggest that liberal economic policies have hit the 
poorer segments of the population particularly hard, reducing caloric intake and increasing levels 
of malnutrition. These effects have yet to be offset by increases in manufacturing (Jayaweera 
2002, as cited by Wickramasinghe 2006: 315)?1 In 2008, Sri Lanka's rate of inflation hit an 18­
year peak, at 28 percent, the highest in Asia at the time. This was at least in part the result of the 
global surge in food and fuel prices at the time. As of June of that year, consumer prices in 
Colombo had risen by 28.2 percent from the previous year, bus fares were up 27 percent, and train 
fares had almost doubled (Ondaatjie 2008). Many families struggled to cope with soaring food 
costs. According to a report released in 2008 by the Department of Census and Statistics, only half 
of the country's 20 million people were receiving the minimum daily calorie intake of 2,030 kcal 
(Fernando 2008). These factors have encouraged many to look for work overseas. 
cropping, casual labour (e.g. in the gem fields and road gangs), carpentry, masonry and small businesses 
(Spencer 1990: 115). 
21 The Economist estimated that 52 percent of the population, including 88 percent of all people in rural 
areas, earned less than $2 per day as of 1995 (Economist 2007). The key factors contributing to poverty in 
rural areas were reportedly the declining value of agricultural exports and a lack of investment in 
infrastructure, chiefly roads, electricity, communications and irrigation (Economist 2007). 
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Another crucial element is the fact that Sri Lanka was at war for nearly three decades. In 2000, 
spending on the armed services accounted for 5.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 40 
percent of all government expenditure (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2001: 311 ).22 Spending on the 
military has eaten up funds that could otherwise have been used for investments in infrastructure. 
The loss of life and effects of violence and fear have further contributed to the sagging economy. 
Sri Lanka's civil war not only fuelled migration but was also fuelled by it. The remittances 
migrants have sent home over the past two decades helped sustain the government's massive 
military expenditures. While there has long been concern about the role of the Tamil diaspora in 
channelling resources to the L TIE, the indirect support overseas migrants have provided to the Sri 
Lankan government's fight against the Tamil Tigers is less obvious although no less real. Sri 
Lanka's conflict has at least in part been fought on the backs ofmigrant domestic workers. 
To payoff its war bill, the government has taken on increasing debt from foreign sources, and in 
2009 it limped back to the International Monetary Fund (lMF) for a bailout worth $1.9 billion. The 
main sources of foreign exchange - migrant remittances, garment and tea exports - play an 
important role in helping the country payoff this debt. Women make up 75-85 percent of the tea 
picking workforce (McLennan 2011),90 percent of garment factory workers (Lynch 2007: 31), 
and 52 percent of overseas migrants (SLBFE 2009: ii). While women have always been 
economically active in Sri Lanka, reforms initiated in the 1970s have mobilised them for waged 
work to an unprecedented degree. The ways in which these national trends have reverberated 
through Sri Lankan society to the village and household levels will be outlined in the following 
pages. 
Local Livelihood Prospects 
With reference to the villages ofWatinapaha and Nilpanagoda, this section provides an example of 
local employment prospects?3 Watinapaha and Nilpanagoda lie several kilometers outside of 
Minuwangoda town in Gampaha District. Their residential areas are interlaced with bits of jungle, 
paddy fields, vegetable plots and pineapple groves. They are located within Sri Lanka's 'coconut 
triangle', a lush, wet lowland portion of Western Sri Lanka named for its high yield of coconuts. 
Different varieties of coconut are processed for their meat, oil, and fibrous exteriors, which are 
used to make coir ropes, mats, brooms and other items. 
22 Sri Lanka's military expenditures were higher than those of other South Asian countries. According to 
data from the Stockholm International Peace Peace Research Institute, military expenditures as a percent of 
GOP in 2000 were 3.1 in India, 4 in Pakistan and 1.4 in Bangladesh. For a discussion of the defense budget 
and expansion of the armed forces in Sri Lanka in the 1980s and 1990s, see Wickramasinghe (2006: 316­
317). 
23 With the exception of a small number of Christians, residents of Watinapaha and Nilpanagoda are 
predominantly Sinhala Buddhists. 
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Figure I: Coir processing in Nilpanagoda (All photographs by the author) 
Local men work in agriculture (specificalIy paddy and bulaat, or betel leaves), daily manual 
labour (kuli wada), the coconut fibre industry, glass fibre-board companies, military service or 
government jobs. Many also migrate abroad for work. Women also work in agriculture and the 
coconut fibre industry?4 Watinapaha and Nilpanagoda are located within easy commuting distance 
of Katunayake Free Trade Zone, and many women were employed there or in garment factories in 
surrounding areas. Others worked as local school teachers or government employees. 
Homes vary greatly; some, 
particularly those of more 
prosperous families, are one or 
two-story brick or cement 
structures with tile roofs and 
broad verandas, while others are 
made of mud and thatched 
roofing or corrugated metal 
sheets. The house in which I 
stayed (left) is typical of most in 
the vilIage - a single-story 
Figure 2: House in Watinapaha cement and tile roof structure, 
24 Coconut fibre processing is arduous; men do much of mechanised work in mills and dig and maintain the 
pits in which coconuts are soaked to loosen the fibre, while most of the work drying and weaving the fibres 
is performed by women. The division of labour and working conditions in this industry have been described 
in Risseeuw's monograph (1988) of women coir workers on the south-west coast. 
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with a neatly-swept garden in the front, and pepper vines, mango and cashew-nut trees growing in 
back. 
Most households cobble together income from a variety of sources. During the period of research, 
a male day labourer could expect to earn 300 - 400 Rs ($2.72) for a day's work. A nursery school 
teacher earned 3,500 Rs ($32) per month, while women in garment factories earned roughly 6,000 
Rs ($55) per month.2s Those working in garment factories often spend significant amounts of time 
and money commuting to and from work. In contrast, women who migrate to work as domestic 
workers in Jordan could expect to earn $125 to 200 per month. If they live with their employers, 
they can save money that would otherwise be spent on their own daily subsistence. They are lured 
overseas not just by the pay-packet promised but the ability to save more of their earnings. 
The Division of Labour 
The dominant division of labour in Sri Lanka places men in the position of earning money and 
women in the role of budgeting and spending on food and other family necessities and doing the 
physical work to maintain the household. Women exercise significant control over household 
finances.26 While the normative structure implies that men are responsible for income-earning and 
women for the management and care of household members, in practice this division is rarely so 
neat, and both men and women may pitch in in ways that challenge this separation of duties. The 
gendered division of labour comes under threat particularly in times of financial scarcity. Current 
economic conditions have left many men jobless and unable to fulfil their roles as breadwinners, 
while new sources of employment have cropped up for women.27 Moreover, while the normative 
structure implies that men should be the breadwinners, there is an equally strong normative ideal 
that women should make sacrifices for the family. Hence, while women may hold the purse 
strings, they are also the ones who typically eat last and, in times of scarcity, least. 
In Watinapaha and Nilpanagoda it is common for women to leave employment at the time of 
marriage. Women attribute their decisions to the difficulties of juggling household duties and 
childcare with paid employment. Their employment may also be a source of shame for men 
because it can be interpreted as evidence of their failure as income-earners. Many women say that 
they, not their husbands, were the first to broach the idea ofmigrating. Many husbands are initially 
reluctant to let them go but are eventually persuaded in light of financial circumstances?8 It is a 
matter of status for a man to have a wife who does not have to work. Having a wife who has to 
25 For the year 2007, the average exchange rate was 110 LKR to 1 USD. Currency conversions have been 
calculated according to this rate. 
26 This is illustrated in Stirrat's account (1989: 98) of a fishing village on the northwest coast ncar Chilaw, 
in which men bring in the fish, and the marketing and financial decisions are largely left to women. 
27 On challenges to the gendered division oflabour, see Gamburd (2000: Chapter 7). 
28 On men's perspectives and counter-arguments to migration, see Widger (2009: Chapter 7). 
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perform servile labour in someone else's home can be humiliating, although this humiliation may 
be tempered if she does the work abroad, out of sight, and eams good money. Accounts of 
negative attitudes towards women's paid work point to contradictions in nationalist discourses 
which, on the one hand, posit women as the 'mothers of the nation and the locus of tradition and 
culture' (Lynch 2002: 88), and on the other emphasise the need for economic growth through 
women's labour-power.29 In this context, women's formal employment has been construed as an 
affront to Ceylonese culture and traditions (De Alwis 2002). 
In this regard, there are parallels between women migrants and garment factory workers. Both 
groups constitute a breach in gender norms because of women's conspicuous presence outside of 
traditional roles. Women's migration, much like garment factory work, has been portrayed as a 
source of disruption to the moral fabric. Like 'garment girls' (Hewamanne 2003, Lynch 2007), 
women migrants are assumed to be sexually promiscuous. Stereotypes are reflected in popular 
nick-names such as, 'Arabi badu' (Arabic goods) or 'rata badu kiile', 'rata' meaning 'abroad' or 
'foreign', 'badu' referring to goods, and 'kale'meaning 'piece', with piece often used to refer to 
girls. The same stereotypes do not apply to male migrants. 
Migrant women are also blamed for social ills. Academics, politicians and local residents alike 
have perpetuated the idea that women's migration results in the increased incidence of child abuse 
and incest, divorce, alcoholism among men, and low educational achievements among children.30 
Many residents of Watinapaha and Nilpanagoda, including migrants themselves, talked about the 
risks to which mothers who migrated exposed their families. This is part of a broader social 
discourse in which mothers, far more than fathers, are held to account for their family's success or 
failure. Stories about the ill effects of mothers' migration were also often tinged with jealousy and 
deployed by villagers who did not go abroad as a way of slighting those who had become more 
prosperous. Such stories formed part of competitive village gossip, involving both envy and 
ridicule of mothers shirking their familial duties. But the link between these problems and 
women's employment is far from straight-forward, as we will see in the remaining sections of this 
chapter.31 
29 Marecek points out that much of the political discourse resisting British rule prior to and after 
independence portrayed women as the bearers of Sinhalese cultural heritage (2000: IS7). These ideas are 
not unique to Sri Lanka. Chatterjee (1990) has written about the construction of women as guardians of 
indigenous culture and heritage in Indian nationalist rhetoric. 
30 Parrefias (2005a: Chapter 2) describes a similar discourse in the Philippines, where the children of women 
who have migrated abroad are thought to be badly behaved and prone to criminal activity or juvenile 
delinquency. 
31 This point has also been made by Gamburd (2000, 2008: 110). 
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Profile of Women Migrants 
To better understand who migrates and why, I carried out structured interviews with 245 women 
attending pre-departure housemaid training courses at five government facilities. This is out of a 
total of 31,462 women who completed the courses in 2008 according to the Sri Lankan Bureau of 
Foreign Employment (hereafter referred to as 'the Bureau'). The findings are presented below. 
Before proceeding, some remarks about the methodology are in order. 
I was given permission to carry out the interviews by the person who oversees the training 
programme at the Bureau's head office in Battaramulla. As of 2008, the Bureau operated 23 
training centres throughout the island. Interviews were carried out at centres in Mount Lavinia, 
Kadawatha, Kurunegala, Dambulla and Chilaw, all of which are located in the southern or 
western parts of the country (see map below). The Mount Lavinia facility, located in the capital of 
Colombo, is the largest and serves women from all over the country, so a significant proportion of 
the interviews (39 percent) were conducted there. Travel to the northern and eastern parts of the 
country would have made the sample more representative of national trends but was not possible 
due to the war. Some of the interview questions, for example those about educational attainment 
and employment, were modelled on the 2001 Census to enable comparisons with national-level 
data. The national statistics are based on an analysis of household data from all districts in Sri 
Lanka, whereas my survey did not have an even distribution from all districts. This constitutes a 
limitation. The ethnic and religious make-up of the sample I interviewed is broadly reflective of 
the reported population at the nationalleve1.32 Reliable data concerning the social composition of 
Sri Lankan migrants in Arab countries do not exist, but they are generally thought to be 
predominantly Sinhalese (Buddhist and Catholic) and Muslim (Moor and Malay), with fewer 
numbers of Tamils (Hindu and Catholic) (Brochmann 1993: 71; Sriskandarajah 2002: 293). 
Muslims constitute 8 per cent of the Sri Lankan population but reportedly comprise 22-23 per cent 
of all Middle East-bound migrants (Gamburd 2000: 40).33 This may in part be a result of the high 
demand for Muslim domestic workers in the region. Tamils, particularly the internally displaced 
and those from the Eastern Province, also have reportedly migrated in especially high numbers 
(Dias and Jayasundere 2002). Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims are strongly represented in the 
North and East of the country, areas I was not able to visit. The representation of these groups in 
the survey is roughly proportional to their share of the population at the national level but not 
necessarily their composition in the migrant workforce. 
Seventy-five percent of the interviewees were Sinhalese, eleven percent Sri Lankan Tamils, four percent 
Indian Tamils, and ten percent Muslim. This compares with national estimates of 74.5 percent Sinhalese, 
11.9 percent Sri Lankan Tamil, 4.6 percent Indian Tamil and 8.3 percent Muslim (Moor) according to the 
2001 census. 
33 According to the 2001 census (Department of Census and Statistics 2003), Sinhalese constituted 82.0 per 
cent, Sri Lankan Tamils 4.3 per cent, Indian Tamils 5.1 per cent, Sri Lankan and Indian Muslims 7.9 per 
cent, and others 0.7 per cent. 
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Map 3: Provinces of Sri Lanka 
Source: http://www.sercononline.comiprom s/sep/ fn . I/ Ft aug.htm 
Red dot and text added to indicate tra ining faciliti es where migranlS \ r inter \ d. 
Pre-departure tTaining is mandatory for a ll fir t-time mi rant and repeat ml rant \ h d n t 
pass a language test, either Arabic or English depending on the country r empl ym nl. p rat 
COurses are held for those going to Middle a tern ver u n n-Middl de tinati n , 
including Cyprus, Hong Kong, Malaysia and ingap r . The ampl d i br adly 
Middl ~ a treflective of women's migration trends, including 209 (84 per ent) headin 
and 39 to other destinations. Interviews were carried out rally in inhala and Tamil b ten 
November 2007 and April 2008 with the help of a re earch a istant. I appr a h d la durin 
practical lessons, for example when trainees were practicing cleaning or cooking, and asked 
whether they would be willing to be interviewed. We had no trouble finding volunteers. I was 
concerned that they would assume I was affiliated with the Bureau and feel compelled to 
participate. In an effort to avoid this, I explained that the interviews had nothing to do with the 
training programme or the Bureau and described my affiliation as a visiting student at the 
University of Colombo. I also assured the trainees that the data would be kept anonymous and 
confidential, and that if anyone preferred not to speak with me, I would not inform the class 
instructor or anyone else at the training facility. Once the interviews began, word spread about 
what I was doing and the kinds of questions I was asking, and I feel confident that anyone who 
did not want to speak with me could have kept clear. 
As with any survey, the findings should be treated with caution. Even seemingly straight-forward 
questions about marital status proved to be complicated. For example, when asked whether they 
were married, women tended to respond affirmatively if they had been married at any point in 
their lives; if they were now separated, divorced or widowed, they would not usually mention it. It 
was only later in the interview when discussing household composition that it became clear that 
some women were no longer living with their husbands or had become widows, in which case 
their earlier responses had to be corrected. Given this background, no firm conclusions should be 
drawn from these findings. They are, however, broadly indicative of the main trends with respect 
to women's migration and complement several patterns I identified using ethnographic methods. 
Age. Marital Status and Household Characteristics 
The ages of the women I interviewed ranged from 18 to 50. More than half (58 percent) were 
between the ages of 20 and 30; 9 percent were aged 19 and under; 22 percent were between the 
ages of 31 and 40; and 11 percent were 41 or older. In 20 II, the Sri Lankan government raised the 
age limit for departing domestic workers from 18 to 21 in an attempt to reduce the risk of abuse. 
Such bans are largely ineffective, as ample anecdotal evidence shows that younger women find 
ways to migrate with travel documents that are not their own. The majority of women migrants 
are thought to be married (Dias and Jayasundere 2004: 166, Gamburd 2000: 39). Among survey 
respondents, 54 percent were married at the time ofdeparture, 27 percent had never been married, 
13 percent were separated or divorced and 6 percent were widowed. In comparison to the national 
average, unmarried women are under-represented in the migration stream.34 More striking is the 
fact that whereas nationally only 1.2 percent of women are reportedly divorced or separated, 
among those I interviewed 13 percent fit this category. This could be for two reasons. One is that 
ethnographic evidence suggests that marital breakdown often prompts women to migrate, a trend 
34 According to the 200617 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, out of the entire population, 35.3 
p~rcent were never married, 55.5 percent were married, 8 percent were widowed, and 1.2 percent were 
dIvorced or separated (Department of Census and Statistics 2008b: Table 2.7). 
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discussed below. The other relates to a potential source of error in the national statistics - stigma 
may make women reluctant to identify themselves as divorced or widowed. Female-headed 
households were over-represented among those I interviewed, representing 30 percent of the 
sample in comparison to the nation-wide estimate of 24 percent.3S Migrants' households also 
appear to be larger than average, with a median household size of 5 and mean of 5.1 compared 
with the national mean of 4.1. 
Education and Income 
In the eyes of Jordanian employers, Sri Lankan domestic workers all come from a 'poorer' class, 
yet their socio-economic backgrounds vary quite substantially, and not all come from the lowest­
income or least-educated groups. In fact, in comparison to the national average, those with no 
formal schooling are under-represented among migrants, and those who have successfully 
completed their Ordinary Level (O-Level) exams are over-represented.36 Responses to questions 
about household income should be treated with caution for many reasons, one of which is that 
even if people are inclined to give an accurate estimate, not all individuals necessarily know how 
much income their household receives each month. Out of those I interviewed, 46 either did not 
want to answer the question or said their household income fluctuated too greatly to estimate with 
any degree of certitude. Of the 199 who responded, the mean monthly household income was 
12,742 Rs ($116), with a median of 10,000 Rs ($91). This compares with a national average of 
26,286 Rs ($239) and a median of 16,735 Rs ($151). In terms of per capita monthly income, the 
mean among respondents was 2,763 Rs ($25), with a median of 2,776 Rs. This compares with a 
national mean of 6,463 Rs ($59). These findings suggest that while migrants are not less educated 
than the general Sri Lankan population, they appear to come from households with significantly 
less income. Many of the women I spoke with said that their household income provided just 
enough for daily subsistence but was insufficient for large expenditures, for example making 
structural improvements to housing. 
Work History 
Of those interviewed, 22 percent had worked abroad previously as domestic workers or in 
garment factories, whereas the rest were first-time migrants. An equal number had never worked 
in Sri Lanka in formal employment, and 34 percent had worked at some point in a garment 
3S For the purposes of these interviews, household (gedara) membership includes those who regularly sleep 
and eat in the house and are considered part of the domestic unit. 
Among survey respondents, only 1 percent had no formal schooling, 7 percent had completed some 
primary schooling (grades 1-5), 36 percent had completed some secondary schooling (grades 6-10) but did 
not take O-Level exams, 45 percent had passed their O-Level exams, and 11 percent had passed their A­
L~vel exams. This compares with national rates of 4.8 percent with no schooling, 26.5 percent with some 
pnmary schooling, 41.7 percent with some secondary schooling but not O-Level exams, 16.4 percent 
passed O-Levels, and 10.7 percent passed A-Levels (Department of Census and Statistics 200Hb). 
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factory in Sri Lanka. Only 5 percent had worked as domestic workers in Sri Lanka. This suggests 
that migration to Arab countries brings women who have not previously been employed into the 
formal workforce. It also reflects the fact that women are willing to perform certain jobs abroad, 
i.e. domestic work, that they do not do at home. 
In relation to work status, only 29 percent (72 women) had been engaged in paid employment at 
some point in the 12 months prior to migration. This included women who were working in 
garment factories or other industrial facilities, engaging in agricultural and manual labour, 
plucking tea, or working as clerks in small businesses. A larger number of women - 116 (47 
percent) - did unpaid work in their own homes or family business; 33 (13 percent) described 
themselves as unemployed,37 and 21 (9 percent) were self-employed, a category which included 
those operating small cafes or food stands, or preparing items of food such as dried fish or beedis 
(a kind of cigarette) in their homes. 
Expectations About Migration 
When asked how long they expected to stay abroad if working conditions were satisfactory, the 
majority (72 percent) said they planned to work overseas for only 2 years. Only 4 percent said 
they planned to stay for at least 6 years. Findings from Jordan indicate that while many women 
initially plan to stay abroad for a few years, it usua\1y takes six or even eight years to accumulate 
savings to enable significant expenditures, such as the purchase of land and construction of a 
home. When asked how much they expected to earn while working abroad, 54 women (22 
percent) said they had no idea. For those going to Middle Eastern destinations who did have a 
figure in mind, the average expected monthly salary was 17,537 Rs ($159), with a median of 
17,000 Rs ($155). For non-Middle Eastern destinations, the mean was 44,328 Rs ($403), with a 
median of40,000 Rs ($364). 
Recruitment Processes and Costs 
Labour migration to the Middle East is a predominantly rural phenomenon; only 34 percent of 
women migrating for work abroad reportedly come from urban areas (Dias and Jayasundcre 2002: 
4). This is unsurprising given that Sri Lanka's popUlation as a whole remains predominantly 
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rura1. Among those I interviewed, 64 percent came from areas they described as rural, 32 percent 
37 Unemployment is defined as those above the legal working age (14) who are not in paid employment or 
self-employment, and are available for and seeking work, i.e. taking steps to seek paid employment or self­
employment. Given that the rate of absorption into the Sri Lankan labour force is limited and much of the 
labour force is engaged in informal employment, a very loose definition of seeking work was used. I asked 
~hether women had been looking for or ready and willing to take up work (r£l'kiyawe). 
More than two-thirds of the population resides in rural areas (Economist 2007). 
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from urban districts and 4 percent from tea estates.39 A total of 106 women (43 percent) said they 
had moved to a different district at some point in their lives for work, marriage, because of the war 
or for other reasons. High rates of internal migration (Spencer 2003: 5) appear to coincide with 
overseas migration. 
An entire bureaucracy has been set up to facilitate migration to the Middle East. At the national 
level, it is promoted by the Bureau of Foreign Employment, as is described in chapter 3. At the 
village level, it is facilitated by a vast network of 'brokers' and 'sub-agents', who act as mediators­
for-hire between potential migrants and recruitment agencies, helping migrants with paperwork 
and administrative procedures. As of 2008, there were 626 licensed recruitment agencies in Sri 
Lanka, more than half of which were based in Colombo. They transmit job orders to brokers 
operating at the village level. Brokers' activities are not regulated, and some charge excessive fees 
for their services. They are well-known figures in most villages, and though they are sometimes 
viewed as exploitative, they provide valuable services for those seeking employment abroad. Of 
the women I interviewed at the Bureau's training facilities, 104 (42 percent) said they were 
migrating with the help of a broker or sub-agent; 68 (28 percent) said they were migrating through 
an agency but not with the help of a broker or personal contact; and 67 (27 percent) said they were 
migrating with the help of a personal contact other than a broker. Brokers were distinguished from 
other contacts in that they were remunerated for their assistance. These findings suggest that 
intermediaries - whether brokers, relatives or other personal contacts - playa role in the migration 
process in the majority ofcases. 
Some migrants are able to select their countries of employment, while others have the decision 
made for them by recruitment agency staff depending on the availability ofjobs. The majority (59 
percent) of the women I interviewed at the training centres said they had not made the choice 
themselves. Of those who did, 58 percent said their decision was influenced by the fact that a 
relative (ncedceya), fellow villager or other contact in the host country was helping them to 
migrate. Only 43 women (30 percent) chose the destination on the basis of the country's 
reputation. Countries are typically ranked according to differences in salaries and benefits, with 
non-Middle Eastern destinations preferred because they are thought to offer higher salaries. These 
interviews suggest that many women do not have a say in where they migrate. Among those who 
do, social networks playa strong role in their decisions. 
Women migrating for domestic work are required to pay the Bureau 7,700 Rs ($70) in registration 
fees (which include health insurance) plus 3,000 Rs ($27) for medical exams. In interviews at the 
Bureau's training facilities, responses to questions about the costs of migration varied greatly. I 
Women were asked whether they came from a village (gama) or a town (nagaraya), the former being 
considered rural and the latter urban. 
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cannot draw conclusions because not everyone would have been aware of costs recruitment 
agencies charge after the training. Moreover, many women said they did not know whether money 
would be deducted from their salaries once they arrived in the host country. Though doing so 
violates the terms of the sponsorship system, some women said they intended to pay local citizens 
to act as their sponsors when they arrived. This system entails paying for the visa in addition to an 
inducement for the sponsor. This is sometimes called the 'free visa' system, 'free' referring not to 
the lack of cost but to the fact that once a sponsor has been paid, the migrant can choose her own 
employer. Many women said they did not know how much they would have to pay their future 
sponsors. The lack of awareness about the costs of migrating in itself is significant. Other women 
reported that all of the costs of migration, including the Bureau's registration fees, were being paid 
by agencies. A preference for Muslim domestic workers meant that some employers were 
prepared to pay a premium and cover these costs for the migrant. Accordingly, some Muslim 
women reported that agencies paid them cash advances in exchange for having agreed to migrate 
or had enticed them with the promise of radios or television sets. 
Fees associated with migration correspond with the desirability of destinations; Cyprus and East 
and Southeast Asian countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore can be several times more 
expensive to reach in comparison to Arab countries. In an interview in January 2008, L. K. 
Ruhunage, Deputy General Manager of Foreign Relations at the Bureau, said that while there was 
a legally stipulated fee structure based on workers' salaries that in principle governed the amounts 
required to migrate, it was widely acknowledged that brokers and agencies charged exorbitant 
amounts. Though there is a preference to send men abroad for work instead of women, the fees 
charged by agencies to place men in employment abroad are often prohibitively high. 
Of those women I interviewed who reported having already made payments to go to the Middle 
East, the figures ranged from 1,500 Rs ($14) paid by one woman mil,'l'ating to Kuwait, to 200,000 
Rs ($1,818) paid by another migrating through the 'free visa' system to Dubai. The mean was 
22,075 Rs ($201), and the median was 10,000 ($91). The costs reported for non-Middle Eastern 
destinations were considerably higher, with a mean of 186,462 Rs ($1,695) a median of 175,000 
Rs ($1,591). Though no firm conclusions should be drawn from these figures given that they do 
not include costs migrants might have to pay after they arrive in the host country, in broad terms 
they indicate a lower cost of migration to Arab countries in comparison to other destinations. The 
fact that there were so many different responses to these questions even among women migrating 
to the same country suggests a great deal of variation with respect to how much women know 
about the financial costs of migration. 
40 
Motivations for Migration 
Securing Vital Needs and Planningfor the Future 
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Figure 3: Home built with remittances from Jordan 
Decisions about migration are often motivated not strictly by the inability to meet basic 
subsistence expenses but the desire to make investments in family projects. Women interviewed at 
the Bureau's training centres were asked an open-ended question about why they decided to work 
overseas. Economic need was assumed to play some role, but I asked them to identify one or two 
of the most important factors that had influenced their decisions. The single most commonly cited 
reason - mentioned by 103 (43 percent) of the 242 women who respondL'<i to this question - was 
to earn money for housing. This included money to purchase land, build or complete construction 
of a home. Many were living in their parental homes or with affines and wanted a place of their 
own. Owning one's own home, ideally on a plot of land large enough for a small garden (gewatte), 
is strongly valued and linked with the passage into adulthood. Renting a home is seen as wasting 
money. Population growth has outstripped the housing stock and the cost of land has increased, 
meaning that substantial resources are needed to buy land and purchase or build a new home. 
Some of the women I interviewed were living in houses made of mud and cajun (coconut fronds) 
and wanted to build more solid cement or brick structures with tile roofs. Others had leaky roofs or 
homes too small to accommodate growing families and wanted to make improvements. 
The second most common response, mentioned by 57 women (24 percent), was to earn money for 
their families' daily living expenses. A total of 37 (15 percent) of women said they were migrating 
in order to earn money for their own dowries or that of sisters or daughters. The word 'dowry' 
(daewaedda) was seldom used; such payments were more often referred to as expenses associated 
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with getting married and starting a new life with a spouse. Dowries are thought not to be required 
for 'love marriages' but are typically expected for arranged marriages. In practice, even in the case 
of 'love marriages', women are expected to provide money or assets that act as a marital start-up 
kit for the new couple. The ability to provide these things makes the union appear more formal and 
socially acceptable. One of the other most commonly-cited reasons for migration was to earn 
money for children's or siblings' educational expenses. In order to ensure a child's educational 
success, parents and teachers believe in the necessity of private tuition (Little 1999: 193), the costs 
of which can be a significant burden for low-income parents. Many other women said they were 
migrating to settle debts or to invest in future livelihoods, for example purchasing a small shop, 
farming or sewing equipment. 
Twenty-one women (9 percent) said they were motivated by economic need in the wake of the 
illness or death of a spouse or parent. Such was the case for Lata, a 41-year-old woman from a 
village in Matale District, central Sri Lanka whom I met in Jordan. As a young woman, she had 
worked alongside her parents on a rubber plantation. After marrying, she and her husband 
cultivated rice paddy. She earned a pittance in both types of labour. When her daughter turned 
three years old, Lata decided to go abroad. With the goal of improving their home and saving 
money for her daughter's educational expenses, Lata went to work as a domestic worker in Saudi 
Arabia. She described her time there as nightmarish. Her employers had seven children, whom she 
cared for in addition to cleaning the house from six a.m. until well into the night. She barely left 
the house. Although she sent letters to her family, she did not know other Sri Lankans in Saudi 
Arabia and had no opportunities to speak her own language. Craving her family's company, Lata 
longed to return to Sri Lanka. But towards the end of her stay in Saudi Arabia, she received word 
that her husband had been bitten by a poisonous viper while working in the paddy fields. lie had 
survived, but barely. The viper's poison had crippled him, preventing him from working in the 
fields. Lata was suddenly the sole breadwinner. As a result, after completing her two-year stint in 
Saudi Arabia, she took a job in Jordan, where I met her. 
Lata's work for an elderly Jordanian man was an improvement. With no madame (as female 
employers are called) to scrutinise her and only one person to look after, the work was not 
backbreaking, as it had been in Saudi Arabia. But she couldn't shake the wrench of loneliness she 
felt. Not allowed to leave the home where she worked, Lata was on call 24 hours a day looking 
after her employer. She earned $140 a month, which she saved and sent to her husband. This 
money was barely enough to cover daily household expenses. While working in Jordan she was 
diagnosed with high blood pressure, a condition for which she would require medication for the 
rest of her life. Nearly a decade of household confinement with little exercise may have been 
partly to blame, but Lata attributed the condition to sadness: her constant thoughts of home had 
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made her unwe11.40 Although she wanted to return, Lata expected to remain abroad for at least 
three more years. Her case demonstrates why many women become serial migrants, working for 
several contract periods until they save enough. 
While Lata's decision to remain abroad was prompted by her husband's illness, other women are 
compelled to migrate as a result of their husbands' inability or unwillingness to find work. Swarna, 
a 29-year-old woman from Puttalam with a two-year-old son, decided to go abroad despite strong 
objections from her own parents, who said her husband should go instead. Swarna's husband was 
a building contractor with a heavy drinking habit and, according to Swarna, had a lazy streak. 
Swarna was doubtful that even ifhe did go abroad he would have the initiative to do the work. She 
complained that she had to instruct him to do everything. 'He doesn't even know how to match his 
clothes. I have to tell him [to do] everything.' Swarna had specific objectives in mind: she planned 
to work overseas in order to settle several outstanding loans and then begin saving for the costs of 
putting her child in an international school where he could learn English. She hoped to be home by 
the time he was ready for school. 
In other cases, women's migration is prompted by the need to payoff debts associated with 
previous attempts at migration, as Doreen, a 30-year-old mother of two, illustrated. In 2000, two 
of Doreen's younger brothers paid smugglers to help them travel, one to Italy and the other to New 
Zealand. Doreen mortgaged her land in exchange for 5 Lakh Rs ($6,579) to pay the smugglers.41 
The brother heading for New Zealand took a boat with 88 other people that broke down during the 
two-month journey. He was imprisoned in a detention facility for one and a half years. The other 
brother was caught by the Italian authorities and also detained. Doreen lost her land when she 
failed to keep up the mortgage payments!2 She decided to migrate to Cyprus in order to buy a new 
plot ofland and build a home. 
Studies of migration in other contexts have emphasised the role of utopic imaginings in migrants' 
decision-making. But among most of the women I encountered, migration was not talked about in 
terms of becoming modern, as it has been described for other contexts (e.g. Fer1:,'Uson 1999). 
Women tend to approach it in a more pragmatic way as a strategy to deal with financial crises or to 
invest in the future. As in the cases of Lata and Doreen, going abroad is a way to cope with family 
crises. At the time of departure, their return to Sri Lanka was unquestioned. Employment overseas 
as a domestic worker is rarely talked about as having transformative potential for the migrant 
herself, although it may have this effect. Rather, the focus is on the acquisition of savings. 
40 For a discussion of the ways physical ailments may be thought to be caused by mental distress in a 
~liI\age in western Sri Lanka, see Widger (2009: 95). 
Based on an average annual exchange rate for 2000 of76 LKR - 1 USD. 
42 She had mortgaged her land through a personal loan at a monthly interest rate of 10 percent. She said that 
a mortgage through a bank would have had a lower interest rate but would be more difficult and time­
consuming to obtain. 
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Moreover, most women do not imagine the Middle East as El Dorado. Hopes and aspirations tend 
to be smaller-scale than this. Many view migration as a speculative wager made in the hope that 
by leaving their families for a time they will give them a better life in the long-run. 
Mothers and Daughters: Migration as a Rile ofPa!.sage 
Many women express a strongly felt duty to provide for their families, particularly their children, 
and cast their decisions to go abroad in terms of maternal duty. While this type of migration is 
often individualised in that women travel alone, the decision to go is quite the opposite. 
Motivations to migrate often arise out of the fact that in Sri Lanka, as in many other places, 
notions of the person are highly relational. Marriage and childbirth define womanhood. Though 
women's participation in waged labour at current rates may be new, the ways in which they feel 
responsible for and bound to their families is not. These ties make them feel compelled to provide 
economically in the ways they attempt to do by migrating. 
Migration also tends to be inter-generational. It would be unusual for a migrant to be the only 
member of her family to have gone abroad, an unsurprising fact given that 20 percent of the 
country's workforce is overseas. In many cases, their mothers, mothers-in-law, aunts and even 
grandmothers had migrated. Matilda, for example, was one of five sisters all employed as 
domestic workers in Jordan. She brought her daughter there, who subsequently manied and had a 
child of her own, and all three generations lived together in Amman. Of those women interviewed 
at pre-departure training facilities, only 21 women (9 percent) out of the sample of 245 had no 
relatives who had ever gone abroad. A significant number (31 percent) had five or more relatives 
who were either currently or previously working abroad. A total of 27 percent reported that their 
mothers had migrated before them, and 24 percent had one or more sisters who had migrated. 
Only 9 percent had brothers who had migrated previously. 
In many cases, a precedent is set by the older generation whereby it is expected for a wife or 
daughter to provide in this way. Several of the women I met at training facilities were going 
abroad within months of having manied, suggesting that migration may have been an implicit or 
explicit part of their dowries. This appeared to have been the case for one young woman, who 
worked as a domestic worker at a guesthouse in Colombo. Iler mother had been working in the 
Middle East until she returned abruptly and made arrangements for her daughter's marriage. 
Within two months of the wedding, a job had been arranged for her in Dubai. The plan, which her 
mother had helped concoct, was for her to depart for Dubai and be followed two months later by 
her new husband. Six months passed, and the husband had yet to leave for Dubai but continued to 
ask for her earnings. Within the literature on Sri Lanka, dowries usually consist of moveable assets 
and land, and this appears to be an unusual example of women's productive capacity being 
bartered as part ofa maniage transaction. 
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A number of women attributed the need to migrate to the fact that they had not been able to 
complete their own educations - and hence fared less well on the job market - because their own 
mothers had been in the Middle East when they were growing up and had not been there to 
encourage them to study or support them in other ways. Education is believed to lead to jobs, 
particularly professional or government employment. A discourse of blaming migrant mothers for 
poor educational attainment or juvenile delinquency among children is common. It is not clear, 
however, that educational success necessarily translates to employment, as unemployment is 
particularly high among the educated. Ironically, some women who blame their mothers for 
having migrated decide to migrate and leave their own children behind, repeating the pattern. Such 
was the case with Kumari, a 21-year-old woman from Colombo whom I met in Amman. Kumari's 
mother migrated to Jordan when Kumari was 10, returning every two years for only a week or 
two. Eventually, she stopped returning altogether and stopped sending money home. Kumari and 
her father assumed she had become involved with another man, and Kumari spoke at length about 
how her mother's absence had affected her. Kumari married at the age of 17 and had a daughter of 
her own. When her daughter turned three, she decided to go to the Middle East to earn money for 
her family. As luck would have it, the recruitment agency with which she had registered sent her 
to Jordan, the same eountry where her mother had worked. Kumari suspected that her mother 
might still be there but had no interest in tracking her down. She rationalised her own departure by 
saying she would maintain more regular contact with her child and send all of her money home. 
For her and many other women, financial support was an important form of long-distance 
mothering. 
Nevertheless, deciding to leave children behind is not easy. Among women I met at training 
facilities, questions about plans for departure often provoked a flood of tcars as they talked about 
leaving their children. Of those interviewed, 62 percent had at least one child, and of those, 47 
percent had two or three children, and 10 percent had four or more. In cases in which women had 
children under the age of 18, 34 percent reported that they intended to leave them in the care of 
their own mothers, 22 percent in the care of their husbands, and 19 percent in the care of their 
husbands' parents. Fewer women said they planned to leave their children with siblings or other 
relatives. Some women in Nilpanagoda and Watinapaha dccide not to mib'l'ate because they do not 
want to leave their children behind or because they have no one on whom to rely for childcare. 
Choices about migration often hinge on what other resources a woman has, particularly whether 
she can depend on female kin for childcare. In public discourse, fathers are not considered good 
options and tend to be viewed in a predatory light, apt to neglect or even abuse children left in 
their care, especially if they are prone to drinking. In common parlance, fathers' roles in raising 
children is often discounted. Although many fathers have tender, loving relationships with their 
children, they are generally thought to be responsible only for providing material support. The 
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intimate, day-to-day care, emotional support, oversight of school studies and prepamtion of food 
are left to mothers. Fathers are regarded as being emotionally distant from their children once they 
have reached a certain age, whereas women are seen to be more directly engaged (Obeyesekcre 
1984). 
In response to complaints that young children were suffering from abuse and neglect in the 
absence of their mothers, in March 2007 the government banned women with children under the 
age of five from working overseas. The decision provoked outcry from women's organisations, 
who demanded that it be revoked. During the period of research, the ban was not enforced, and 
women with young children continued to leave the country for employment. Those who did so 
pointed to a lack of viable alternatives and said the additional money they would send home for 
education, house improvements and dowries outweighed the negative impacts of their absence. 
They viewed providing material support as an extension of their roles as mothers rather than a 
departure from it. 
Responding to Marital Conflict: Migration as an Alternative to Divorce 
Domestic violence, alcohol use and disputes with husbands over finances often influence women's 
decisions to go abroad. Throughout Sri Lanka, social norms dictate that married couples should 
not divorce even if they are fighting repeatedly and their disputes tum violent. Legal divorce 
proceedings are rare. Some spouses may live apart, but few make their changed status official. 
While some women live alone, doing so is financially difficult and socially unacceptable. For 
women such as Nira, described at the beginning of this chapter, migration can provide a temporary 
break if not a permanent escape from an unhappy union. Migration contributes to family 
breakdown, but not in the straightforward, linear way commonly assumed. Interviews indicate that 
marital breakdown often prompts rather than follows migration. I learned about this when speaking 
with migrants in Jordan, but marital conflict was also mentioned as a factor influencing decisions 
to migrate among 16 (6 percent) of the women interviewed at training centres. 
As in Nira's case, alcohol use often fuels marital conflicts. The consumption of alcohol is highly 
gendered in Sri Lanka. While Buddhist prohibitions against intoxicating substances apply equally 
to men and women, many men drink whereas the vast majority of women do not, it being 
considered a socially unacceptable practice for 'respectable' women (Gamburd 2008b). 
Unemployment and a lack of financial resources can be a source of humiliation for men, driving 
them to the bottle (ibid). Drinking plays a crucial role in male camaraderie and cementing social 
networks (Widger 2009: 326-7). But the diversion of scarce household resources for an activity 
women see as unproductive and detrimental can spark fights and prompt women to go abroad to 
supplement household income (Gamburd 2008b: 110). 
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Young and Restless: Social Motivations for Going Abroad 
While the majority of the women I met emphasised a need to go abroad, for some the decision 
appeared more impulsive, as Manoja's story suggests. I met Manoja at a pre-dcparture training 
facility in Colombo. She was preparing to go to Jordan on what sounded like a whim; she had a 
cousin who lived there and was doing well. Manoja wanted to follow in his footsteps and saw 
going to Jordan as her only opportunity to travel. After I told her I had lived in Jordan, she asked 
for my phone number. Two months after we first met, she called me frantically from Jordan, 
asking for help to get her passport back from her employer so that she could come home. She said 
the work had been too much for her, and she had run away. Her employer refused to hand over the 
passport until she came up with the money he had spent bringing her to Jordan. Manoja eventually 
found a place to stay with other Sri Lankans and worked on a part-time basis. Jordan had not been 
what she had expected. 
For other women, migration offers a means of revenge in family disputes, as was the case for 
Shanika. Shanika lived on a steep mountain slope on the outskirts of Sinharaja Rainforest, in the 
lush south-west corner of the island. Although only 160 km from Colombo, reaching her home 
from the capital took an entire day, involving three buses, a bumpy trishaw ride up a winding, pot­
holed dirt road and, finally, a ride in the back of a lorry. With no public transportation connecting 
her village with the nearest town, the only options were to hitch a ride in the village's only vehicle 
- a lorry that doubles as a school bus - or to walk. Shanika's mother and father had separated when 
Shanika was 8, and Shanika grew up living with her mother, sisters and brother in her mother's 
natal village in a simple, two-room house made of mati; (mud mixed with dung) with a Cat/jan 
(coconut leaves) roof. Her mother supported the family by working in the tea fields and cultivating 
manioc, cinnamon, potatoes and other vegetables on land donated by the government. Shanika 
went to school long enough to finish her O-Level exams and then took a job as a weaver in a 
powerloom factory in Panadura, on the western coast, where she earned 3,000 Rs ($27) per month. 
While there, she met a young man working in a nearby noodle factory who became her beau. The 
two wanted to marry. He approached Shanika's brother, who asked if he wanted a dowry. The 
young man said he did not but that his mother did, and so Shanika's brother refused and insisted 
the two break off ties. Shanika was incensed both with the boyfriend for having asked for the 
dowry and with her brother for refusing to pay it. In anger, she decided to go abroad. Shanika said 
that at the time she felt 'jindera', as if on fire. A woman at the powerloom factory who had 
previously worked in Jordan helped her to secure a job, and in 1992, at the age of 26, Shanika left 
for Jordan. She had defied her family by going to Jordan and once there fclt terribly alone. 
Although her initial decision had been made in haste, she stayed in Jordan for 13 years. She 
worked for a family in Zarqa, initially earning $50, twice what she had been earning as a weaver. 
Her salary was eventually raised to $1 SO. She sent most of her earnings to her mother, who used 
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them to build a house that was ready by the time she returned to Sri Lanka in 2005. flers is one of 
the best-equipped and most spacious homes in the village and is one of only a handful with 
electricity. 
Thus, for some women, economic and emotional incentives coalesce to make migration an 
attractive option. Other important factors driving women to migrate include curiosity, the desire to 
join kin already abroad, or attempts to circumvent parental obstacles in the pursuit of romantic 
love. For example, a young woman from Puttalam explained that she wanted to go to Dubai both 
to support her family and in order to be with her boyfriend, whom her parents had forbidden her to 
marry. She planned to bring her boyfriend to Dubai after she obtained her own job. In her view, 
this was the only way they could be together. 
'Migration Fever' in Watinapaha 
Another important dimension is the emergence of what in other contexts has been called a 'culture 
of migration' (Thomas-Hope 1978, 1998), in which people increasingly view going abroad as an 
expected or even the only means of obtaining upward mobility.43 Watinapaha provides an 
illustration: One afternoon while walking home, Malini and I were met on the road by a young 
man who, after chatting with us briefly, asked if Malini could help him go abroad. 'Ne. pi.mde?' 
('No, are you crazy?'), she replied, asking why he would want to leave his wife and child. The 
man lived in one of the nicest homes in the area, situated along the main road, and had a job and 
motorcycle. Malini thought it foolish for someone in his position to leave. 'It's like people have 
migration fever', she said when he had left, explaining that ever since she had returned from 
Jordan people had been asking for her help to migrate even when in her eyes they lacked sufficient 
cause. The visible fruits of migration, particularly the new garb and gold that migrants bring back 
with them and the homes they build, add to its allure. There is also a marked difference in 
architecture between the homes of migrants and non-migrants.'" The contmst is particularly 
striking with the homes of migrants working in Italy, some of whom build two-story structures 
that dwarf the neighbouring homes and have ostentatious flourishes, spiml staircases or fake 
columns. 
While migrants often frame their decisions to go abroad in tenns of poverty and limited livelihood 
options in Sri Lanka, an increase in consumerism also acts as a powerful propellant. The opening 
~3 Describing a more extreme version, Horst (2006) writes of a desire for resettlement among Somalis in 
Kenyan refugee camps that is so intense it is disease-like, occasionally sparking madness if not fulfilled. 
According to Horst, the affliction, which Somalis can buufis, acts as a form of collective imagining that 
provides hope among people who are otherwise hopeless (2006: 152). 
"" Thangarajah (2004: 156-159) describes the ways migration to the Middle East has influenced housing 
styles among Muslims in a vi1\age in Batticaloa district, eastern Sri Lanka. Middle East returnees build 
homes with more pronounced divisions for male and female areas and equip them with imported artefacts 
replicating Gulf house-styles. 
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up of the economy introduced new imported items and advertising. creating new demands and 
desires (Kemper 2001). Many of my evenings in Watinapaha were spent with Malini's family 
sprawled out on the floor eating rice and curry dinners while watching the latest Indian or Sri 
Lankan TV serials. The glamorous lives and well-appointed homes of teledrama protagonists far 
exceed village nonns. As Appadurai (1991: 198) has written. the mass media offers 'prisms of 
possible lives', fantasies in which people imagine lives different from their own. Such fantasies 
inspire yearnings that might only be fulfilled with money earned abroad. 
For some, including Malini's brother Tissa, money earned abroad enabled consumption habits that 
were hard to break. Shortly after Tissa returned from working in Iraq, he treated the family to an 
evening out. Twelve of us piled into a van borrowed from a relative and drove to Negombo beach 
for a splash in the sea. After nightfall, we went to McDonald's for dinner. This would not have 
been my choice, but the children among us were overjoyed and for a moment I relished the 
prospect of a non-rice-based meal. This feeling was short-lived as Tissa and I watched the clerk 
tally up the bill for our twelve dinners. which totalled the Rupee equivalent of more than $40. a 
staggering sum by local standards. Tissa's flashy display of generosity was an assertion of success 
abroad. But such acts proved difficult to maintain. Tissa had returned from Iraq with a plan to 
marry an American woman he had met on the military base and migrate to the United States as her 
spouse. The plan evaporated by the time he got to Sri Lanka, at which point the woman had 
broken off their relationship. Tissa began investigating other possibilities. lie became singularly 
focussed on the goal of going abroad. and how he could do so became a main topic of 
conversation in the household. particularly when I was around because he was convinced I could 
help. Having worked in Jordan and Iraq, he had now set his sights on more lucrative destinations 
in Europe or North America. His brother-in-law. Lakmal. who was in the military. was also eager 
to migrate. Together. they used Tissa's savings from Iraq to pay for tourist visas for Canada. Each 
night for several weeks, Tissa quizzed me about what life might be like in Canada and how much 
things would cost. When the man they had paid failed to produce the visas. Tissa became 
depressed. He was the youngest of four siblings and the only one without a house of his own. 
Local employment options paid so little it would take years for him to be able to save enough to 
build a home. His experience working in Iraq had established expectations that could not be 
matched in Sri Lanka. 
Silences Surrounding Women's Migration 
The fact that paid domestic work is seen as beneath women from 'respectable' families is not 
entirely overcome by those who have gone abroad to perform it. Women who would never work 
as domestic workers in Sri Lanka are willing to do so abroad because it takes place far from the 
gaze of other village residents and generates enough money to outweigh the stigma. Similarly. 
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writing of a community in southern Kerala, Osella and Osella (200 I: 79) describe how migration 
lessens the shame of employment in manual labour by allowing for a separation between village 
life and work that is undignified. Sri Lankan women who have returned from working in Arab 
countries rarely cultivate a positive image of themselves as migrants or as domestic workers. This 
became clear to me while carrying out research in Nilpanagoda. Malini occasionally assisted me in 
carrying out formal interviews with migrants and non-migrants. When we encountered women 
who had worked in the Middle East, she did not identify herself as having worked abroad. I had 
hoped she would share this information to break the ice when broaching a delicate subjcct, but I 
gradually came to understand her reasons for not doing so. While the economic goods resulting 
from time abroad may be a source of prestige, the experience itself is not.45 Migrant domestic 
workers are both admired for the money they eam and looked down upon for the degrading status 
of their work. For this reason, stories of life abroad rarely feature accounts of suffering or 
mistreatment, which can be a source of shame rather than evidence of tenacity in the face of 
adversity. Whereas in Jordan Sri Lankan women speak voluminously about problems with 
employers and recruitment agents, at home in Sri Lanka few mention these subjects unless directly 
asked, and even then, seldom at length. Having struggled abroad does not translate to a sense of 
dignity or self-worth upon a migrant's return. It should also be said, however, that the women I 
met at training centres in various parts of the country who had gone abroad previously were less 
guarded in their accounts of migration and talked about their hardships more freely. I assume they 
were more forthcoming because they felt anonymous when speaking to me, as we were not ncar 
their home communities and hence there was less fear of gossip. The conspicuous silences in 
returnees' accounts may mean that some women contemplating migration are not given the whole 
story about what to expect. However, discussions with women at the Bureau's training centres 
indicated that even women who had themselves been physically abused on previous trips often 
remained determined to migrate again in the absence of alternatives. Moreover, many of the 
women who were migrating for the first time had heard stories about abusive employers and were 
fearful of going abroad, an issue that will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3. This suggests 
that while some women may be more aware of potential difficulties than others, many are not 
naive about the dangers of working overseas. 
Conclusion 
Labour migrants have been called the 'unsung heroes of globalisation' (Ramamurthy 2003) and 
heralded as reducing poverty through remittances. Pro-migration development theorists have 
predicted that migration through regular, legal channels for temporary work abroad by 'unskilled' 
45 D . h
olOg ot er people's work ('wena keneku yalalhe weda kirima ') or 'low-status work' (pahClth weciCl) is 
generally viewed as demeaning, which helps explain why women rarely ofTer detailed descriptions of 
domestic work performed abroad, 
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or 'semi-skilled' workers from poor backgrounds tends to result in higher flows of remittances 
than other types of migration (Ronnas 2003: 16). By this logic, one might think Sri Lanka, with its 
high proportion of 'unskilled' circular migrants, would be the perfect candidate for the 
development-through-migration model. But evidence from three decades of migration to the 
Middle East raises questions about migration as a path to prosperity. It is possible that migrant 
remittances have stymied economic development by reducing incentives for the government to 
invest in projects that would have provided employment at home and by helping to fund the 
country's war bill. While there has been increasing interest in how governments can better invest 
migrants' remittances, what also needs to be considered are ways remittances can enable spending 
that may be antithetical to long-term development needs. Many women migrate from Sri Lanka in 
order to educate their children to give them a better future. But without well-paid jobs in Sri 
Lanka, many of those children themselves grow up to become migrant domestic workers. 
While trying to avoid the trap of portraying contemporary Sri Lanka as being in a state of decay 
and fragmentation in contrast to a cosier, egalitarian and stable past, I have presented some of the 
transformations in the past four decades that have influenced decisions about migration. The 
stories presented in this chapter speak to the diversity of women's reasons for going abroad. Some 
have gone out of wanderlust. But the narratives of most migrants at all stages of migration ­
before leaving, while in Jordan, and after returning - emphasise going abroad as something they 
are compelled rather than choosing to do. And for many, the decision to go is heart-breaking. Their 
sense of compulsion arises not just from dire economic need but social obligation, and many 
migrants cast their motivations in a language of sacrifice for the family. This context highlights the 
ways individuals' understandings of themselves are highly relational, bound up with their rights 
and duties vis-a-vis kin. While the journey abroad itsclfmay be solitary, the enterprise of deciding 
and preparing to go is not. This calls into question the nature of the 'individual' as a unit of 
analysis in understanding migration. The evidence presented in this chapter also raises questions 
about the limitations of the household as a unit of analysis. While migrants are often prompted by 
household-level problems or goals, their options have been shaped by Sri Lanka's war-weary 
economy, widening inequalities under economic liberalism, and changing patterns of 
consumption. Migration is often portrayed by scholars as an individual or household strategy, but 
it is conditioned by factors at the local and national levels. Equally important in this equation is the 
international context in which the Sri Lankan economy is enmeshed and the socio-economic, 
political and cultural forces in Arab countries that have created a demand for Sri Lankan women's 
work. This will be addressed in the next two chapters. 
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Pre-Departure Training and the Making o/Servants in Sri Lanka 
It is late afternoon at the Bureau of Foreign Employment's training facility in Mount Lavinia, 
Colombo, where a class of prospective workers huddles around an instructor as she gives a 
cooking lesson. They are preparing a salad of sliced carrots, cabbage and onions, along with rice 
and baked chicken. Despite the heat and humidity, the women watch intently as the instructor 
demonstrates how to clean and slice the vegetables. Many of the women have travelled here from 
remote villages around the island. There are Muslims from the east coast, Tamils from tea estates 
in the central hill country, and Sinhalese from lowland villages in the south. Once here, they 
receive training over the course of two weeks in preparation for employment as domestic workers 
abroad. 
Going abroad offers many individuals a rare opportunity to accumulate savings. But it is a gamble 
with many risks. Stories about domestic workers mistreated by employers in the Middle East 
appear regularly in the Sri Lankan press. For example, on December 30, 2009, the Daily Mirror 
featured a story about a Sri Lankan woman in Jordan who endured daily beatings from which she 
was eventually hospitalised.46 Other media outlets have described women working for long 
periods without pay.4? In October, the Sunday Times reported the findings of an NGO study 
suggesting that 10 percent of Sri Lanka's expatriate workers faced physical, psychological or 
sexual abuse while abroad.48 Low-paid workers such as domestic workers are described as most at 
risk. As a result, the political discourse about Sri Lanka's migrant domestic workers is 
contradictory. On the one hand, there is a patriarchal dcsire to protect women employed abroad, 
with an underlying assumption that women migrants are more vulnerable than men. On the other 
hand, there is a countervailing tendency to view migration as a source of 'net profit' to be 
expanded because of the much-needed remittances migrants send home. Politicians have issued 
statements insisting that Sri Lanka stop sending 'unskilled' housemaids abroad because of the ill 
treatment they endure and the emotional strain on their families. But there has been a simultaneous 
push to increase the capital Sri Lanka receives in remittances. In March 200R, President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa reportedly recommended that steps be taken to reduce the number of women mib'Tating 
as housemaids (Senaratne 2008). Several months earlier, in September 2007, Foreign Employment 
46 Daily Mirror, 'Lankan domestic worker in Jordan abused', 30 December 2009. 

47 The Sunday Times told the story of Mallika, a domestic worker who returned to her home in Wadduwa 

after 16 years of 'slavery' in Saudi Arabia. She described enduring severe beatings and verbal abuse, and 

~eing held against her will to work without pay. 'Amma is back', Sunday Times. November II, 2007. 

8 Sunday Times, '10 percent of Sri Lankan foreign labour faced ahuses in 200 1', 25 October 2009. 
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Development and Welfare Minister Keheliya Rambukwella said he planned to increase expatriate 
remittances. 'Our targeted direct foreign remittance is US$3 billion by the end of this year from 
foreign employment and through a thorough campaign to boost Sri Lankan labour force especially 
in European and other countries we are positive of earning 4 billion dollars as net profit of the next 
year,' he said (Weerakoon 2007). Contradictory state discourses about the need to protect women 
migrants while maintaining remittance-driven capital flows have also been noted with reference to 
Indonesia (Lan 2006: 50) and the Philippines (Tyner 2004: 2). 
One of the chief strategies the Sri Lankan government has adopted to tackle the problem of abuse 
while maintaining the 'maid trade' has been to create pre-departure training programmes. The 
rationale is that increased awareness of how to adapt to host country norms and expectations will 
decrease the likelihood of maltreatment. The training programmes are also a response to demands 
by host countries that domestic workers arrive better prepared for their jobs. 
The pre-departure programmes are run by the main government agency charged with promoting 
and regulating the overseas deployment of workers, the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign 
Employment. Established in 1985, the Bureau is a self-financed publie corporation that derives its 
revenue from recruitment fees, administration fees and commissions from employment agencies 
(10M 2005: 22). The Bureau's main duties are to promote the employment of Sri Lankans abroad, 
regulate employment agencies, and ensure the protection and welfare of Sri Lankan migrants and 
their families. Four representatives of recruitment agencies serve on its eleven-member board, as 
stipulated in the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act (1985). This gives it a vested 
interest in the business of overseas employment. Migrant workers are required to register with the 
Bureau and pay registration fees. Bureau employees keep watch at the airport to make sure all 
departing workers are registered. In 2009, the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act was 
amended to grant 'police powers' to the Bureau's civilian employees (Samath 2009). Those 
workers who try to leave the country with false travel documents can be arrested at the point of 
departure. Those who fail to pay the Bureau's compulsory registration fees can be denied the right 
to travel. Worker advocates and human rights lawyers have said that these police powers violate 
citizens' freedom of movement by preventing them from travelling even if they have the proper 
travel documents. 
The Bureau promotes overseas migration in a number of ways. It has established low-interest loan 
schemes through state banks to help migrant workers cover the cost of going abroad or for 
investments in housing and self-employment projects when they return to Sri Lanka. Additionally, 
it operates a scheme by which scholarships are granted to migrant workers' children who pass 
grade five, General Certificate of Education Ordinary Level (a-Level) and Advanced Level (A­
Level) examinations. The Bureau has also played an increasing role in preparing workers for 
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employment abroad. In a memorandum dated 28 April 1994 to the Bureau's Board of Directors 
and Chainnan, Sunimal Senaratne, then the General Manager, made the following 
recommendation: 
The Bureau has experienced since its inception the problems that the Sri Lankan migrant workers, 
especially housemaids, have to undergo in their host countries as well as within their family circles, 
through the vast number of complaints that pour in daily. The Bureau has also realised that this 
pathetic state is a direct consequence of sending untrained personnel for employment. Considering 
this situation, Honorable Minister of Labour and Vocational Training has decided to make training 
compulsory for migrant workers after June 1994. 
Senaratne went on to suggest that the existing training facilities should be enhanced and new 
centres opened to ensure that all new recruits receive adequate training. Documents such as this 
reflect the assumption that abuse of workers occurs as a 'direct consequence' of their lack of 
training. 
Part of the reason for the focus on training workers in the hopes of pre-empting abuse is that the 
Sri Lankan government is largely unable to protect citizens in host countries where it has no legal 
jurisdiction. The difficulties faced by Sri Lankan embassy staff in responding to cases of abuse in 
Jordan are described in chapter 5. Thus, emphasis is instead placed on the 'personality 
development' of the domestic worker before she goes abroad. This is in lieu of the more politically 
unpopular and practically difficult alternative: demanding that host states enforce workers' 
contractual and labour rights through regulation and by holding errant employers and recruitment 
agencies to account. 
In the sections that follow, I describe the pre-departure training programmes currently in place. 
The analysis is based on participant observation of a 13-day housemaid training course at the 
Bureau's main training facility in Mount Lavinia, where the greatest numbers of new recruits are 
trained. I also observed classes at the facilities in Kurunegala, Dambulla and Chilaw. In breaks 
before and after lessons, I conversed with trainees and instructors. Interviews were conducted with 
departing migrants, training centre staff and officials at the Bureau's head office. In addition, 
migrants currently working in Jordan were interviewed about their experiences and evaluation of 
the training. I also draw on discussions with Jordanian employers and officials at the Sri Lankan 
embassy in Jordan. Important secondary source material, including the English-language versions 
of training manuals used in the pre-departure training programmes, was collected at the Bureau's 
library in Battaramulla. 
Overview of the Training Programme 
The Bureau of Foreign Employment began offering training to prospective migrants soon after its 
creation in the mid-1980s, but participation was low until 1996, when the training was made 
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compulsory for migrants without prior work experience in the Middle East. In 2007, an estimated 
32,568 women participated in the Middle East and non-Middle East-bound housemaid tmining 
programmes (SLBFE 2007: Table 65).49 This represents nearly a third of the 102,176 women 
departing for employment as domestic workers that year (SLBFE 2007). Part of the reason for the 
low participation is that training is only mandatory for those going abroad for the first time or for 
those who do not pass a language test (Arabic or English, depending on the destination). Those 
migrating on repeat contmcts are exempt. It is impossible to estimate the percentage of new 
recruits who complete the training on the basis of available data, but given that some migrants 
manage to depart for overseas employment without registering with the Bureau, it would appear 
that some also do not receive the formal tmining.so 
Figure 4: Learning to make a bed, Mount Lavinia~Colombo 
The Bureau's training progmmmes are funded out of its Welfare Fund. Although touted as free, 
migrants and employers indirectly pay for the training, since the Welfare Fund is based largely on 
registration and recruitment agency fees, which are paid by employers and mib'Tanls. Tmining is 
provided at 23 centres run by the Bureau as well as a number of centres run by private recruiting 
agencies, most of which reportedly base their courses on the Bureau's curriculum and employ the 
49 According to the same source, a total of 22,798 women completed the Middle East-bound training; 3,356 
completed the non-Middle East-bound training, and 6,414 participated in the one-day housemaid refresher 
course for repeat migrants. Bureau-administered training is also given in the form of literacy classes, 
vocational courses for garment factory workers and training specifically for Korean-bound migrants. 
so According to one source, only 70 percent of migrant women actually register with the Bureau of Foreign 
Employment prior to leaving (Dias and Jayasundere 2002: 14). Migrants interviewed in Amman and Sri 
Lanka confirmed the presence of a black market whereby one could buy false training certificates. One 
source estimated that as of 2007, the going rate for these certificates was 20,000 Rs ($182). The training 
itself was provided free of charge, but by buying a certificate one could leave without having to take the 
course. 
ss 
Bureau's instructors.sl Separate courses are held for Middle East and non-Middle East-bound 
migrants. Women bound for the Middle East learn Arabic, while those heading for non-Middle 
Eastern countries learn English. Apart from this, the curricula are much the same. Separate courses 
are held in Sinbala and Tamil, and for women who cannot read and write, additional literacy 
courses are offered. My focus is on the training for migrants bound for the Middle East, where the 
vast majority of Sri Lankan expatriate workers are employed. 
The training for Middle East-bound migrants takes place in 120 hours over the course of 12 days. 
Each day begins at 8 am, when trainees line up to sing the national anthem and perform aerobic 
exercises. Trainees are then taught through a mixture of lectures and 'hands-on' practical lessons. 
The instructors are former domestic workers who are required to have worked abroad for at least 5 
years in addition to having passed a-Level examinations (10M 2005: 128). The instructors receive 
training from the Bureau, and Bureau officials regularly visit the training facilities to oversee the 
programmes. External consultants are hired to give additional lectures on banking, electricity and 
health. 
r1gure ): Lookmg lesson, Mount Lavinia, Colombo 
The stated objective of the training is to teach women how to be 'honda gruhasevikava 't or good 
household servants. Most of the women come from rural villages and have no experience with 
51 In addition to the governmental training programmes, a number of NGOs, namely the Migrant Service 
Center, the Legal Aid Commission and ACTFORM provide supplemental awareness-raising programmes 
for prospective migrants in rural areas throughout the island. These are discussed by Dias and Jayasundere 
(2002: 21-3,26). . 
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modem appliances or imported cleaning products. Trainees are given practical lessons in how to 
use and care for electrical equipment, make beds, lay dining tables, polish floors, shampoo carpets, 
cook Middle Eastern cuisine and care for children and the elderly. They also listen to lectures on 
how to speak basic Arabic, open a bank account, mail letters home, cope with stress and prepare 
their husbands and children for their absence. At the end of the training, they take an exam in 
order to receive a certificate of completion. Performance on the exam is largely irrelevant, as all of 
those who take the course are given certificates. 
Figure 6: Lesson on childcare, Mount Lavinia, Colombo 
In addition to the pragmatic advice that is meted out, the training serves three primary, un-stated 
goals viewed as crucial to the making of good housemaids. These will be described in the 
following sections. 
Lesson One: Developing Bourgeois Attitudes to Dirt 
The first goal involves the instruction of middle-class values with respect to cleanliness and 
personal hygiene. Many of the practical lessons are aimed at sensitising women to the fact that 
they will have to clean more often and with more paraphernalia than they are used to.52 The 
majority of the women attending the courses, indeed all of those in the course I observed, did not 
have commode-type toilets, showers or bathtubs in their own homes and had never used them 
before attending the training.s3 In order to prepare them for what they would encounter abroad, 
S2 Heightened standards of cleanliness were cast by one instructor as being a result of the fact that Arab 

employers are culturalIy different. A trainer at one facility told her class: 'Muslims do not trust in re-birth. 

For that reason, they are very clean. They don't like being sick.' The word she used for 'clean' ­
'pirisiduwa • - can refer either to physical cleanliness or being free from polIution in a ritual sense. 

53 As is common in rural Sri Lanka, they bathed in rivers or from a welI with a jug. 
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trainees are taught to use and clean Western-style bathrooms. An elaborate colour-coded y tem 
helps them distinguish between cleaning towels that can be used for the floor, toilet, wa hbasin 
and fixtures. A lengthy session is devoted to cleaning products and disinfectants, including 
everything from air freshener to toilet bowl cleaner, and the many different type of mops, 
brushes, dusters, sponges, pads and wipes they will need to use in the Middle East. In the class 1 
observed, this lesson produced giggles from many of the women, who were urpri sed to learn that 
so many products existed and that they would be required to identify and use all of them. 
r 
Figure 7: Cleaning lesson, Mount Lavinia, Colombo 
The attempts to inculcate middle class values extend to personal appearance and bodily 
comportment. Throughout the training sessions at the Mount Lavinia facility, women who had 
taken off their shoes and were barefoot were admonished by instructors. Those caught eating lunch 
while seated on the floor were told that doing so could make them ick. When one woman look off 
her shoes upon entering the facility 's model living room, a i cu tomary upon entering homes in 
Sri Lanka, the instructor scolded her, saying she should forgel lIch ' unedll al d vi Il age way '. 
The instructor later told me that she considered it a problem that a many ri Lankan women wenl 
abroad wearing the cheapest sandals they owned, assuming their employers would buy Ih m new 
ones. She said that if employers saw them wearing such things from the tart, they would think 
they are ' poor village women ' and treat them as such. Migrants are encouraged to adju t their 
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bodily comportment and personal habits through a process of genteel refinement by which they 
will, it is hoped, succeed as workers. 54 
Ten ofthe total instruction hours are dedicated to 'personal grooming and hygiene'. In the module 
I observed, women were encouraged to shower each morning, apply makeup, and wear fresh 
clothes every day. While none of the women wore makeup at the beginning of the training, I 
noticed that many had applied some for the ceremony on the final day. Ironically, while wearing 
makeup and stylish clothes is presented in the training as one of the ways domestic workers can 
impress their employers and adapt to life abroad, it is also one of the bases upon which migrant 
women are criticised when they return home to Sri Lanka. Returnees are sometimes scornfully 
referred to as 'Dubai kelli', or 'Dubai babes', who show off by wearing excessive makeup, 
jewellery and tight clothes, habits that go against the grain of modest respectability for women in 
rural areas. 
Lesson Two: Learning Docility 
The second main theme of the training involves teaching migrants to be obedient and deferential. 
One of the cornerstones of the pedagogy is that trainees should learn by doing. Trainees are 
therefore responsible for the day-to-day maintenance of the facility. They sweep and prepare the 
classrooms and outdoor areas at the start and end of each day. In overseeing the work, trainers 
assume roles mirroring those of Arab employers. In the sessions I observed, their manner with 
trainees was brusque and authoritarian. They referred to trainees as 'lamay', or 'children'. They 
are served tea and cakes prepared by the cookery class and eat their lunches separately from the 
trainees. They also set themselves apart through dress, donning saris and high heels in contrast to 
the skirts and blouses worn by trainees. These differences allow the instructors to maintain social 
boundaries and reinforce their positions in charge. 
A point of contention between instructors and trainees was the rule that trainees should not bring 
or use mobile phones with them to the training courses. While some could not afford to own a 
mobile phone, many did and objected to this rule. Those who had travelled great distances, leaving 
family or boyfriends behind, wanted to be able to call home. One day at the Chilaw training 
facility, a trainee was found to have smuggled in her phone. She was lambasted by the instructor, 
which brought her to tears and disrupted the day's lesson for more than an hour. Disputes between 
trainers and instructors also erupted when trainees failed to trim their fingernails to the length 
specified by the instructors, leading to harsh reprimands. It is unclear whether the instructors were 
so stringent as a means of maintaining their own order over the class or because they viewed strict 
adherence to rules part of learning to be a good housemaid. In either case, such incidents provide 
S4 This resembles accounts of housemaid training programmes in Indonesia where according to Lan (2006: 
85-7), migrants' own homemaking and caretaking habits are cast as crude a~d primitive. 
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trainees with their first taste of what it will be like to have to forgo personal privileges while 
employed abroad.ss 
On the first day of the training, women are told about the expenses their 'masters' [hamputhaJ 
incur to recruit them. They are warned that, in light of this, it is reasonable that employers will 
become angry if migrants do not do their jobs properly or do not complete their two-year 
contracts. Trainees are told that if they make mistakes or do not finish their work, it is reasonable 
for employers to hit them. One instructor cautioned her class: 'Oyala wedamaga hariyolh eyala 
deparak hithanne neha. Eyala gahawi.' [If you neglect your work, they won't think twice. They 
will beat you.] Even minor mistakes can result in physical abuse.s6 Beatings from dissatisfied 
employers, it is suggested, are inevitable. The threat of corporal punishment is not altogether 
unusual when one considers how physical and behavioural discipline is commonly inculcated in 
schools throughout South Asia. Transgressions by pupils are often met with a beating or whack 
with a stick.s7 
The strategy presented for how to avoid beatings is to work as hard as possible. As one instructor 
explained, 'We have to make our masters happy. We have to win their trust. Even if you do not get 
your salary for the first month, don't give up work. Do your work well next month. They may not 
pay you because you do not work well enough for the salary you get.' Working harder is presented 
as a tactic for how to deal with an employer who does not pay the salary owed. The women are 
instructed not to use words such as 'don't' or 'can't', and to carry out instructions without asking 
questions. One pre-departure guidebook states: 'As much as possible, arguments with the 
employer should be avoided. The employer can make life difficult for the overseas worker. Most 
Arabs are personal in their feelings' (SLBFE Undated: 16). The manual goes on to warn: 'In order 
to keep overseas workers in line, it is normal for some Arabs to frighten you by threatening to call 
the police, or threatening to kill you and bury you in the desert. In such cases, remain calm and act 
normally. Running away would not help. Once the employer sees that the worker is not alarmed 
the frightening usually stops' (ibid). 
The underlying theme is that housemaids who do not work hard enough may be physically 
punished, and that good housemaids who work harder eventually will be rewarded. The trainees 
are told, 'Your success depends on you.' As one instructor advised, 'If you work well, they will 
SS Many domestic workers in Jordan and elsewhere in the region are not permitted to have mobile phones or 
to make or receive calls using employers' phones (HRW 2007: 72; Chammartin 2004: 20). Communication 
with the outside world is curtailed as a way of reducing the likelihood that the domestic worker will run 
away or engage in activities without the consent of the employer. 
S6 A New York Times article (Waldman 2005) described a similar scene at one of the Bureau's training 
centres in which prospective migrants were warned that they could be beaten or burned for making a 
mistake. 
S7 S fi . . 
ee, or example, Froerer (2007: 1049·1052) on IndIan prImary schools. 
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treat you well.' Another instructor explained the underlying philosophy of the training to me this 
way: 'We teach them how to win the confidence of their boss. Do whatever job you are doing well 
and do it professionally. No man will come close to you if you are doing a good job. They won't 
want to lose a good worker.' 
In addition to being obedient, the 'good worker' is portrayed as flexible and adaptable, always 
ready to please her employer. An informational brochure published by the Bureau of Foreign 
Employment suggests these qualities as typical of Sri Lankans: 
Reliability and Loyalty. These are natural characteristics of the Sri Lankan employee, by nature 
warm, hospitable and generous, through ways oflife inbred in them from youth. These characteristics 
also help Sri Lankan employees to become quickly 'acclimatised' and oriented in foreign locations 
and help them to discover job satisfaction and contentment, so essential for good and successful 
employer-employee relationships. Sri Lankans cherish and maintain their links with families back 
home and would like to return home at the end of their period of contract.58 
Thus, it is suggested that the ideal worker is one who will be loyal, flexible, and will remain in the 
country only temporarily. 
Lesson Three: Service with a Smile 
Linked to lessons in obedience and flexibility is the third goal of the training: 'personality 
development,.59 Theme 7 of one of the training manuals is dedicated specifically to this theme. It 
states: 
It is very important that the migrant female worker maintain a favourably high standard of 
personality. Especially during the first 2 - 3 months after arriving in a foreign country it is likely that 
due to stress, personality weaknesses tend to appear. Then the employer may make faulty judgements 
about the employee and may consider her to be inefficient, unpleasant and unhealthy (SLBFE 1999: 
32). 
Personality development includes 'developing a physically pleasant appearance.' In addition to 
personal cleanliness and dress, migrants are advised that 'all mannerisms should suit the respective 
culture- EuropeanIMiddle East.' Migrants should look relaxed and have 'good manners' (ibid). 'It 
is possible to win the employer by following favourable manners'. 'Having a pleasant smile is also 
important' (ibid). Trainees are advised that while making direct eye contact with employers is 
accepted in 'European culture', 'according to Arabian culture, one is expected to look down at an 
angle of 45 and [only] occasionally have direct eye contact' (SLBFE 1999: 32-33). The following 
illustration, included as Annex 6 of a training manual (SLBFE 1999), demonstrates the appropriate 
angle of eye contact. 
58 Undated brochure published by the Bureau of Foreign Employment, available at the Bureau's library in 
Battaramul\a. 

59 The preface of one manual (SLBFE 1999: 1) states: 'Helping the process of personality development of 

Sn Lankan female migrants is considered a national task.' 
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Figure 8: Illustration from an SLBFE training manual 
Trainees are instructed to use key Arabic phrases with their employer, such a ' In hallah' [God 
willing] and 'Alhemdolillah' [Praise be to God] . They are advised that if everyone else in the 
household is fasting during Ramadan, they too should fast. One instructor warned her class not to 
bring Hindu or Buddhist religious photos or cards with them abroad lest such thing alann 
employers. If asked their religion, trainees should identify themselves a hristi an because it will 
be considered more appealing to Muslim employers, according to instructors. 
In a session I observed about how to prepare for the journey abroad, an instructor cautioned her 
class against wearing sandals or plastic slippers upon first meeting employer . hoe with 'at lea t 
one-inch heels ' are preferred, she said, pointing to her own high heel . manating an air f 
confidence, she said: 'Lassanata innone' [You need to be beautiful] . 'Airport k di hondata 
hasirenna. Game hitapu widiyata newei' [Behave well at the airport. Don't behave like a village 
woman]. Similarly, an instructor at another training center told her clas to pack nice clothes. 
'Oyalage asaranabawaya penwanna epa' [Don' t show them that you are helple .] he told them 
not to reveal their poverty [dupath] and to always wear long sleeves and skirts. With th se 
warnings, migrants are encouraged not to appear too ' poor', 'rural ' and uneducated. 
Trainees are also encouraged to wear shorts or trousers under long skirts and dresses, and to sle p 
in pyjamas with trousers rather than nightgowns, in order to avoid unwanted advances by male 
employers. As one instructor opined, trainees should use conditioner rather than hair oil and not 
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bring too many 'smelly' Ayurvedic products or medicines with them to the Middle East, lest 
employers think they are sick or become repulsed by the strange scents. If they bring photos from 
home, they should carefully consider what is in the background. For example, said one instructor, 
if the photo was taken in the kitchen and reveals a hearth where firewood is used to cook, 
employers will think you are poor. 
Trainees also are taught to refer to employers as 'mama' and 'baba'. In Sri Lanka, kinship terms 
are not used in this way; in a domestic setting, employers are usually referred to as 'nona' [lady] 
and 'mahattaya' [sir]. Other distinctions between home and abroad can be more challenging. For 
example, trainees are told that they may not be trusted at first and their honesty may be tested. 
They are also infonned that they will not be allowed out of the house at first and that, even as time 
goes on, they are unlikely to have a day ofT. They are warned that they will have to win their 
employers' hearts in order to secure • privileges' . 
The thrust of this portion of the training centres on teaching trainees how to head off potential 
problems by bridging cultural gaps. It also attempts to mould the personalities and bodies of 
migrant workers in such a way that they will be more appealing to employers. As part of learning 
their place in the hierarchy, trainees are encouraged to appeal to employers on moral and ethical 
grounds rather than on the basis of any knowledge of their contractual rights. The training 
ideology endorses the view that the blame for abuse rests with the worker's own personality. 
Within this model, there is no room for the possibility that 'good' women can be mistreated. The 
implicit corollary is that certain types ofmigrant women deserve to be the victims ofviolence. 
The Absence of Labour Rights 
While the pre-departure training provides useful advice on a variety of topics, it gives almost no 
information about basic labour rights. Although ample information is supplied about workers' 
duties and responsibilities towards employers, little is said about employers' responsibilities 
towards workers.6O The fact that Sri Lanka has established a minimum wage for overseas domestic 
workers was mentioned in only some of the training courses I observed. Interviews suggested that 
even on the final day of the training, many trainees remained unaware that they were entitled to a 
60 The lack of information about workers rights and redress mechanisms has also been noted in reports by 
10M (2005: 113, 123) and Human Rights Watch (2007: 96-7), which said • ... the only information about 
their rights that trainers provided was the advice that they should run away to the Sri Lankan embassy. 
Trainers provided the phone number of the embassy, but little else. Many domestic workers were 
misinformed about their rights, and some interviewees were unaware that they could leave abusive 
employers before their contract period ended.' 
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minimum wage, much less what it was. Trainees were also not made aware that they had a right to 
maintain possession of their own identity documents.61 
In the event of abuse, trainees are advised to contact the embassy or write a letter to Sri Lanka 
asking relatives to inform the Bureau of Foreign Employment. This advice is questionable. It is 
doubtful that a migrant in urgent need of assistance would get a prompt response this way. Some 
migrants are not fully literate and need help sending letters home; others are restricted from 
writing by their employers. Furthermore, many migrants are reluctant to tell their family members 
if they are being subjected to sexual or physical violence and would be disinclined to write home 
about it. No country-specific information was provided about other ways migrants in distress 
could seek help. During interviews, trainees frequently asked me where they could go if they had 
problems with employers. Although a limited number of NGOs provide support to migrants 
abroad, no information about such sources of assistance was provided in the training. 
Part of the reason for the lack of information about legal redress is that such mechanisms are rarely 
available to migrants. This is an issue that will be discussed in greater detail in chapter S. In 
addition to the practical difficulties of regulating work in private households, domestic workers are 
excluded from the labour law in most Arab host states. Non-citizens are forbidden from striking or 
joining unions in much of the region, and those who dare to protest can face deportation.62 The 
fact that they live cloistered inside their employers' homes means that many domestic workers 
lack the social networks that might otherwise come to their aid. In most cases, their only recourse 
involves breaking the law by absconding from their employers' households. 
Embassies offer the main source of protection, providing shelter for workers in distress, mediating 
disputes with employers, and assisting with repatriation when necessary. But the general attitude 
among the migrants I knew was that embassy officials lacked sympathy for their grievances. Many 
were reluctant to go to the embassy for fear they would be returned to the recruitment agency or 
their employer. These fears are not unfounded. The unwritten policy at the Sri Lankan embassy in 
Amman during the period of research was that those workers seeking shelter at the embassy who 
had not completed their two-year contracts and who were not believed to have sutTered abuse 
would be returned to the agency or place of employment to fulfil the contract. In some cases, this 
meant forcing a migrant to go back against her will, a situation I witnessed on more than one 
occasion. This is described in more detail in chapter S. Despite their reputations among migrants, 
61 A 2002 study carried out by the University of Colombo and the Migrant Services Centre found that only 
12 percent of migrant domestic workers interviewed were aware of their rights when they first left for 
employment abroad (cited in Human Rights Watch 2007: 99). _ 
62 For example, in August 2008, Kuwait deported 850 Bangladeshi workers for alleged involvement in a 
strike for higher pay. Many of those deported said they had nothing to do with the strike and reported being 
physically abused while detained (BBC News 5 August 2008 'Deported Bangladeshi workers allege torture 
in Kuwait'). 
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some embassy officials expressed genuine sympathy towards the situation of workers in Jordan. 
Many also believed that workers ran away from their employers' homes not because of 
maltreatment but because they were homesick, lazy or incapable of doing the work required. In 
some instances, embassies facilitate legal action against errant employers, but court cases are 
costly and time-consuming, and private negotiations outside of the formal justice system are 
preferred. As will be described in chapter 5, in Jordan convictions against employers for abusing 
or failing to pay workers are rare. Given the lack of legal protections and the extremely limited 
opportunities for collective action, the suggestion put forth in the training courses that workers are 
more or less on their own and must fend for themselves by appealing to employers is not 
surprising. 
In addition to these factors, exporting subservient domestic workers may be considered 
advantageous given that the market for domestic service is competitive, and when one sending 
state aggressively presses for safeguards to protect workers, host country demand may shift to 
more acquiescent suppliers. The governments of the Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka have all 
at some point implemented temporary bans on the recruitment of domestic workers to Jordan in 
response to concerns about the treatment of their workers.63 When this happens, recruitment 
agencies have mounted pressure on the Jordanian government to allow recruitment from new 
countries. In January 2008, when the Philippines banned the recruitment of Filipina domestic 
workers to Jordan, recruiting agencies rallied the Ministry of Labour to allow recruitment from 
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Nepal (Jordan Times, I August 2008). The Philippines has previously 
banned recruitment to Lebanon, where recruitment from these three source countries has already 
begun.64 It is worth mentioning that deployment bans do not stop workers from migrating to 
Jordan. Recruitment agencies bribe or deceive immigration officials in the country of origin 
and/or send workers through indirect routes via transit countries in order to circumvent the bans. 
Jordanian authorities do not recognise other countries' deployment bans and allow workers to 
enter when they arrive at the airport.6s 
Sri Lanka is not unique in encouraging the virtue of obedience among migrant domestic workers. 
Rudnyckyj (2004) and Lan (2006: 84-5) describe training for domestic workers departing from 
Indonesia that also involve lessons in moral and bodily discipline and submission. The tone of the 
63 In August 2010, the Sri Lankan government imposed a ban on sending domestic helpers to Jordan 
because of the high number of complaints of unpaid salaries and ill-treatment by employers. The ban was 
lifted one month later after recruitment agencies promised to address the problems. 
64 As Lan (2006: 75-80) has shown with reference to Taiwan, contrasts between 'smart' and 'assertive' 
Filipinas and 'docile Indonesians' have been cultivated by recruitment agencies to persuade employers to 
phase out Filipina domestic workers in favour of Indonesians, who offer agencies higher profits and more 
control over the recruitment process. 
65 A similar situation has been described in Lebanon, to which the governments of Nepal, the Philippines, 
Madagascar and Ethiopia have banned the deployment of domestic workers (Hamill 2011: 34-39). 
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training programme helps to explain the lowly position of Sri Lankan women within the global 
market for domestic workers. Demand for domestic workers is often stratified along national 
lines.66 Sri Lankans and Indonesians are designated as being more servile, hardworking and 
unquestioning, whereas Filipinas are assumed to be better educated, more assertive and more apt 
to push for certain rights. Within this framework, Filipinas are often said to deserve higher 
salaries and more privileges, in part because they are said to 'know their rights'. I have no 
evidence to suggest that Filipina domestic workers are actually given more privileges or paid 
more in Jordan, but according to one source, they eam an average of $200 to $250 per month in 
Lebanon in contrast to Sri Lankans, who earn $180 (Hamill 2011: 40). Even without comparative 
data for Jordan, an argument can be made that by encouraging docility, the Sri Lankan 
government's training programme perpetuates the low status of Sri Lankan workers within the 
pecking order, and that this may influence the way employers treat them as a category.67 With 
some exceptions, the general rule is that more affiuent employers opt for Filipina domestic 
workers, whereas less wealthy families employ Sri Lankans and Indonesians. This has 
implications for their working conditions. More well-to-do employers can afford to hire a mini­
legion of domestic helpers, so the burdens of cleaning, cooking and childcare can be divided 
among several women. In larger, more opulent homes, employees may have their own rooms and 
bathrooms. Women working for less privileged families, on the other hand, often lack these 
amenities and have no one with whom to share the work. Sri Lankan and Indonesian women are 
described by recruitment agency staff as being less 'pushy', for example about the right to have a 
mobile phone or to leave the employer's house during time off. With this in mind, employers may 
be even more likely to deny privileges to workers who are thought to be more compliant. 
Participants' Responses 
What are migrants' views of the training courses? Those I observed carried out the practical 
lessons with varying levels ofenthusiasm; while some dragged their feet, most completed the tasks 
assigned. Some trainees resisted the strict rules against phone use, and in one facility, Tamil 
trainees complained that Sinhalese instructors discriminated against them. Many were dissatisfied 
with conditions in the facility's hostel where they slept at night. But when asked directly, none 
openly rejected the content of the training course. Although some complaints about individual 
instructors or misdeeds of fellow trainees were mentioned, few objected to the training itself. The 
single most common issue raised was the language portion of the training; many wished it could 
66 Nationality-based hierarchies of domestic workers have been noted, for example, in Qatar (Nagy 1998) 

and Lebanon (Jureidini and Moukarbe1 2004: 586), as well as Taiwan (Lan 2006) and Hong Kong 

(Constable 2007). 
67 Ong (2006) makes a similar point about Filipina workers attaining 'trophy' maid status and thus generally 
being better treated by employers in Southeast Asia in contrast to Indonesian workers, who have worse 
reputations. 
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be enhanced, saying their knowledge of Arabic was insufficient. While trainees may have been 
reluctant to voice criticisms for fear that I would pass this information on to their instructors, the 
majority seemed genuinely satisfied. 
However, several women said they felt more anxious about going abroad after the training than 
before. A number of trainees had already worked abroad and shared their experiences with the 
neophytes. The hostel at the training facility provided a platform for such chronicles, as new and 
old migrants inter-mingled at night and swapped horror stories about employers who failed to pay 
or abused their domestic workers. Instructors' warnings about employers who beat their domestic 
workers confIrmed their fears. During interviews, many trainees asked whether I thought it was 
indeed dangerous for a young girl [i.e. virgin] to go to a particular country, or whether it was true 
that employers would hit them. Others asked for telephone numbers they could call for help. Two 
women said that as a result of the stories they heard, they had nearly made up their minds not to go 
abroad but had already given their passports to agencies and now felt compelled to go despite their 
fears. The Officer in Charge (OIC) at the Dambulla training centre said that according to her 
records, only 75 percent of those women who complete the training end up going abroad. The 
main reasons for declining to go were family problems, problems with recruitment agencies, or 
visa irregularities. Similarly, the OlC at the Chilaw facility estimated that 15-20 percent of the 
trainees decided not to go abroad for the same reasons or because they had misgivings about 
leaving their children. Although neither OIC mentioned it as a factor, my discussions with 
migrants suggested that some decide not to go based on anxieties fuelled by the stories they hear at 
the training facilities. In this sense, the training gives women realistic warnings about the problems 
they may encounter. However, as I described in the previous chapter, the majority of my 
interviews with potential migrants suggested that most women were not naive about the dangers to 
begin with, having heard stories from previous migrants in their home communities or having been 
exposed to them on TV and in the newspapers. During the period of research, Sinhala and Tamil­
language media were closely following the story of Rizana Nafeek, a Sri Lankan who migrated to 
Saudi Arabia at the age of seventeen and was sentenced to death by beheading after her 
employer's infant died in her care. Such stories inspired a degree of wariness among departing 
migrants. 
Veteran migrants offered critical reactions to the training after having worked abroad. Maria, a 
returnee interviewed in Sri Lanka who had worked for four years in Lebanon and 18 years in 
Singapore, said: 
You know, the trainers say if you work hard, and you show that you are clean, the employer will like 
you. But it depends on the personal problems of the employer, too. If the lady has a problem with her 
husband and her husband talks with you, even if you are very good, she will get angry with you. It's 
not always the maid's fault. But also, sometimes we do things wrong. It can be either side. 
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Another long-tenn migrant, Chandra, who was employed in Jordan as a domestic worker, told me 
about her experience completing a 12-day training programme in 1999 in Colombo. Her first 
recollection of the training was that it had been difficult for her to attend. She is from a village 
near Kalutara, 40 km south of Colombo, and had to wake at 3 a.m. each day to cook for her family 
before travelling to Colombo by bus for the training. When I asked her opinion on the training 
based on her subsequent experience working in Jordan, she replied: 'It was useless. I got nothing 
from it. I didn't learn a thing. I had to learn everything when I got here.' She said that the Arabic 
dialect they had taught was considerably different from the one she had to master in Jordan. She 
also cited differences in the style of food they learned to cook and said the appliances used in 
training were out-dated. Her comments resemble those of employers in Jordan, who have said that 
despite the training, domestic workers arrive from Sri Lanka with no knowledge of Arabic and 
great difficulty learning to use equipment and cleaning products. 
Similar criticisms were expressed by an official at the Sri Lankan embassy in Amman in an 
interview in July 2008. When asked his opinion about the training programme, he said: 
My understanding is that it is not enough. I don't know whether it is even satisfying the requirement 
by 20 percent. Jordan is different than Saudi Arabia. Kuwait is different than Saudi Arabia. It should 
be a country-specific training program. Those doing the training should know what Jordan is like. I 
don't think the trainers are aware of what the situation is here. The training should prepare workers 
psychologically. You have gone to various places in Sri Lanka. If you go deep in Kurunegala, 
Moneragala or Matara or Batticaloa - there are very poor people. They live in huts. Not houses like 
this. They don't use appliances. So, when they come here, it's a problem. You should give a quality 
service to get a return. When we look at the Filipinos, they speak English, and they are professionals. 
So, I think we should also bring our people up to that category. You should give a quality service, 
and for that we should be prepared. 
These comments point to the need for more country-specific infonnation to be provided in the 
training, a deficiency also noted by migrants. They also suggest an attitude that, because Sri 
Lankan migrants are less well-educated and hail from poor, rural backgrounds, they are less 
'professional' and hence deserve lower salaries. This notion has purchase among migrants and 
employers alike in Jordan. 
Moral Migration and the Patriarchal Family 
In addition to the three goals identified above, a significant component of the training emphasises 
women's moral obligations to their families as the root cause of migration. A significant amount 
of class time is devoted to how women should prepare their families for their absence. Unlike 
women, men are not required to enrol in training programmes prior to working abroad (Dias and 
Jayasundere 2002: II). The absence of women from the household for overseas work is assumed 
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to be more disruptive to families than that of men. There is also an assumption that women need to 
be 'protected' in ways that male workers do not.68 
In addition to preparing their families, women migrants are instructed on how they themselves 
should deal with the emotional strain of separation. For example, if they receive a letter from 
home while working, they are advised not to read it immediately because it could distract them 
from their work. In one session I observed on this topic, the instructor told an anecdote about a 
young woman whose grandmother died three days after her departure for the Middle East. The 
girl's husband called the training centre to inquire how to contact the girl. The instructor refused to 
give the husband the phone number, not wanting the migrant to be informed of her grandmother'S 
sudden death lest it cause her to break her contract and return immediately. In the event that 
trainees miss their families, they are advised to listen to music or sing to themselves quietly 
(SLBFE 1999: 35). It is suggested that treating their employers' children like their own will help 
them feel less lonely (ibid). Migrants are also given suggestions on how to counter thoughts that 
could interfere with work. 'For example as against an unfavourable thought like, "there is work 
throughout the day. I am now sick of this work" argue with a counter thought like "I came here to 
work not to enjoy comforts, I get a good salary for the work I do. Why should I be concerned 
about being loaded with lots of work, after all I do not have any other problem'" (SLBFE 1999: 
35-6). Trainees are advised to write down 'positive' statements so that they can be read again and 
again. 
A training unit on 'Family Marriage and Sexual Life' discusses the institution of the family in 
order to highlight the problems women's absence can trigger. 'The mother occupies the central 
position in a family. Family discipline, nutrition and protection are her responsibilities. She has to 
perform functions in relation to these responsibilities .... It is not possible to avert the damage the 
family experiences when the females migrate abroad for employment' (SLBFE 1999: 19). In a 
session I observed in Mount Lavinia, a class was asked to do a group exercise in which they 
discussed what they should have already done and should still do as wives, mothers and daughters. 
They were then asked to consider what problems their families might face in their absence, and 
how to solve them. Rather than portraying migration as potentially emancipatory for women, the 
training emphasises the figure of the sacrificial mother who migrates for her family's benefit. 
Migrants are encouraged to remain focused on their family goals while abroad, to send money 
home regularly and to visit Sri Lanka every two years. They are told to remain disciplined, both 
fiscally and sexually. Those who have love affairs or stay away too long are cast in negative terms, 
illustrative of the hazards of working away from home. 
68 As Dias and Jayasundere point out, most NGO initiatives aimed at raising awareness among migrants 
also have focused exclusively on women, with a lack of attention to male workers (2002: 27). 
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Cautionary tales about other migrants are used throughout the programme to impart moral lessons. 
For example, in a class I observed in Chilaw, an instructor told trainees the story of a mother who 
went abroad when her son was 15. Sometime after she left, a neighbour gave the boy a cigarette 
laced with drugs. Now, the instructor explained, the boy is in a mental hospital and is very angry 
with his mother for having left. 'As a woman and as a mother, your first priority is to look after 
your family, your husband, your children,' she told her class. This story reinforces a broader 
popular discourse that blames migrant mothers for the problems that occur when they are absent. 
Families with 'missing' migrant mothers are commonly alleged to be at greater risk of 
experiencing infidelity, divorce, alcoholism, or to have children who are sexually or physically 
abused.69 
The overall message is conflicting and potentially demoralising as wom~n face what, for many, is 
the most frightening step in their lives. Far from being a source of potential independence, 
migration is portrayed as part and parcel of their commitment to their families. In advising women 
how to prepare their families for their absence, the training presents an image of women's rightful 
place within family structures. Disciplined, chaste and acquiescent workers are portrayed as a 
success for their families. Thus, the training both perpetuates the moral economy of the patriarchal 
family while at the same time encouraging women to enter the global labour market. 
The training curriculum proposes that provided that the migrant remains focussed on her goals, 
sends money home regularly and does not stay away too long, migration can be a boon for her and 
her family. The risks of family disintegration are greater, it is suggested, if migrants stay abroad 
for lengthy periods and do not maintain close contact with their kin. Frequent return trips and 
regular remittances are portrayed as good for the family unit. But they also serve national interests. 
Temporary migration of 'unskilled' workers offers particular benefits to sending states. Such 
workers have fewer opportunities to settle abroad than those who are considered highly-skilled, 
and those who migrate for shorter periods are more likely to send money home often, ensuring a 
steady influx of foreign exchange. In the training curriculum, the interests of the state, migrant and 
family seemingly become one. But as many women are keenly aware, the consequences of 
migrating are not so straightforward. Because mothers play such crucial roles in maintaining Sri 
Lankan families, the promise of winning one's fortune abroad comes with risking the family's 
well-being. Women receive a mixed message both in the training and in society at large: that they 
should go abroad as a familial duty, but that doing so may lead to their family's undoing. The 
69 Horror stories about the dangers of migration abound in popular parlance and in much of the academic 
literature on migration (Gamburd 2008a: 12-13). Spencer describes a village love alTair between the 
daughter of a migrant in the Middle East and the daughter's boyfriend, who both poison themselves after a 
dispute. The girl dies, and the boy is left seriously ill. According to Spencer, the moral message of the story 
is clear to villagers: 'Things go wrong, the mother is not there, and tragedy ensues. In the end, the mother is 
to blame, and migration is the source of moral disorder' (2003: 4). 
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incoherence of the training programme in this regard reflects contradictions within state and 
popular discourse more broadly, in which women's migration is portrayed as both a social evil and 
an economic necessity. 
Conclusion 
Domestic workers are typically categorised as 'unskilled' workers. But as these training 
programmes suggest, considerable cultural and linguistic knowledge is required for them to 
perform their jobs to the satisfaction of employers. The extent to which the training succeeds in 
preparing migrants for this task is not obvious. As employers and bureaucrats alike note, the 
programme is insufficient in preparing migrants for their new work environments. By the end of 
the course, trainees may memorise a few Arabic words but remain unable to comprehend 
instructions or converse with their employers. Most do not possess detailed knowledge about the 
countries in which they will be employed. Nor are they invariably eager to migrate. If anything, 
some become more fearful and decide not to leave. In this way, the training courses may be 
successful in weeding out women whose nerves may not be strong enough to stand the strain. But 
I am not making the argument that all workers are being successfully inculcated in how to be 
subservient. This is a short course. And as any teacher knows, some advice that students are given 
ends up like water down the proverbial duck's back. 
That a government would establish a training programme aiming to impart certain skills and fail 
utterly in the process is not unusual. What is unusual is that a programme purportedly designed to 
reduce the likelihood of abuse makes no pretence that workers have protection against abuse in 
the first place. Rather than encouraging 'rights-based empowerment' - as international donors and 
anti-trafficking gurus now dictate that governments should do • the Sri Lankan government's 
training programme suggests that abuse is not only possible but likely. 
What is striking about this case, then, is that it is a frank admission that the Sri Lankan 
government cannot - or will not· protect its citizens abroad. Workers are made to understand in 
no uncertain terms that their fate is in their own hands. Their best hope is to try to please their 
employers. This is where the three goals identified earlier come into play. The instruction of 
bourgeois values with regards to cleanliness, the emphasis on obedience, and the goal of 
'personality development' can be analysed as an endeavour on the part ofgovernment bureaucrats 
to impart the dispositions necessary for maintaining a flow of workers that cause minimal 
problems in host states and, hence, maximise the flow of remittances. 
One caveat should be added, however. When government bureaucrats designed the training 
programme, they presumed that well-mannered, well-groomed migrants would be better suited to 
work abroad. But this may not have been because such workers were presumed to cause fewer 
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problems. Middle-class prejudices unrelated to overseas migration also underpin the lessons. The 
curriculum embodies a civilising mission on the part of comparatively more prosperous civil 
servants who look down on lower-class workers as uncouth and attempt to make them more 
refined. Similarly, while much of the programme adheres to the training manuals, additional 
advice and explanations are given by instructors. This is based on their own experiences, opinions 
and stereotypes about the Middle Eastern 'other'. The content of the lessons are a composite of 
influences, and so the programme should not be seen exclusively in terms of state instrumentality. 
Nevertheless, with its underdog status in the market for domestic workers, the Sri Lankan state 
encourages migrants to adopt strategies of accommodation rather than reform. While ostensibly 
initiated as a protectionary measure to curb the threat of abuse, the training programmes endorse a 
view that abuse and non-payment of wages are natural and acceptable results of insufficient work 
and poor personality development. In this way, the problem of abuse is located in the body and 
behaviour of the worker rather than in the employer or host government. 
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Gifts from Abroad: Domestic Servants and the Political Economy ofJordan 
One cold January morning in Amman, I had one of many conversations with a taxi driver about 
Jordan's ailing economy. He thought the presence of foreign workers was part of the problem. We 
pulled up at a traffic light next to a man in a grimy, tangerine-coloured unifonn sweeping a pile of 
debris. Tilting his head in the direction of the street-cleaner, the taxi driver said, 'He's probably 
Egyptian. Jordanians don't want these jobs. They all want to be sheikhs, smoking the argilah and 
sleeping, not doing anything.' The notion that even when Jordanians need the money, their pride 
prevents them from undertaking certain types of work is commonly espoused. What many refer to 
as the thaqafat al- 'aib (culture of shame) is said to explain the large-scale employment of 
migrants for low-paid work. A case in point: In a speech to the Cabinet in 1998, fonner Prime 
Minister Abdul Salam Majali referred to the thaqafat al- 'aib as the main cause ofjoblessness and 
basis for the kingdom's reliance on foreign labour.70 
The Arab region has some of the highest rates of unemployment in the world, and with a rapidly 
growing popUlation, those rates are set to rise. Why, then, have governments facilitated the 
recruitment oflarge numbers of workers from outside the region? This contradiction is even more 
puzzling in Jordan, where rates of poverty and unemployment among citizens are particularly 
high. As many as 14.2 percent of Jordan's population, or 700,000, live in what the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) considers 'extreme poverty' (UNDP 2009: 113)." No reliable 
statistics on unemployment exist, but according to government estimates it was 12.7 percent as of 
2008. Independent sources have said it is as high as 30 percent. Joblessness is reportedly 39 
percent among the young, and 59 percent among young women (UNDP 2009: 109). These figures 
compare with a global average of 6.4 percent (ibid: 10). And yet, Egyptians collect the garbage, 
pump the gas, tend to the agricultural fields and work on construction sites; Chinese and South 
Asian migrants work in the garment factories; and Sri Lankan, Filipina and Indonesian women do 
the paid domestic work. Despite some 44,500 new jobs created annually from 2000 to 2005, there 
has been no substantial decline in unemployment, in part because many of those jobs have been 
filled by expatriates (Razzaz and Iqbal 2008: 3). Foreign workers comprise at least 24 percent of 
70 As reported by the Jordan Times, 'Majali calls for comprehensive efforts to fight poverty, 

unemployment' Sunday, June 28, 1998. 

71 This is based on survey data from 2002 using estimates of the national poverty line· which is lower than 

the two-dollar-a-day international line - and taking into account the cost of food and basic non-food needs 

(UNDP 2009: 112). 
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the labour force (Ministry of Labour 2010: 14) and remit an estimated 3 billion JDs ($4.23 billion) 
from the kingdom each year. 
On the surface, this may appear paradoxical, but here I argue that Jordan's recruitment of foreign 
workers is no accident, and that the reasons have less to do with the 'thaqafat al- 'aib' than with 
political economic structures relating to rentierism. The first section of this chapter provides an 
overview of the country's rentier economy as crucial to the employment of foreign workers and 
expansion of domestic service over the past four decades. The 'rentier economy' refers to 
Jordan's dependence on a regular supply of external economic rent, or 'unearned' income not 
derived from productive activity in the domestic economy.72 Rentier theory holds that if the 
majority of revenue comes from outside the domestic economy, domestic politics tend to revolve 
around gaining access to that rent, or from the perspective of rulers, allocating rent in ways that 
ensure political stability (Nsour 2002: fn 15). In this case the two main sources of rent are foreign 
subsidies and expatriate remittances. The second section of the chapter draws on ethnographic and 
other data to explore the nature of demand for foreign domestic workers at the household level. 
The third and final section builds on these insights and extends the analysis, suggesting that paid 
domestic workers provide a service that has implications for the kingdom's economy as a whole. 
Part One: An Oil Economy Without Oil 
External subsidies have been a pillar of the political economy since the territory of Transjordan 
was first carved out as part of the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France. It 
extends back to the early days of Hashemite rule, when Amir 'Abdullah, an outsider to whom 
local groups did not naturally feel allegiance, used British subsidies to purchase loyalty. Backed 
by British largesse, Abdullah I was installed as the ruler of the British Mandate of Transjordan in 
1921 and continued as king when it was granted independence in 1946. Prior to WWI, Jordan was 
largely rural and more homogenous and egalitarian than many other parts of the region (Wilson 
1987: 55). The chief differentiating factor among Transjordanians in 1920 was livelihood ­
pastoral or peasant (ibid). Economic differentiation increased during WWII, when high inflation, 
shortages and war profiteering led to the formation of a group of wealthy merchant landowners 
and moneylenders (Amawi 1994: 174-175, Wilson 1987: 165). By the end of the 1940s, in 
addition to a mercantile bourgeoisie, a middle class made up of small-scale traders, shopkeepers, 
craftsmen and civil servants, as well as a working class of wage labourers, had also begun to 
emerge (Shteiwi 1996: 410). 
The 1948 Arab-Israeli war sent the first major influx of Palestinians into Jordan. Tens of 
thousands of Palestinians, including large numbers of farmers and merchants, settled in Amman 
72 For an account ofrentier theory and the changing degree and nature of rent in the Jordanian economy, see 
Knowles (2005) and Brynen (1992). 
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and Irbid to the north (Shteiwi 1996: 411). Following Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in 
1950, Palestinians were granted full citizenship and quickly became the majority. Following 
'unification' and throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Jordan's economic policies favoured business 
and commercial interests in the East rather than West Bank (Carroll 2003: 110, Wilson 1987: 
193). Many West Bank elites moved or set up second homes in Amman, where work 
opportunities were more plentiful (Carroll 2003: 109, Massad 2001: 236). According to a survey 
conducted in Amman by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1960, the upper class, estimated at 8.2 
percent of the population, was predominantly comprised of top public and private sector 
employees and commercial and industrial business owners (Shteiwi 1996: 411). A small middle 
class (20.9 percent) included professionals, technicians and sales workers, while a large working 
class (67 percent) engaged in service, transport, communication and production work, as well 
mining, quarrying and the armed forces (Shteiwi 1996: 411). 
Israel's occupation of the West Bank in 1967 sent another 310,000 Palestinian refugees fleeing 
across the Jordan River, and the Palestinian resistance movement began to consolidate in Jordan. 
In 1970, deteriorating relations between the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Hashemite 
regime eventually led to violent clashes later known as Black September, prompting a campaign 
of 'Jordanisation' in which scores of Palestinians were expelled from military and government 
posts (Massad 2001: 13, 246). Palestinians remain grossly under-represented in senior 
government, military and security jobs. Shut out of much of the public sector, they have 
traditionally dominated the private sector, particularly banking and commerce (Carrot12003: 114­
5). 
By the mid-1980s, with an economic crisis in the Gulf and prospects for continued foreign aid and 
remittances receding. Jordan's economy was on the verge of collapse. Budget deficit and external 
debt levels soared, as did unemployment. Facing financial crisis, in 1989 Amman took loans from 
the IMF and World Bank that hinged on far-reaching structural adjustment programmes. During 
this period the government slashed food and utilities subsidies, revamped the tax system, and 
privatised public sector enterprises, including oil refineries, cement, transport, water and 
telecommunications companies. This sent the cost of living soaring, and a freeze on public sector 
employment exacerbated unemployment. By 1999 more than one-third of the popUlation was 
living under the poverty line (Nazza12005: 7-8). 
The neoliberal policies advocated by the IMF and World Bank have yet to produce the economic 
'progress' promised.?3 Income disparities have risen since 1989, leading to an increasingly 
73 I refer to neoliberalism in the sense defined by Harvey (2005: 2): 'a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights. free markets, 
and free trade.' 
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polarised society (Saif and Tabbaa 2008: 11). Today the economy relies heavily on the service 
sector, which comprises over 70 percent of GDP and 75 percent of jobs (World Bank 2010a: 1). 
According to the UNDP, the type of services that predominate contribute little to the local 
knowledge base and lock the country into an inferior position in world markets (UNDP 2009: 
103). Manufacturing and agriculture make smaller contributions, representing 10.6 and 2.6 
percent of total employment respectively (Department of Statistics 2009). Jordan's relatively 
unproductive economy is part of a wider regional pattern of de-industrialisation as a consequence 
of oil-led economic growth. On average, Arab countries were less industrialised in 2007 than 
1970 (UNDP 2009: 103). 
With little in the way of industry, Jordan relies heavily on income from expatriate remittances and 
overseas development assistance (ODA), primarily from the United States and European Union. 
Foreign sources of revenue comprised more than 54 percent of the budget in 1980 and throughout 
much of the 1970s (Baylouny 2008: 284). In per capita terms, Jordan was the highest recipient of 
aid flows from the 1970s until the early 1990s (ESCW A 2007: 20). It was the seventh-largest 
recipient of US foreign assistance in 2010, a position it is expected to maintain in 2011 (Lawson 
et a12010: 15). From donors' perspectives, the flow of aid has acted as a political and economic 
stabiliser, helping to prop up the Hashemite regime and to ensure the provision ofa logistical base 
for US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, cooperation in intelligence sharing, and the 
maintenance of good ties with Israel. 
External rents have played a pivotal role in shaping state-economy relations. They allowed the 
government sector to expand and dole out large benefits to loyal constituencies, namely tribal 
elites, East Bank landowners and business classes (Brynen 1992: 79-80). They have also helped 
ensure quietism in the absence of meaningful political participation. Although nominally a 
constitutional monarchy, the real reins of power are held by the king and his court. Parliamentary 
and municipal elections are held, but electoral districting and the distribution of scats is skewed 
towards thinly populated, tribal areas in the south and north, where support for the monarchy is 
strongest. This leaves the majority Palestinian population under-represented and undercuts 
support for the opposition Islamic Action Front, which is favoured in urban constituencies. 
Although parliamentary and municipal elections are held regularly, most poJicymaking is done 
behind closed doors by authoritarian rule. King Abdullah II appoints the prime minister, cabinet 
and the upper house and controls the security services. He can dissolve parliament, veto 
legislation and introduce 'provisional laws' with the full force of law when parliament is out of 
session. He has done so twice since assuming power in 1999. When parliament was out of session 
between 2001 and 2003, more than 220 provisional laws were passed by royal decree, including 
controversial investment and economic reforms and amendments to the penal code introducing 
harsh penalties for publications that could damage national unity or tarnish the kingdom's 
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reputation. Parliament was disbanded again in 2009, during which time Prime Minister Samir 
Rifai's government introduced more than thirty provisional laws on thorny issues such as 
pensions, taxes and utilities pricing. Shortly before this thesis was submitted, in the spring of 
2011, popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt had triggered renewed calls for political reform and 
support for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, which would limit the king's powers 
to appoint or disband parliament. 
Returning to the issue of rentierism, worker remittances presently form the other major source of 
rent and comprise at least a fifth of the GDP. Although Jordan lacks the oil wealth of its eastern 
neighbours, it has been said to have an oil economy because a large proportion of its workforce is 
employed in the Gulf states. Beginning in the early 1950s and throughout the following two 
decades, hundreds of thousands of Jordanians - most of Palestinian origin - sought employment in 
the Gulf. This relieved pressure on the local labour market and furnished the kingdom with an 
increasingly significant source of income. Rather than viewing the loss of skilled labour as a 
'brain drain', the government fostered emigration through a range of policies, including tailoring 
education curricula and vocational training to meet the needs of oil-exporting countries (Brand 
2007: 4, De Bel Air 2003). Today an estimated 600,000 to 670,000 Jordanians, most of whom are 
highly skilled, work abroad, with half a million in the Gulf countries alone (De BcI Air 2010: 1). 
The high rate ofemigration of skilled labour has political rami fications, allowing for the departure 
of potential rivals and lessening the threat of destabilisation from frustrated middle and upper 
classes (ibid: 10). Emigration serves as a safety valve for contradictions in the distribution of 
economic and political power. As Brand (2007: 4) has suggested, the Jordanian government has 
promoted a strategy of encouraging out-migration rather than making the structural reforms 
required to create jobs at home. Both foreign aid and remittances appear to have reduced 
incentives for the government to mobilise domestic resources and to make the long-term 
investments needed to strengthen the kingdom's economic base. 
Jordanian emigration to the Gulf peaked during the oil boom from 1973 to 1985, and it was 
during these years that demand for foreign labour within Jordan increased - particularly in sectors 
benefitting from the investment of expatriate remittances. In the 1970s and 80s, the government 
allowed for the entry of 'unskilled' and 'semi-skilled' workers from Egypt, Syria and several 
Asian countries. This came at a time in which unemployment among Jordanians and Palestinians 
had dropped to almost nothing due to high rates of public sector employment and out-migration 
(Baylouny 2008: 286). Much like the Gulf states, Jordan's labour market was segmented into two 
parts - one for citizens with higher wages and more benefits, and the other, concentrated in 
agriculture, manufacturing, building and services, for temporary workers, with low wages and few 
legal protections. As opposed to 'immigrants', migrant workers are officially referred to as 'al­
'ammai al-wafidin' (incoming labour), suggesting that they are visiting rather than settling 
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pennanently. Article 12 ofthe 1996 Jordanian Labour Code states that foreigners should be hired 
only if there are no qualified Jordanians to perfonn the job. In such cases, priority should be given 
to Arab workers. In practice, however, expatriate workers from Arab and non-Arab countries are 
routinely hired for jobs involving manual labour. In 2010, the Ministry of Labour passed a 
temporary regulation allowing foreign workers to join existing unions, but they are not allowed to 
fonn their own unions or hold key positions.74 Government pennission must be obtained in order 
to organise strikes; migrants who have engaged in illegal strikes have been beaten and deported 
(ICFTU 20 I 0). 
According to the Ministry of Labour (2008: 29), 303,325 non-Jordanians held work pennits in 
2008, of whom 67 percent were Egyptian. This figure rose to 335,707 in 2009 (Ministry of 
Labour 2010). According to unofficial estimates, there may be as many as 100,000 to 150,000 
unregistered migrants working in the kingdom (ICFTU 2010). Many of the new jobs created in 
recent years have been in construction and manufacturing in the Qualifying Industrial Zones 
(QIZs), where foreigners make up the majority of the workforce. The QIZs were meant to be an 
incentive for Jordan to agree to a US-brokered peace treaty with Israel in 1994 and allow for duty­
free exports to the United States provided that 8 percent of the content is Israeli. Although touted 
as a reward for Jordan, Jordanians have seen few of the benefits. The majority of the companies 
are owned by non-Jordanians (Baylouny 2005: 42, Halaby 2010). No company with purely Arab 
capital appears to operate in any of the QIZs (Nazzal 2005: 14). At least 66 percent of the 
workforce is non-Jordanian (lLO 2006: 4). Deepak, a personnel manager at a gannent factory in 
One of the QIZs in Dulayl, told me that while there was initially an understanding that foreigners 
should not exceed one third of the total workforce, in practice at least 80 percent of the workers he 
hired were young women from other countries because they had a better work ethic and were 
better at taking orders. 'Jordanians don't want these jobs. This is a poor country. They need the 
money, but they don't want to do the work,' he said. The need to recruit foreigners is frequently 
explained with reference to what employers describe as a 'shortage' of domestic labour. This so­
called shortage is used to justify the continued recruitment of foreign workers under tenns 
favourable to employers. 
Factory managers typically expect garment factory workers to work long hours, especially when 
there is a rush to fill an order. A study of working conditions in the QIZs in 2005 and 2006 by a 
labour watchdog found that 'mandatory 38 to 48 and even 72-hour shifts are routine' (Kernaghan 
2006). Workers have reported having to work until 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning on Thursdays in 
74 Trade union activities are heavily restricted. All unions must belong to the General Federation of 
Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU). and Ministry of Labour approval is required for new unions to be formed 
(ICTFU 2010). The rate of union membership among Jordanians is estimated at 10 to 15 percent of the 
labour force (Solidarity Centre 2005: 9). 
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order to reach production targets before the weekend (ICFTU 2007: 7). Given that Jordanian 
families commonly expect women to be home before dark and that the labour law prohibits night 
shifts for women, employers tend to favour migrants who live in labour accommodation facilities 
near the worksite and who are willing or can be coerced to work longer hours. Similarly, in the 
agricultural sector in the Jordan Valley, farm owners prefer to hire migrants who will live on the 
farm and accept lower wages and dependent work rcIations (Van Aken 2005: 120). Migrant 
women have complained of being prevented by factory managers from leaving the workplace on 
Fridays, the stipulated day off (ICFTU 2007: 7). Workplace accidents and labour rights violations 
are reportedly rampant (ICFTU 2007: 6-10, Kernaghan 2006). As of2011, the minimum wage in 
Jordan was 150 JD ($212) per month. Minimum wage restrictions do not apply to migrant 
workers, and many of those employed in the garment factories earn significantly less than their 
Jordanian counterparts. In April 2011, several thousand Asian garment factory workers went on 
strike demanding an increase in their wages from 110 JD to 150 JD per month (Palma 2011). The 
workers said that in response to the strike, factory owners stopped supplying food, water and 
electricity to their hostels (ibid). When the workers brought their case before a labour court, they 
were ordered to return to work. The fact that employers do not have to contribute towards social 
security or severance pay for foreign workers also makes them less expensive to employ. 
Government policies that allow firms to hire expatriates under these conditions represent a 
concession to capital, a way of deregulating the lowest rank in the labour market and maintaining 
a more or less unfree, menial workforce. These policies have played a role in determining low 
wage levels and working conditions that Jordanians find unfavourable." The 'shortage' of 
domestic labour to fill these jobs is at least partially a result of this. 
Given the high rates of poverty and unemployment, why haven't more Jordanians lowered their 
standards to take up jobs now filled by expatriates? Few in-depth empirical studies have been 
done on the issue of work (or the lack thereof) among this segment of Jordanian society. 
According to a World Bank report (Razzaz and Iqbal 2008: 3-4), more than half of the 
unemployed are not willing to accept available jobs at current wage levels. The authors suggest 
this is because they expect to obtain better remunerated employment in the public sector or abroad 
or to receive some form of income support. Public scctor jobs are still preferred because of the 
75 Drawing on research conducted at AI-Hassan Industrial Estate, Hasselknippe and EI-Ahed (Forthcoming) 
describe the practical and social obstacles Palestinian and Jordanian women workers face in garment 
factories. This includes disapproval from male relatives, a lack of childcare facilities, a fear of arbitrary 
dismissal as a result of personal disputes with managers, and what were perceived to be unfair salary 
deductions for absenteeism. Many expressed dissatisfaction with working conditions and pay. Complaints 
were made about poor ventilation, filthy toilets and restrictions on visits to the toilet, and an exhausting 
work regime. Only one third of the workforce at AI-Hassan is Jordanian. Jordanians and non·Jordanians 
work in segregated teams because, according to Hasselknippe and EI-Abed, many Jordanians would not 
want their daughters or wives to work alongside foreign women, who are viewed as morally deficient and 
sexually promiscuous. 
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social security and retirement benefits they offer, the guarantee of steady income, and the short 
working hours. Even if such jobs are not as plentiful as they were in the past, expectations remain. 
Foreign workers tend to dominate in sectors of employment that are not considered prestigious, 
and there is evidence to suggest that certain jobs are further stigmatised by their association with 
foreigners. For example, the fact that agricultural work is done by migrant workers reportedly has 
made local men less inclined to perform it (Van Aken 2005: 116). Similarly, a study on 
unemployment found that Jordanians were discouraged from seeking employment in jobs 
dominated by non-Jordanians (Guegnard et a1. 2005: 24-25). (Attitudes towards foreign workers 
will be discussed in chapter 5, on domestic worker-employer relations.) It would be an 
exaggeration to say that working in certain sectors is so taboo that no one will do it. A significant 
portion of Palestinians residing in the refugee camps, for example, work in mining and 
manufacturing, a sector in which many non-Jordanians are also employed (Tiltnes 1999: 25). An 
empirical question remains as to whether certain jobs are viewed negatively due to their 
association with foreigners, because of the nature of the work itself, or because they are poorly 
remunerated. A survey of 200 unemployed men and women carried out by Jordan University'S 
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS 2006: 8) found that the majority would not work in agriculture 
and or in factories for 150 JD ($212) per month but would do so if the wages were increased to 
200 JD ($282). These wages would still not be sufficient to prompt them to accept employment as 
cleaners or in construction, however. A study on the tourism industry found that of 2,778 
respondents surveyed, the overwhelming majority (60.2 percent) expressed a preference for 
working in the public sector as opposed to 24 percent in a tourism-related establishment (USAID 
2007: 2). Only 12 percent said they were averse to working in tourism because such work was 
against their norms and traditions (USAID 2007: 49). A more significant factor, cited by 27 
percent, was the belief that such jobs were less secure. Greater numbers reported that public sector 
jobs offered more fringe benefits (31 percent) or better salaries (13 percent) than jobs in tourism 
(ibid). This suggests that cultural attitudes do playa role, but that other factors such as wages and 
benefits are equally ifnot more important. 
Several sources ofwelfare support enable economically-deprived families to withstand hard times 
without having to accept less prestigious work. This includes charitable assistance from groups 
such as the Islamic Center Charity and Society (lCCS), one of the largest NGOs in the kingdom, 
and, for Palestinians, welfare and basic services from the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Many low-income houscholds 
receive income from relatives working abroad. One in three Palestinians residing in refugee 
camps received gifts, transfers or remittances from abroad in the 1990s (Tiltnes 1999: 25). The 
military and security services are also important. Conscription ended in 1992, but the military 
continues to employ a large sector of the workforce. Ten percent of the total labour force 
80 
reportedly worked in the anny in 1997 (Abrahart et al 2002 as cited by Baylouny 2008: 301). 
According to Baylouny, the military and security service is the only sector to have expanded 
during structural adjustment. In contrast to other forms of welfare support that have declined, 
social welfare for military personnel and their families has been enhanced (Baylouny 2008: 302). 
Employees and their dependents receive free health care and scholarships for higher education 
and can purchase goods at subsidised rates at military cooperative stores (ibid). This form of state 
welfare has been bolstered by aid from the United States, which eannarks a substantial portion of 
its assistance to Jordan for military expenditures (Baylouny 2008: 301). 
To summarise briefly, this chapter has suggested that while the 'culture of shame' is not 
insignificant, it has been somewhat overplayed as an explanation for why Jordan employs so 
many foreign workers. The country's rentier economy, employers' preferences for more pliable, 
less expensive foreign labour, and concessionary government policies allowing foreign workers to 
be employed regardless of the impact on the local labour market should also be considered. This 
is not to say that cultural attitudes to work are irrelevant, but rather that such attitudes themselves 
may be influenced by how well remunerated certain jobs are and the kinds of benefits and security 
they offer. Given other sources of support and expectations of alternate employment options, 
many Jordanians have not been motivated to take up menial jobs under the prevailing 
circumstances. 
Part Two: Understanding Demand for Domestic Servants 
Historical Shifts in Domestic Service 
Let us now tum to the issue of demand for domestic workers. The genealogy of domestic service 
in the area that now comprises Jordan is difficult to trace due to a lack of source material. As Zilfi 
(2004: 4) notes with reference to the Middle East from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth 
centuries, historical sources on women's work in general, let alone domestic employment, are few 
and far between, and most of what is known of servants derives from shari 'a court registers.76 
Based on the limited sources available, it appears that in the 1950s and 1960s paid domestic 
workers in Amman were predominantly low-income women from ruml households and 
Palestinian refugees from the camps (Humphrey 1991: 54). Interviews with older residents of 
Amman suggest that the employment of women from the refugee camps and the Jordan VaHey 
(Ghor) to assist with domestic work and child care is now rare. Two reasons are generaHy given 
for this. One is that it has become difficult to find women willing to do this type of work; the 
other is that once foreigners became available, employers preferred them. Unlike locals, they arc 
76 One exceptional study of the history of servants in the region is Judith Tucker's social history of 
nineteenth-century Egypt, which documents women's expanding employment as domestic servants (Tucker 
1985: 92-93). 
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willing to work on a live-in basis for less pay. They are also easier to control. A woman in her late 
sixties recalled her experiences employing domestic workers from the Jordan Valley. 
The women from Ghor were inconvenient. They'd want two or three days ofT. When they went, 
they'd take sugar and milk and olive oil and all sorts of things from the home back to their families. 
You have to spend like 20 JD on all of this stufTand pay for their transport. Her people would come 
with her when she came back to the house. So, people would rather have a Sri Lankeeyah. It's also 
very difficult to find girls from the Ghor nowadays who are willing to do this work. 
A similar trend has been described for the agricultural sector in the Jordan Valley, where farm 
owners prefer to hire Egyptians over Jordanians because they will work longer hours for lower 
wages without breaks or holidays (Van Aken 2005: 120-2). 
Curious about the experiences of local women who had worked or continue to work in domestic 
service, I tried in vain to identify people in Amman with whom to speak. One woman who 
employed a Palestinian woman to clean her home twice a week said she would pass along my 
questions but did not approve of the idea of my meeting the worker in person. It was not clear 
whether this made her uncomfortable or if she thought the worker herself would object. A fellow 
researcher who had grown up in Wihdat refugee camp in the 1950s and 60s said that if any 
women had been working in private homes during those years, they would have kept it secret. JIe 
recalled people referring to other camp residents as 'aw/ad al-khaddamal' ('children of servants') 
as a derogatory term but knew of no one who admitted their relatives actually did this work. The 
shameful aspect related not to the idea of women working outside their own homes but to the 
sexual connotations implied by working inside the homes of strangers. I eventually came to meet 
a young woman, Hala, who had worked as a research assistant on a project on garment factory 
workers in Irbid and who knew Palestinian women currently employed as domestic workers.IIala 
is from AI-Husn refugee camp, located in northern Jordan on the outskirts of lrbid. She offered to 
show me around the camp and introduce me to some of these women. The husbands of two of the 
seven women emphatically rejected the idea of their wives speaking with me about the subject, 
but I was able to meet with four of the others. 
AI-Husn camp, also known as Martyr Azmi AI-Mufti Camp, was set up in 1968 to shelter 
refugees displaced from the West Bank and Gaza by the 1967 war. Today there are an estimated 
26,000 inhabitants, including 22,000 registered refugees (UNRWA undated). lIa1a and I planned 
our visit to the camp on a Monday, when water flows freely through the pipes and women are 
most likely to be at home." As we meandered through the narrow streets and back alleys, women 
worked busily washing windows and doorways and hanging laundry in the warm sunlight. Of the 
four women we visited, two were widows and one was divorced. An four worked during the day 
and returned to the camp in the late afternoon. Samia is a 42-year-old mother of five from Syria 
77 Throughout much of the kingdom, water flows freely through the taps only once a week. For the next sil, 
days, households rely on a finite supply of water stored in tanks. 
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who moved to the camp when she married her husband, a Palestinian. She comes from a family of 
10 children and had no fonnal schooling. Shortly after her husband passed away, Samia began 
working outside the home because she had no other way to support her children. She initially 
cleaned schools and hospitals but was asked to show educational certificates in order to keep these 
jobs, so she began working in private homes. She worked for a single employer from 8 am to 3 
pm seven days a week for a monthly salary of 70 JD ($100). After five years, the employer, who 
was disabled, ended the arrangement because she wanted to hire full-time help. Samia was unable 
to leave her own children unattended at night and so was replaced by a Sri Lankan domestic 
worker. She has since remarried and has begun working in several different homes. Most of her 
employers are elderly. 'They have money but not health,' says Samia. Other Arab domestic 
workers she knows have complained about Sri Lankan and Filipina women taking their jobs, but 
Samia says it has not been difficult for her to find new employers. 
Samia and the other domestic workers emphasise the fact that they do not work in homes while 
men are present. Unlike Asian domestic workers, they do not refer to employers using fictive kin 
names, instead referring to them in the common way as Umm Samer (the mother of Samer), for 
example. In their conversations with me, they described their work as arduous but generally 
unproblematic, and though they mentioned occasional disputes over matters relating to payor 
work, they said their employers usually treated them with respect. They were aware that my 
research focussed on Asian domestic workers, and it is possible they glossed their own situations 
in a positive light as a way of distinguishing themselves. Three of the women had previously 
worked in gannent factories on the nearby AI-Hassan Industrial Estate, the largest OIZ. They said 
domestic work was preferable because the workday was shorter - 8 am to 2 pm as opposed to 4 or 
5 pm at the factory - and they did not have to stand in one place all day and could take breaks. 
The main drawback, however, was that being paid on a daily basis made it more difficult to save 
for large purchases, and they received no compensation if they had to stay home in the event that 
their children were i11. They reported earning an average ofS-10 JD per day ($10-13). They would 
have preferred working in the public sector, they said, but felt that as Palestinians, they were 
discriminated against and did not have the wasta, or kin and tribal tics, to obtain better 
employment. 
These women are now a small minority. Significant changes in the paid domestic workforce 
occurred as the Jordanian economy grew increasingly intertwined with the oil-based economic 
boom in the Gulf. The total number of migrant domestic workers in Amman in 1984 was 
estimated at 8,000 (Humphrey 1991: 55). The number has grown considerably. As of 2009, the 
Ministry of Labour estimated there were a total of 70,000 domestics in the kingdom from three 
main source countries: 35,000 Sri Lankans, 20,000 Indonesians and the rest from the Philippines. 
Interviews with recruiting agents and employers suggest that Sri Lankans and Filipinos were the 
83 
first groups to begin arriving in the late 1970s and early 1980s but that greater numbers of 
Indonesians have been recruited in recent years in response to employer demand for Muslim 
domestic workers and because they are willing to work for lower salaries than Filipino workers.78 
Recruitment agents say they are unable to satisfy even half of the demand for domestic workers in 
Jordan because there are not enough applications from the three main source countries. According 
to one agency, lower salaries and lower living standards in Jordan mean that many women prefer 
to work in the Gulf states. 
Recruiting agencies play an important role in shaping employers' perceptions of domestic 
workers. Agents often advise employers about which nationality of domestic worker would best 
suit their family based on stereotypes. Filipinas are said to be the best educated, most efficient and 
speak the most English, making them suitable for parents who would like their children to learn 
English. Sri Lankans and Indonesians, on the other hand, are reputed to be harder workers, 
suitable for large homes with lots of work, and are less apt to demand independence and push for 
certain rights, for example to have a mobile phone or to go out on weekends. One agency owner 
shared his observations: 
Families without much money, who have little resources, always want someone with no experience. 
They think, 'She'll take what she gets'. The most common problems with Filipinas are about a day 
ofT and a mobile. They want these things. Indonesians, because they are Muslim, don't believe in a 
day off. They have the same culture as the employers. With very conservative clients, I don't 
recommend that they get Filipina girls because in the Philippines, they have a Western life and have a 
hard time adjusting to life here. Here. people's idea of a domestic worker is that I own you. You can 
sleep when I sleep. You eat when I tell you to eat. You cannot even open the window or go out unless 
I say so. So, I don't tell them to get a maid from the Philippines. One from Sri lanka or Indonesia 
would be better. Although the contracts say that the worker should have a day's rest. that she is 
entitled to full payment, there is a very big gap in families' mentalities about these things. Ilow a 
worker will be treated depends on where her dice fall. Some get lucky and are given gifts, clothes are 
bought for them, and they are taken out on their birthdays. Others are not even allowed to look out 
the window. So, we like to make good matches. 
Agencies also offer advice about how domestic workers should be treated, encouraging employers 
not to allow them to venture out of the house alone or to talk with other migrant workers. 
Hospitality, Cleanliness and the Domestic Aesthetic 
Among elites, social life in Jordan involves a circuit of munasabat, or occasions, including 
holidays, engagement ceremonies, weddings, birthdays, baby showers, funerals, graduation 
parties and receptions of various kinds, all of which involve large gatherings. Families also 
regularly assemble for feasts on Fridays. Ilomes should always be prepared for the possibility of 
visits from relatives, friends and neighbours. Women derive much of their status from the 
78 Recruitment agents report that Sri lankan and Indonesian women are paid roughly the same monthly 
salary - approximately $125 - 150 during the period of research. Filipina domestic workers are commonly 
said to earn more. Without systematic data on their earnings. I cannot evaluate this claim, but it is worth 
noting that the minimum wage stipulated by the Philippines government was $400 per month compared 
with $150 set by the Sri lankan and Indonesian governments. 
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cleanliness of their homes and the intricacy of the meals they serve, both of which relate to all­
important traditions of hospitality. All of this requires significant amounts of labour. Even the 
mundane running of a household can be arduous. Traditional dishes are not easy or quick to make 
and often require several stages of preparation. Homes are cleaned in a particular manner, 
involving much soaping up and rinsing down. Carpets and mattresses must be beaten and exposed 
to the cleansing power of the sun. Windows, shutters and floors must be washed regularly to 
remove the dust that accumulates in the arid climate. 
Housework might not always have been so taxing. Homes have grown larger and grander, and 
standards for cleanliness have escalated in the rentier economy. As Forte's (2001) work on the 
expansion of consumption among Palestinians shows, expectations for hospitality and cleanliness 
have risen, and while women's labour in the home cleaning and baking bread used to playa 
central role in defining household status, that prestige is now connoted by women's ability to buy 
and use 'modern' goods as well as by their enjoyment of leisure activities. On the most basic 
level, demand for domestic servants relates to ideas of leisure and the escalation in the volume 
and forms of consumerism. As Beal's (1998, 2000, 2001) work on Amman's upper classes 
illustrates, conspicuous consumption of items for the home plays a particularly important role in 
the construction of elite status. Domestic service is undoubtedly part of this broader pattern, 
though Beal's account is object-focused and mentions servants only briefly.79 Domestic workers 
help employers maintain an appearance of leisured gentility while also facilitating a convenient, 
'modern' lifestyle (Gill 1994: 51). Though most families employing domestic workers are 
financially well-ofT, it has become increasingly common for middle-class families to hire 
domestic workers. I met school teachers, secretaries, hairdressers and taxi drivers who employed 
domestic workers. 
Household Composition, Life Course and Care Work 
Demand for domestic workers is fuelled not only by the need for help with housework but also 
with care work. This is particularly evident at stages in the family developmental cycle when 
children or the elderly need to be looked after. Changes in household composition and cross­
generational dynamics have meant that domestic workers are increasingly sought to perform work 
family members might have done in the past. There is evidence of households decreasing in size: 
according to national statistics, the average household size shrank by more than 15 percent over 
the past three decades, from 6.7 persons in 1979 (Dt ..partment of Statistics 2004) to 5.4 in 2008 
(Department of Statistics 2009). This decline is most likely partly a result of falling fertility levels, 
79 Beal has noted that while middle-class households in Amman might employ one Egyptian. Sri Lankan or 
Filipino worker in their homes, elitcs tcnd to employ a 'mini-army of domestic employees. the oversight of 
which constitutes a full-time responsibility .. .' (1998: ] 29). Aside from this brief mention, migrant domestic 
workers are not included in the analysis of household consumption patterns. 
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which appear to have decreased by 57 percent from 7.4 children in 1976 to 3.2 in 2004 
(Department of Statistics 2007). It may also be the result of a greater incidence of nuclear 
household types, which reportedly make up 70 percent of all Jordanian households (Tiltnes 1999: 
7). 
The majority of employers interviewed for this research resided in nuclear households. This does 
not mean people interact less with the extended family. As Othman (1974) has noted, Jordanian 
families continue to have strong social and economic ties with wider kin, and a strong preference 
for living near or next to extended family members remains. The ideal living arrangement is for a 
couple to build their home on the ground floor and gradually add stories vertically for their 
children as they marry and establish their own families. While the importance of the extended 
family should not be underestimated, there is a preference for the independence that nuclear 
residential structures atTord. Several young Jordanian women said in interviews that one of their 
preconditions for a marriage proposal is a promise that the couple will have their own home, free 
from nagging and opinionated mothers-in-law. Arwa, a woman in her late 20s who had recently 
married, said: 
We're not building big houses for the whole family the way we used to. It's too expensive. Due to the 
cost of land and building supplies, people are living in smaller apartments. But it's also for privacy. 
Young women don't want someone older living with them, telling them how things should be done. 
They want to be on their own. 
Preferences for privacy and independence from meddlesome in-laws may not be new but can now 
be fulfilled in ways that might not have been possible before, and domestic workers playa role in 
this. Many employers remarked that the ability to have a domestic worker care for children allows 
them to avoid having to live with their mothers-in-law, who in the past would have contributed to 
this task. 80 Young women also noted that one of the advantages of employing a domestic worker 
was that it allowed them to go out to dinner or attend social events with their husbands in the 
evenings. This is part of what appears to be a new premium placed on 'quality time' as an 
important ingredient in conjugal relations among the younger generations. lIiring a full-time 
domestic worker can also be a more convenient and cheaper option than a private nursery. The 
lack of adequate, good-quality childeare facilities in Jordan was noted by many employers. 
Demand for domestic workers also reflects changing attitudes toward childhood and the 
importance of education. Children who a generation ago might have been expected to help with 
household chores are now encouraged to devote more time to studying and participating in after­
school activities. Muna, a 38-year-old mother of six who is the director of a kindergarten and in 
80 Noting increasing preferences for nuclear households in Taiwan, Lan (2000: 11) described a similar 
motivation amongst Taiwanese women who hire domestic workers in lieu of residing with in-laws. 
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the evenings studies for a master's degree, illustrated these points when she explained her 
decision to hire a Sri Lankan domestic worker. 
I have thirteen brothers and sisters. Growing up, everyone helped with al\ the responsibilities in the 
house. We took turns. We had shifts for the kitchen, the bedroom, doing the laundry, helping mom 
with everything so she didn't do all the work herself. And also the boys were helping. Whcn I started 
my family, I was doing it the same way as my mom. But when the children got older, I thought these 
chores would distract them from their studies and even from having fun. I don't want to have 
arguments with them, to have misunderstandings, or to harm them by pushing them to help me. 
That's why we decided to have the maid. Because I thought it would be more relaxing for 
everybody .... 
Employing domestic workers also gives middle-class mothers more time with their children, 
something now believed to be necessary for child development. This has been cited as a factor 
driving demand for domestic workers elsewhere (Anderson 2001: 27). 
Dania's family provides an example. Dania's mother and father live on the bottom floor of a large 
villa and employ two Filipina workers. Their son lives on the floor directly above them, and 
Dania, her husband, four children and one Filipina domestic worker live on the top floor. Dania 
has a Master's degree in education and works as a private teacher for the royal family, a subject 
about which I was warned not to inquire, royal affairs being top secret. Dania grew up with 
servants, the first one having been hired when her mother developed heart problems. When Dania 
married and started her own home, she and her husband waited until after their first son was born 
to hire their first domestic worker because they wanted privacy during their first year as a married 
couple. Twelve years have passed since then, and in that time they have employed a string of 
Filipina domestic workers. In addition to housework, Dania's current domestic worker looks after 
Dania's four children until she comes home from work. lIer family used to employ Sri Lankan 
domestic workers but now only hires Filipinas. 
The Sri Lankans who come to Jordan now aren't like the ones who used to come. They don't want to 
work. Before, they would come and give you everything they had. Now, they're, I don't know ... 
they're stubborn. Filipinas are more professional, arc better with children, speak better English. 
Language is very important to me. For me, it's very important for her [the domestic worker] to have 
finished secondary school. You can't always count on this with Sri Lankans .... People say if you're 
of a certain status, you have to have a Filipina. It wasn't so much that, for me, as language and 
education. 
The following example is illustrative of many of the wider patterns with respect to families' 
decisions to hire domestic workers. Ibrahim and Mariam are a retired couple in their sixties. They 
have five children, three ofwhom are unmarried and live with them in a three-story villa. Yazan is 
a university student, and Riad and Samir work for a foreign car company. The two elder children 
are married and reside separately, but Ibrahim says it would be unusual for two days to pass 
without them seeing all of their children and grandchildren. Mariam and Ibrahim employ Lina, a 
live-in domestic worker from Sri Lanka. Also staying with the family is Mariam's nephew, Amer, 
a teenager who weighs more than 400 pounds and has been sent from the United States to try to 
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lose weight. Since Ibrahim retired, the couple has begun renting out their basement and the top 
floor of their home to paying tenants in order to supplement their income. 
When they first married, Ibrahim trained to be a paediatrician at the University of Sophia in 
Bulgaria. Mariam joined him and attended university there. They lived in Sophia for six years 
before returning to Jordan to live with his family in Madaba. Ibrahim took a job working with an 
international aid organisation providing medical care, and Mariam worked as an administrator in a 
UN agency. She had a long commute into Amman for work, and with several young children, said 
she struggled to cope. The couple hired a domestic worker, a Sri Lankan, for the first time in 
1986. Mariam recalls that they paid her 20 JD a month. 
According to Mariam, two things are responsible for the rise in employing domestic workers. The 
first is that life has become more expensive, meaning that more households rely on both parents 
working. The second relates to the lack of good-quality childcare. 
You know, we have this saying, Al-Urdun Awwalan [Jordan First].81 But in reality, the government 
doesn't care. I lived in Bulgaria for six years. My children were young when we were there, and I 
sent them to pre-school. The pre-schools in Bulgaria are first-class. They served the freshest 
vegetables. They were so clean. We lived right across from the pre-school and I used to look out the 
window and watch Dalia playing in the yard. The government spent so much money on the 
kindergarten ... But here, we don't have these options. It costs so much to send your children to a 
private nursery - at least 100 JDs per month. It's less expensive and easier just to get a maid at home. 
This was the main motivation for me. Childcare. I don't know if the government nurseries are up to 
standard, if they treat the children well. They're just, you know, ziballa [trash]. So, I have two 
choices, either to send my children to one of those very expensive nurseries in a private school, or get 
a maid. It's easier to get a maid. 
Mariam noted that many women feel overloaded by the burden of work and taking care of their 
families. On the issue of whether husbands helped, she had this to say: 
When we were first married, Ibrahim used to help me. In Bulgaria, we didn't have a washing 
machine and he used to help me by making the coffee and things. When we moved back to Jordan. 
his sister once came to the house and saw him helping me and screamed, "You are a doctor. You 
should not serve people. Stop thisl" And so he stopped. This is what men like to hear, anyway. I 
failed to train him to help me. 
Mariam's comments were echoed by a number of other employers, who noted that husbands who 
helped out with domestic chores risked being teased for what was seen 8S a loss of masculinity. 
When asked whether her children pitched in with housework, Mariam replied: 'They had too 
much schoolwork. Too much studying.' Ibrahim and Mariam sent their children to private schools 
81 This is a reference to the slogan of a nationalist campaign King Abdullah II launched in 2002 
emphasising Jordan's interests at a time when public attention was focussed on crises in Palestine to the 
west and Iraq to the east. 
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and paid for additional lessons after school. This was a significant expense for the family, 
something Ibrahim and Mariam made sacrifices to afford.82 
You know about the scare of the Tawjihi. There are very few spots in the government schools and 
children must get very high scores if they want to go to them. Otherwise, they have to go to one of 
the private colleges. During the Tawjihi year, we paid so much for tuition for our children .... I have 
thought about this a lot and I did a calculation once. I calculated that we spent 70 percent or more of 
our income on our children's education. Of the five children, only Dalia got a scholarship. The others 
we had to pay for. Each credit hour in the university cost 65 JD. This is incredible. It's an incredible 
cost. I compare it to India. I had a colleague at the UN who was from India. He had a PhD. He told 
me that from his first year of school up to his PhD, he only paid $100. This is nothing. Here, we pay 
so much. It's a disgrace. 
The Tawjihi to which Mariam refers are national exams for the General Secondary Education 
Certificate, upon which entry to universities and community colleges is based. High scores are 
required to study in private universities and to enrol in certain disciplines - such as pharmacy, 
engineering and the hard sciences. The exams are the source of a great deal of stress for students 
and their parents. The release of exam scores in the summer results in an all-out frenzy, as those 
who achieved high marks parade through the streets blasting car horns in celebration. 
Education is an asset both because of the prestige that qualifications in higher education confer as 
well as the role it plays in the economy. Given that it is generally only the highly-skilled (i.e. 
those with a tertiary education) who emigrate, it can be considered a prerequisite for migration 
(De Bel Air 2010:1) and plays a crucial role in the way Jordan positions itself in the global 
economy. As the statements by Mariam and Dania illustrate, much of the impetus for hiring 
domestic workers relates to the desire to provide a certain kind of home environment for children, 
one in which they can study and, for those who can afford to hire Filipina domestic workers, 
practice their English. 
Care of the Elderly 
Domestic workers play an important role at both ends of the life cycle, caring for the young as 
well as the aging. This appears to be encouraged by the government, which provides special 
subsidies for elderly and disabled persons to hire non-Jordanian domestic workers. The Ministry 
of Social Development exempts all elderly andlor disabled persons who are unable to care for 
themselves from paying work permit fees for domestic workers. The scheme began in 1993 under 
the Law of the Care of Persons with Disabilities [Ri 'ayal a/-ashkhas a/-mu 'awwaqin] Number 12. 
According to ministry stafT, it was initiated because of cultural attitudes toward group homes, 
82 Education is a significant expense for most families. All households in Jordan reportedly increased their 
expenditures on education from 2002 to 2006 (Saif and Tabbaa 2008: 16). The wealthiest ten percent 
reportedly devote 8.6 percent of their total household expenditures to education; this is fifteen times more 
than the amount spent by the poorest ten percent of households (ibid). 
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which are perceived as sites of abandonment.83 'Our culture is not like Britain's. We are closer to 
each other', said one ministry staff member when explaining the reasons for the government's 
initiative. The comparison with Britain was made because this was where I was studying, as I 
explained to him. The numbers receiving these subsidies are surprisingly high. In 2006, 12,340 
domestic workers were brought to the kingdom through the programme.84 In 2007, the number 
rose to 14,945. This is more than one third of the roughly 30,000 domestic workers issued 
residence permits annually. One cannot know for certain that all of those recruited through the 
programme do end up working for the elderly and disabled. But my observations from interviews 
and discussions with employers and domestic workers confirmed that many are indeed recruited 
to work for these groups - particularly the elderly. 
The fact that the government facilitates the recruitment of foreign domestic workers through 
labour legislation and targeted subsidies effectively keeps child care and care of the elderly firmly 
within the realm of the individual family. On the one hand, this policy encourages privatisation by 
keeping care of the elderly and children within the family, yet at the same time the subsidies 
contradict the international financial community's mandate that Jordan reduce public spending. 
Many elderly employers reported that they first decided to hire domestic help after a debilitating 
illness or accident. Even if their children lived nearby, they needed the sort of round-the-clock 
care that might prompt their European or North American counterparts to move into a retirement 
home. Although retirement homes exist in Jordan, as the civil servant quoted above noted, they 
are generally unpopular. Hiring foreign caretakers is the preferred alternative. Some elderly 
employers also stated a preference for hiring domestic workers over living with their children so 
that they could maintain independence or avoid being a burden. With growing life expectancy and 
high population growth rates, the need for the care work domestic workers provide is likely to 
expand in the years to come. 
The Division of Labour 
Another factor contributing to the market for paid domestic work relates to women's employment. 
Women have long played an active, although often unreported, role in the economy. Official 
statistics on women's workforce participation rates - estimated at 17.8 percent for 2008 
(Department of Statistics 2009) - remain very low compared to the global average of40.S percent 
83 Interview, Ministry of Social Development, Department of Welfare for the Disabled, Amman. 13 July 
2008. 
84 Information about the subsidy scheme and the statistics for 2006 and 2007 were provided by stafT at the 
Ministry of Social Development on 7 June 2007 and 13 July 2008. As part of the same scbeme. disabled 
persons are also exempt from paying customs on automobiles. Several elderly employers confirmed that 
they had received the subsidies. 
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(ILO 2009: 9) and even the regional average of 26 percent (World Bank 201Ob).8' Yet compared 
to a rate of 7.7 percent in 1979, increasing numbers of women are taking up formal employment 
outside of the home. Some women opt for this as a matter of choice, while others are compelled to 
do so for economic reasons. Many of those who work all day and then come home to do the bulk 
of the housework feel overloaded and consequently solicit the help of Sri Lankan, Filipino or 
Indonesian women. Egyptian men and women are also hired to help with the cleaning on a part­
time basis. 
Studies carried out elsewhere have suggested that domestic workers fulfil a role that allows 
middle-class men and women to avoid conflicts surrounding the gendered division of labour (e.g. 
Anderson 2000: 1, Enloe 2000: 179, Gregson and Lowe 1994: Chapter 4). The extent to which 
this may be true in Jordan is questionable, as few would deny that housework remains first and 
foremost a woman's job. This is not to say that husbands never help with housework, but the bulk 
of the responsibility rests with women. Muna, the employer quoted above who works full-time 
and employs a Sri Lankan domestic worker, explains: 
If a woman works outside of the house, when she comes home, she must do the same work in the 
house whether she has a job or not. So, women think that if they work outside, they might as well pay 
for a maid from their salary so that when they come home they can be more relaxed. The mentality of 
the Arab or Eastern man is not to help in the house. So, she helps herself. 
Muna was one of several women who said they paid domestic workers out of their own salaries. 
While the ability to employ a domestic worker may not necessarily enable women to work who 
would not have otherwise, domestic workers do anow working women more time for leisure 
activities and to spend with their children. 
Nadia, a news editor at a local television station. and her husband Nasser. a medical doctor. have 
four sons. the eldest ofwhom is fourteen. Nadia returns from work at 9 pm on most evenings and 
so has employed a string of Sri Lankan and Indonesian domestic workers to look after her 
children when they return from school. The last worker she employed ran away. and in the few 
weeks the family went without domestic help Nadia said she barely slept. By the time she arrived 
at the house. everything was in disarray and she had to stay up late into the night cleaning, with no 
time left for her children. When asked whether her husband could come home early. she said they 
had not even contemplated the idea. Nadia discusses her responsibilities towards the household as 
if they are hers alone and seems genuinely unperturbed by the fact that her husband doesn't pitch 
in. With the help of a domestic worker, she can devote the limited time she has left at the end of 
85 Sonbol (2003) provides an account of why workforce participation rates among women remain low 
despite the fact that Jordan has one of the highest female literacy rates in the region (nearly 80 percent in 
1998). She cites patriarchal attitudes that emphasise women's fragility and need for proll.'ction, educational 
curricula and practices discouraging women from pursuing certain careers, and discriminatory laws leading 
to lower pensions and fewer benefits as some of the factors. 
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the day to checking the children's homework and relaxing in front of the television. Contrasting 
herself with others who hire domestic workers for prestige, she emphasised the fact that she needs 
the help. 
If there is a disagreement about whether to hire a domestic worker, it is usually the husband who 
objects. Several mothers said that their husbands and sons, some as young as eleven, refused to 
eat food cooked by domestic workers or to drink coffee or tea which they prepare. For example, 
Umm Leith, a 43-year-old mother of four, said that although her family has employed domestic 
help for more than seven years, her husband has never liked the idea. He insists that the woman 
leave the room when he enters and forbids her to clean in front of him. When asked why she 
thought he felt this way, she said he had never become accustomed to the idea of having a 
stranger in the house. A male interviewee commented that although his wife wanted to hire a 
domestic worker, he refused. 'I go out and work all day. Her job is to clean and put food on the 
table. What will she do if we get a maid?' Such attitudes may be an attempt to keep wives in 
traditional gender roles, but they also speak to a real sense felt by employers that inviting a 
foreign worker into the home entails an unwanted invasion of privacy. Since housework in Jordan 
is still considered women's work, women may be more willing to sacrifice family privacy than 
men. It may also be the case that women do not feel that their privacy is invaded by the presence 
of foreign women in the same way that men do. 
Part Three: Domestic Servants and the Reproduction of Highly-Skilled Labour 
The preceding passages have illustrated the role domestic workers play in elite homes. In this 
section, I wish to draw On the points raised in the previous sections to put forth a hypothesis about 
the way domestic workers are situated within the value chain of the Jordanian economy and the 
function they play with respect to the reproduction oflabour. 
In Marx's terms, domestic workers may be subject to the discipline of the wage but are not 
'productive' workers. 
Every productive worker is a wage-Iahourer, but not every wage-Iahourer is 8 productive worker. 
Whenever labour is purchased to be consumed as 8 use-vallie. as a service ..• labour is not productive 
and the wage-labourer is no productive worker. His work is consumed for its use-vallie. not as 
creating exchange-value: it is consumed unproductively, not productively (Mar" 1976: 1040-41). 
Marx viewed the household primarily as a site of consumption, but as subsequent critics have 
pointed out, despite his insights into the centrality of labour-power to capitalism he failed to push 
the analysis far enough to acknowledge the extent to which the household is also a site of 
production (Hensman 2006: 2). Whether performed by unremunerated family members, slaves or 
paid workers, domestic labour produces labour power. It creates 'value' by virtue of the fact that 
its product -labour power - is a commodity (Cock 1981: 65). 
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In the Jordanian case, domestic workers are central to the reproduction of labour in several ways. 
First, at the level of daily maintenance through tasks that sustain the workforce - for example 
preparing meals, cleaning, washing and mending clothes. Second, on a generational basis through 
the care of the young, elderly and infirm. With respect to the young in particular, domestic 
workers contribute directly to the production of Jordan's potential labour force whenever they 
playa substantial role in raising children. In this vein, as reflected in employers' accounts 
presented in the preceding passages, certain migrants - chiefly those who speak fluent English ­
are preferred on the basis that they may transmit skills to their employers' children. Thus, 
domestic workers assist in the production of certain kinds of labour. 
The less obvious, indirect contributions domestic workers make to social reproduction are equally 
significant. By freeing mothers from the burdens of housework, domestic workers allow them to 
devote more time and attention to their children, help with homework and ferry them to and from 
private tuitions, leisure and various social activities associated with the upper classes. Children in 
homes with domestic workers are themselves less likely to have to chip in with chores or care of 
siblings and are left free for other activities. In these ways, migrant domestic labour is an 
important factor in the social production of highly-educated elites who are trained and made 
'ready-for-export'; first, to top-notch universities and then, in many cases given Jordan's high rate 
of out-migration, for employment in the Gulf states, Europe and North America. Like the labour 
of housewives under capitalism, domestic workers' labour 'becomes part of the congealed mass 
of past labour embodied in labour power' (Secombe 1974: 9). The services they provide help 
produce workers with the social capital and skills necessary for Jordan to compete on the global 
labour market. The value of their labour is realised as one part of the total value Jordanian labour 
power achieves when it is sold on the market as a commodity. 
The round-the-clock service domestic workers provide could not be purehased at comparable 
rates on the Jordanian market. Because the supply of domestic labour is virtually limitless and 
new labour markets can be opened up at any time, wages have remained relatively low, at 
between $100 and $150, for the past decade.86 And because the mi!:,'Tant workforce is un­
regulated, un-organised and easily exploitable, in practical if not legal tenns the working day can 
and often is extended indefinitely without pay for overtime. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
benefits that would be owed to citizen-workers such as maternity and sick leave are seldom paid 
to migrant workers. 
86 Reliable statistics on actual earnings do not exist, but a UNIFEM report (2000) stated that the majority of 
migrant domestic workers in Jordan earned $100 or less in 2000. Many of the Sri Lankan domestic workers 
with whom I met earned little more than this nearly ten years later. The purchasing power of wages has 
fallen during this time; according to IMF indicators, the average annual rate of inflation as measured by the 
consumer price index from 2000 - 2009 was 3.87 for Jordan and 10.73 for Sri Lanka. 
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Migrant labour is also relatively inexpensive for Jordan's economy because the costs of producing 
the workforce are born by the migrants' own countries. As soon as migrant workers become too 
old or sick to continue working, they can be disposed of and absorbed again by the domestic 
community in their own countries. Taking the analysis one step further, it now becomes possible 
to see how the communities from which Jordan's domestic servants come indirectly contribute to 
the surplus value which later accrues to those who employ highly-skilled Jordanian labour. This 
idea is not new - Meillassoux (1981) made a similar point with respect to the way domestic 
agricultural communities articulate with capitalism through labour migration in Africa. In the 
Jordanian context, it is worth bearing in mind that the costs borne by the domestic community 
include considerable emotional strain and the temporary loss of reproductive labour during the 
worker's absence from her own home. 
Taking into account Marx's conception of the two-fold character of labour (its use value and its 
exchange value), we can see that while domestic workers' exchange value is low - around $100 to 
$150 per month - their output in social terms is much more valuable, contributing to the 
production ofmore highly-paid labour. Given that so many Jordanians and Palestinians eventually 
migrate abroad as doctors, engineers and technicians, these workers provide one of Jordan's most 
important links to global capital, a link which, as outlined in the first section, contributes at least a 
fifth of the country's GDP. Household statistical data linking the employment of foreign domestic 
workers to the emigration of Jordanians for work abroad would help to support this point. In the 
absence of such data, my argument remains tentative at best. But the wider point stands - that the 
domestic unit is a site not just of consumption but reproduction of the productive forces of the 
economy. Furthermore, through the trans-national circulation of domestic labour, migrant-sending 
communities under-write at least a portion of the total costs of producing future generations of 
highly-skilled Jordanian labour. In many households, domestic workers are part of the many 
intricate layers involved in the social reproduction of the workforce. They act like a mini-welfare 
state, playing an important role at both ends of the life cycle by caring for the aging and the 
young. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an overview of some of the main political and economic developments 
in Jordan's recent history to contextualise contemporary migration policies. It has highlighted the 
reasons the recruitment of foreign workers has persisted despite high rates of unemployment 
among the local workforce. Foreign workers lack legal parity with citizens and will accept - or 
can be more easily coerced into taking part in - work for lower wages with fewer protections. 
Labour migration is often explained through push/pull models that portray movement as the result 
of a labour shortage creating a 'pull' in one area, and poverty creating a 'push' in another, but this 
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analysis suggests that the employment of foreign workers in Jordan is far more complexly 
determined. Although the state is often assumed to act as a neutral control on. the labour market, in 
this context it has helped to create a stratified labour market which enables discrimination on the 
basis of citizenship. This is an integral part of the structure of capital accumulation in specific 
zones, namely the garment industry, agriculture, construction and the service sector. Moreover, 
there is evidence suggesting that labour market segmentation has contributed to a cheapening of 
labour and degradation of working conditions in these sectors. The extent to which policymakers 
have realised or chosen to ignore this is not clear. 
The employment of so many foreign workers can be understood at least in part as a symptom of 
the lack of organisation among Jordanian labour. Trade unions are weak, and their activities are 
heavily restricted (see ICFTU 2010). If they were able to more effectively represent the interests 
of all workers, including migrants and Jordanians in the lowest pay ranks, and if they were 
allowed to play a stronger role in influencing government action, policies concerning the 
recruitment of foreign labour might well be different. This context raises questions about the 
relationship between repressive and unrepresentative political structures in which decision-makers 
are not accountable to the local population and the pursuit of policies that benefit business owners 
at the expense of the local workforce. This is relevant to the Arab region as a whole, where in six 
of the eight existing monarchies, the labour force is between one-half and nine-tenths foreign 
(Chalcraft 2010: 1). 
Drawing on the limited evidence available, this chapter has also sought to outline the shift from 
employing Arab to Asian domestic workers. A constellation of social, political and economic 
factors at the national and household levels has fuelled the demand for domestic workers. This 
includes changes in class formation in the wake of the oil boom, increasing forms of 
consumerism, changing residential patterns, as well as the social value of education and changing 
attitudes towards childhood. Migrant women are often preferred for domestic work because -like 
migrants employed in agriculture and in garment factories - they tend to live at the worksite, are 
willing to accept lower wages and dependent work relations, and are far from their own homes 
and so work longer hours without regular holidays. Another important factor influencing the 
demand for foreign domestic workers in Jordan is the fact that mib'fants are expected to work 
under conditions that are generally favourable to employers. The legal and practical dimensions of 
their relationships with employers will be the subject of the next two chapters. 
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The Kalala System: Legal and Administrative Framework 
This chapter examines the status of foreign workers employed under the kafala (sponsorship) 
system. Variants of this system are in use throughout the Arabian Peninsula and Levant and apply 
to the vast majority of foreign workers, including those employed in agriculture, construction, 
industrial production, healthcare, personal care, domestic work and other service-sector jobs.8? 
The region hosts some of the highest concentrations of labour migrants in the world. As of 20 I0, 
six Gulf states employed more than 15 million foreign workers, who comprised 38 percent of the 
population (10M 2010). Migrant workers make up more than two-thirds of all residents in Qatar 
(86.5 percent), the UAE (70 percent) and Kuwait (68.5 percent) (ibitl). 
The kafala system is the administrative apparatus by which migrant workers are recruited, 
managed and controlled. It is not homogenous throughout the region, but the basic elements are 
similar. Foreign nationals must have local sponsors in order to obtain residence and work permits. 
These sponsors serve as the worker's guarantor and sole employer. The worker cannot change 
employers without the sponsor's consent, and the employer has the power to send the worker back 
to his or her country at any time. Within this framework, foreign workers are bound to their 
employers for the terms of their service, which typically last two years. 
How did such asymmetrical relations come about? Despite the prevalence of the kafala system 
and its consequences for millions of workers, few scholarly attempts have been made to 
understand its origins. The first part of this chapter puts forth a hypothesis about its legal and 
customary antecedents, suggesting that while kafala contracts have a long history in Islamic 
jurisprudence, their contemporary use for the administration of forei!,'11 workers has radically 
diverged from prior uses. While kafala contracts were once understood as a means of granting 
protection and patronage to vulnerable parties, they have become a mechanism of institutionalised 
discrimination. The second part examines the contemporary use of the kafala system for mib'l"ant 
domestic workers in Jordan. We have already examined the reasons for the exodus of women 
from Sri Lanka to the Middle East for jobs in domestic service (chapter 2), the role of the Sri 
Lankan state in promoting their migration and training them to be obsequious and docile (chapter 
3), and the factors contributing to the demand for their services in Jordan (chapter 4). This chapter 
focuses on the administrative framework of the kafala system and what this means for workers. It 
87 Certain highly-skilled workers such as teachers arc not required to have sponsors in all countries in the 
region. Although this chapter refers primarily to the situation in Arab countries, Israel also uses a 
sponsorship system which 'binds' foreign workers to their employers (Kemp 2004: 272-273). The situation 
of migrant domestic workers there is in many ways similar (Liebelt 2008a). 
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argues that while workers may willingly enter into the sponsorship system, once in they cannot 
opt out until the term of their employment has been completed. Rather than free wage workers, 
they may be thought of as bonded labourers. Chapter 6 then examines the variety of ways 
domestic workers and employers negotiate their roles within this framework. 
The Arab East is often stereotyped by those who live outside it as a region locked in conservatism 
where women are oppressed. We would do well to recall that forms of bonded and enslaved 
labour have existed almost everywhere throughout history, and while the stories presented here 
are from Jordan, the elements of exploitation they contain are by no means uniquely Middle 
Eastern.88 It should also be mentioned that while the practice of employing domestic servants has 
become widespread among the wealthy and has begun to be common among middle class 
families, it remains beyond the means of the majority of Jordanian households, where the 
responsibility for domestic work rests with female kin. 
Part One: Legal and Conceptual Provenance 
The term 'kafola' has a wide semantic scope in Arabic. Its root, Mf - fa' - Him (JC), means to 
feed, support, vouch for or warrant; hence'kafala' refers to bail, guaranty, security or sponsorship 
(Wehr 1994: 976). According to Lane's nineteenth century Arabic dictionary, kafala meant 
'responsibility; answerableness; amenability; or suretiship; the conjoining of responsibility to 
another' (1872: 300 I). Likewise, the kafil is 'one who is responsible, answerable, amendable, or a 
sponsor or surety' (ibid). In line with this sense, in Islamic family law 'kafala' refers to a formal 
agreement to provide temporary support for an orphaned child until adulthood. Such support does 
not confer inheritance rights and is best understood as a form of legal guardianship rather than 
adoption. 
How has a word connoting guardianship and protection come to be associated with the 
employment of migrant workers? Does the kafala system have an historical antecedent? In the 
folIowing passages, I advance a hypothesis about the origins of this fonn of legal sponsorship. 
Without the benefit of archival evidence, I am unable to trace its genealogy into present-day 
Jordan. Nevertheless, I wish to draw attention to the problem because it has so far been neglected 
in the literature.89 Given the scale of the use of the kafala system, its origins deserve further study. 
88 This point is also made by Toledano (2007: 1.17), 

89 Longva has also noted that the kafala system has been largely ignored by scholars oflahour migration to 

the region (1997: 78), 
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Ka/ala Contracts Under Ottoman Rule 
While Ottoman rule of Transjordan officially ended in 1918, the Ottoman civil code, the Majalla, 
has had a lasting influence, particularly with respect to contract law.90 It is possible that the 
present-day kaJala system grew out ofearlier Ottoman forms. 
According to Foster, the concept of the kaJala derives from pre-Islamic practices and was spoken 
of approvingly and confirmed in verses of the Quran and hadith. in this way becoming part of 
Islamic jurisprudence (2001: 139).91 KaJala is synonymous with daman (~t....), which is the term 
used more commonly in all Islamic law schools except for Hanafi (Rispler-Chaim 1991: 144-5; 
Linant De Bellefonds 1978: 404-405).92 In Islamic jurisprudence, the kaJala operated as a form of 
suretyship that could be used to secure: 1) property (ka/ala bil-ma!), 2) attendance before a 
tribunal (ka/ala bil-naft), 3) delivery of goods (ka/ala bil-taslim), or purchase of goods sold 
(ka/ala bil-darak) (Foster 2001: 141). In Ottoman Hanafi jurisprudence uses of ka/ala contracts 
were largely the same. According to the Majalla, a ka/ala agreement consisted of 'someone 
adding himself to another person, and himself undertaking a demand which is binding on that 
person' (Article 612). The Majalla mentions several types of kaJala agreements relating to 
guarantorship, none ofwhich refers to the performance oflabour.93 
In Ottoman contexts the kaJala system was also used as a means of collectivising responsibility. 
For example in sixteenth century Jerusalem, kaJala was instituted as a form of collective 
representation for particular religious groups (Cohen 1984). The Jewish community was 
represented by a 'shaykh al-yahud', who acted as a guarantor representing them in dealings with 
the Muslim government. In other instances, kaJala served as a form of communal control. Petrov 
(2004) describes a Bulgarian village in 1865 in which police investigating a murder of two 
Circassian immigrants required all male villagers to associate themselves with a guarantor 
('kefil). There, the kaJala system functioned 'like a communal check on "deviant" behaviour', 
with trusted village men vouching for the suspects' character and ensuring that they would not 
flee (Petrov 2004: 751, fn 81). Similarly, indigenous Muslims in Libya between the sixteenth and 
nineteenth centuries were subject to a kaJala system whereby 'the head ofeach Muslim household 
9) The Ottoman Mcjelle-i Ahkam-i ',4dliyye (Majalla) was the civil code of Hanafi-derived law of the 
Ottoman Empire. It was promulgated in 1877 in the wake of Tanzimat reforms and remained the basis of 
civil law, particularly contract law, in Trans-Jordan and elsewhere in the region long after the end of the 
empire (Arabi 1998:45, fu 2). The version to which 1refer is a translation by Tyser et al (1901). 
91 The relevant hadilh are found in the Sahih of al-Bukhari in Chapter 42: Book of Sureties (Ka/eIICl). The 
Sahih is one of the six major collections of sayings pertaining to the Prophet Mohammed. The haclith 
pertaining to ka/ala involve people or things being taken as surety for loans or debts. In one (I: 21(9) Allah 
himself is invoked as and acts as a guarantor. 
92 The ways various schools of Islamic law dealt with kafilla agreements are described in the Encyclopaedia 
of Islam (Linant De Bellefonds 1978: 404-405). 
93 Ka/Clla hi/-mal (Article (14) was a guaranty of property ensuring that a debtor would repay a debt to a 
lender, as in the English 'surety'. Kafilla bil-na/s (Article (13) was a personal guaranty whereby one 
became a guarantor for another person to ensure due attcndance in court, as in the English word 'bail', 
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was bonded by professional bondsmen and sheykhs (patriarchs) of their quarters (harat) against 
the detection in their respective households of a thief, a prostitute, or a person neglectful of the 
performance of the daily Muslim rites. Should a "misdemeanour" be discovered, the bondsmen 
were liable to forfeit their bond' (Abou-EI-Haj 1983: 310).94 Outside of the Ottoman context there 
are also examples in which guarantors have traditionally been used to represent opposing parties 
in the mediation ofdisputes.9' 
Based on these examples, kafala contracts appear to have been used most commonly in instances 
in which an individual who lacked the means or political clout to represent him or herself gained 
patronage or custodianship from a notable member of the community. This was for one of three 
main purposes: 1) For financial protection, in which financial risk was extended to a third party; 
2) in order to communalise responsibility from one to more than one person; or 3) as a form of 
legal or political representation. Interestingly, kafala agreements were presumed to be gratuitous 
undertakings, i.e. not for the guarantor's profit (Foster 2001: 137). They implied the personal 
obligation of the guarantor towards the debtor and were characterised by liberality towards the 
debtor (ibid: 142). The guarantor was responsible for the debtor. Nothing in the Ottoman or flqh 
contexts referred to the use of such contracts for the purpose of rewarding the guarantor. Such a 
situation would in fact have constituted a legal breach since any payments made to the guarantor 
for providing kafala would have constituted ribii (usury), forbidden in Islam (Foster 200 I: 143). 
Although there is some danger of comparing what might be an idealised picture of previous uses 
of kafala contracts with the harsh realities of the present system, there appears to be a genuine 
contrast between the contemporary kafala system as it applies to expatriates and the historical 
uses described here. Slavery was a feature of the Ottoman landscape, but none of the accounts of 
Ottoman slavery I have read refer to the use of kafala contracts.96 If the current use of the kafala 
94 In the Ottoman sources cited by Abou-EI-Haj, these bondsmen are referred to as 'kejiller' (Abou-EI-Haj 
1983: fn 16). 
95 For example, see Dresch (1989: 93-94) on the role of guarantors in settling disputes among trihes in 
Yemen. 
96 In relation to the Ottoman context, it is worth mentioning that the situation of migrant domestic workers 
today bears some resemblance to that of Ottoman slaves. Enslaved Africans, Circassians, Georgians, 
Greeks, Slavs and others were brought into areas under Ottoman rule to work in the households of the elite 
and in harems, for agricultural work, menial johs such as pearl diving, mining and construction, and to join 
the Ottoman military-administrative elite (mamluk) (Tolcdano 2007: 12-14). Domestic slaves were an 
integral part of Ottoman society, and because they had been cut ofT from their own kin and social networks, 
they were dependent on links with slave holders for food, shelter and, to some extent, protection. While the 
majority of slaves were largely resigned to their situation, a minority - onen those who had heen ahused as 
well as some who had not - took risks to gain their freedom. According to Toledano, few fled expressly 
with the aim of freedom from bondage; rather, most ahsconded to end ahuse, prevent a forced ahortion, or 
for some of other reason relating to the circumstances of their employment (2007: 79). Toledano dcscrihes 
runaway slaves who, if caught, were generally returned to their masters unless they were believed to have 
been subject to ill-treatment, in which case they could he granted manumission. As a result, many alleged 
ill-treatment to increase the odds that they would be freed. To pre-empt such charges, slavers often made 
false accusations of theft (2007: 61). This resembles aspects of contemporary domestic worker - employer 
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system for migrant labour did descend from these earlier forms, it diverged dramatically in the 
context of nation states and neoliberal market forces and transformed into a system whereby non­
nationals are bound to nationals for the purposes of work or business. 
The KaJala System as Practiced in the Arabian Gulf 
Jordan's contemporary use of the ka/ala system as an administrative framework for the 
recruitment of foreign labour is in many ways similar to that of the Gulf states. Could it have been 
influenced by models from the Gulf, where large-scale labour importation arose earlier? While I 
do not yet have evidence to assess the degree to which this may have been the case, given the 
similarities and the fact that there has been some, albeit limited, scholarship charting the evolution 
of the ka/ala system in the Gulf, that context is worth considering if only for the purposes of 
comparison. There, the contemporary ka/ala system for migrant workers emerged in the context 
of a particular kind of state - one that distributes oil-rent to a small pool of citizens in exchange 
for political acquiescence and the pursuit of free-trade policies and a laissez-faire economy; and 
most importantly, one in which huge migrant worker populations vastly exceed the number of 
nationals. Under these conditions, the ka/ala system was instituted as part of a broader dynamic 
generated by oil revenue alongside administrative policies aimed at separating and controlling 
expatriates. In order to illustrate how and why the ka/ala system emerged as it did in the Gulf, I 
will briefly sketch the history of migration and rise of the oil economy. 
The Gulf port towns of Manamah, Kuwait and Dubai were characterised by migratory flows long 
before the discovery of oil. During the nineteenth century, migrants from India, Iran and farther 
east, along with groups from the desert and inland agricultural areas of eastern Saudi Arabia, 
flocked to coastal Gulf towns to work in the pearling industry and commercial trade (Fuccaro 
2005, 2009, 2010). Immigrants, settlers, sailors and administrators from British India dominated 
the social landscape in early twentieth-century Manama (Fuccaro 20 I 0: 28). Government 
apparatus were minimal, and patronage played a key role in facilitating mib'l'ation, with settled 
migrants sending for kin and providing them with employment and protection upon arrival. 
relationships; employers commonly level false-counteraccusations of theft against those who run away or 
accuse them of abuse, as will be described in chapter S. While cases of slaves absconding occurred 
frequently throughout Ottoman rule, the incidence increased dramatically in the final quarter of the 
nineteenth century (ibid). This was in part because the British government was known to harbour mistreated 
slaves in its consulates and aboard its naval vessels. Another was that the Ottoman state. under pressure 
from the British and due to a need to resolve problems posed by Circassian agricultural slaves. increasingly 
sponsored manumission. The slave trade waned toward the end of the nineteenth century and the institution 
more or less died out in the first decade of the twentieth century (Toledano 1998:3). By comparing domestic 
slaves in the Ottoman era with domestic workers in Jordan today. I do not mean to suggest a historical link. 
Rather. what I wish to emphasise is that both sets of relationships were rationalised in terms of mutual 
dependency. In the Ottoman case and now, absolute dependency was thought to engender loyalty and, 
hence. trustworthiness. Both sets of relations also featured the use of or threat of the use of violence. the 
element of racial and ethnic difference. the stigmatised status of the worker. temporary alienation from the 
worker's own kin, and above all, legal dependence. 
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Economic migrants continued to represent a large proportion of the urban population in the Gulf 
port towns after the discovery of oil in the 1930s, when foreign labour was sought for oil 
production, manufacturing and construction (Fuccaro 2009: 208). While the inflow of workers 
was relatively unlimited in the beginning of the oil era, this gradually changed as immigration and 
nationality laws began to create new legal and political divisions between nationals and non­
nationals, Arabs and non-Arabs (ibid: 223). The notion that GCC nationals should be entitled to 
privileges above and beyond those of non-nationals began to take hold (Crystal 1990: 79). In 
Kuwait in 1948, two decrees established the first legal basis for nationality (ibid). By the late 
1950s, with the number of expatriate workers still increasing steadily, more explicit policies were 
passed favouring nationals. Labour laws specified the hiring of nationals, expatriates engaged in 
labour disputes were swiftly deported, and the formation and activities of unions were tightly 
regulated (ibid: 80). In 1964, a private sector labour law was passed limiting employment 
contracts to five years, compelling workers to register with the state, and establishing priority for 
the hiring of Kuwaitis, followed by other Arabs (ibid). According to Crystal, 'These policies 
encouraged Kuwaitis, including potential dissidents, to set themselves apart from expatriates. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, as Nasserism grew around the world, this policy was a very important 
containment mechanism' (ibid).97 Fuccaro writes of Bahrain, 'Immigrants, who had been the 
building blocks of pre-oil Manama, turned into possessors of visas and travel documents, a 
disciplined labour force subservient to the new economy' (2009: 211). 
Opinion is divided over whether kafala requirements were in place when post-oil labour 
importation began in the 1940s. Longva writes with reference to Kuwait: 
According to some testimonies there may have been a practice whereby migrants were vouched for 
by a respected citizen of Kuwait. I f this was the case, then the practice was not formalized in the first 
decades of labour importation, since the text of the Aliens' Residence Law issued in 1959 and 
amended in 1963, 1965, and 1968 made no mention of it. The 1960 Law of Commercial Companies 
did stipulate that foreigners might not establish businesses in Kuwait except with Kuwaiti partners 
who, in tum, were required to have 51 percent ownership. This requirement of partnership, however, 
was not strictly the same as the requirement of sponsorship ... (1997: 78). 
By the 1950s and 60s, while natives from other parts of the Gulf could enter and settle freely in 
Kuwait, Indian migrant workers were required to have guarantees from employers in order to 
enter (Longva 1997: 78, citing Joukhadar 1980). By 1969, all migrant workers including 
Palestinians had to be guaranteed by Kuwaiti employers (Joukhadar 1980 and Russel 1989a as 
cited in Longva 1997: 78). While the kafala system was commonly practiced by the end of the 
1960s, it was not until 1975 that it was finally codified in an amendment to the Aliens' Residence 
Law (Longva 1997: 79). By the 1980s, all foreigners originating from non-GCC states had to be 
97 Crystal's political history of Kuwait and Qatar (1990) dcvelops the argument thut distributive 
mechanisms, including assured public sector employment and other labour policies favouring nationals 
above foreigners, served to stille political dissent and ensure stability for ruling families. In short, oil wealth 
was distributed in exchange for political control. 
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under the sponsorship of a private citizen or private or state institution (Longva 1997: 79; see also 
Kapiszewski 2001: 202). 
For the first time, the kafala was mentioned and the role of the kafll (sponsor) was explicitly 
identified with that of the employer. In the years since 1975, the kafilla institution had become the 
very key to in-migration. Yet nowhere and at no time had the notion of kafilla and the relationship 
between the kaftl and the migrant worker been clearly explained, not even in the various detailed 
explanatory memoranda that accompanied the law and its amendments. (Longva 1997: 79) 
What is striking is how late this practice became officially regulated. The kaJala system emerged 
recently as an administrative tool institutionalising a broader system ofpatronage and control over 
labour which had long been in place. It functioned to ensure that no more workers entered than 
jobs existed, that they were personally tied to a national, and that they stayed only as long as they 
were employed. 
Discontinuities in Nature and Form 
In the preceding sections, I have traced the vernacular genealogy of the word through its use in 
legal contracts in the Ottoman Hanafi context. I have also discussed the Gulf context, in which a 
practice of patronage and control has been codified only recently. Given the similarities between 
the kaJala system as practiced in the Gulf and Jordan, this is important to consider. But precisely 
how the kaJala system as it applies to foreign workers in Jordan came to be I cannot determine. It 
is clear, however, that the kaJala system has become something substantially difTerent than earlier 
uses of kaJala contracts in Islamic jurisprudence. The system is lent a veneer of legitimacy by 
being named after a previous type of contract enshrined in Islamic law but with which it has little 
in common. In all earlier forms, the kafil took responsibility for his prott:ge and was held to 
account, whereas in this case - at least in practice - he is not held accountable. Part Two of this 
chapter illustrates this in detail. Historical uses of kaJala contracts may also have had exploitative 
elements, but their current implementation with respect to migrant labour violates both the letter 
and spirit of the legal institution. No firm conclusions can be drawn on the basis of my analysis of 
historical uses of kaJala contracts -- this chapter was written with the intention of raising 
questions rather than answering them. But a shift appears to have taken place at least at the 
vernacular level in which something once associated with social protection has become more 
restrictive and punitive. 
In both Jordan and the Gulf, the kaJala system applies not only to the entry of foreign workers but 
also to commercial activities. Thus any expatriate (including Palestinian refugees and Arabs from 
other states) wishing to start a business must form a partnership with a local guarantor.'18 The use 
of the kaJala system combined with regulations barring foreigners from being naturalized, 
bringing family members with them or permanently settling is particularly advantageous for 
98 On regulations concerning naluralisation, business investments and property ownership of non-Jordanians 
in Jordan, see Olwan (2006: 8-20). 
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ruling regimes. Because most foreign workers lack the right to associate, organise, or vote and are 
subject to deportation, the system has effectively out-sourced the least wanted, most difficult, 
dangerous and low-paid work to a vast, politically impotent workforce. Further illustration of the 
way in which the contemporary kafala system differs from earlier understandings of kafala 
contracts is the fact that serving as a guarantor has become a lucrative business. As I mentioned in 
chapter 2, though forbidden by law, visas are commonly sold to migrants by local citizens who 
agree to act as guarantors in exchange for a fee.99 Workers with expired visas and those wishing to 
bring relatives to the country often 'buy' visas in this way. For those who successfully secure 
visas through a kafil whom they trust but do not work for, the arrangement affords a degree of 
freedom to choose their own employer. But it is costly and risky. Many migrants pay large sums 
for visas that never materialise. In order to more fully understand how the kafala system operates 
in practice today, we shall return to the Jordanian context. 
Part Two: The KaJala System for Migrant Employment 
Although this study focuses on the situation ofdomestic workers, it is important to remember that 
the kafala system also applies to migrants employed in agriculture, construction, industrial 
production and many other service-sector jobs. It has been instituted not as the result of a single 
piece of legislation but rather through a series of administrative practices associated with various 
laws and regulations. Any employer seeking to hire a non-Jordanian worker must submit an 
application to the Ministry of Labour specifying the nature of work to be performed, place of 
employment, and other details and including a photograph of the worker, copies of the worker's 
passport, and medical certificates showing that he or she is in good health. The application must 
be approved by the Ministry of Labour, after which time the employer must pay for the 
employment permit. In 2008, work permit fees for the 303,325 foreib'1l workers employed resulted 
in revenue of 54 million dinars (Ministry of Labour 2008: 40), suggesting that the state has a 
pecuniary interest in the recruitment of foreign workers. Once the employment pennit is issued by 
the Ministry of Labour, a request can be made to the Department of Residence and Borders to 
issue a residence permit. Article 27 of Law Number 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigm.'TS 
Affairs states that foreigners may be required to provide security to cover any financial 
obligations that they may incur and to guarantee their departure from the kingdom upon the expiry 
of the residence permit granted. After entering the country to work for a particular employer, the 
worker may not change employers or occupations without prior permission from the Ministry of 
Interior, Ministry of Labour and the employer regardless of the reasons for tile termination of the 
initial employment contract (Ta'amneh 2003: 39). A signed, notarised 'release' from the first 
sponsor is required in order for the worker to be transft..'JTCd to another sponsor. 
99 Longva (1997: 107-108) has described the illegal sale of visas in Kuwait. 
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Employment procedures vary by sector and according to the workers' country of origin. Jordan 
divides countries into three categories for the purposes of entry of foreign nationals. Citizens from 
'Exempt' countries, including Arab League member states, do not need permits to enter the 
country.100 Those from 'Unrestricted' countries do not need prior permission to enter Jordan but 
do require visas, which they may purchase at a port of entry; this category includes countries in 
Western Europe, North America and Latin America. All other countries, including Sri Lanka, fall 
into the category of 'Restricted', meaning their citizens must obtain permission to enter from a 
Jordanian consulate prior to arrival (see Annex A, 'Restricted Nationalities List'). The Jordanian 
and Egyptian governments have signed bilateral agreements allowing Egyptian migrants to obtain 
'open' work permits, which allow them to change their employment; such permits are not 
available to any other nationalities (Ta'amneh 2003: 39). In addition to these laws and regulations 
governing the entry and work of foreigners, Memorandums of Understanding are periodically 
signed between Jordan and the governments of other sending countries. Such agreements are 
seldom made public and lack enforcement mechanisms. 
During the period of research employers paid a minimum of the equivalent of $2,000 in 
recruitment agency and government fees in order to bring a domestic worker to the country. This 
situation resembles debt bondage in that in exchange for the employer having paid this sum, the 
migrant is expected to work for two years. But there are important differences between the 
context at hand and forms of bonded labour linked to the clearing of debt. Ilere, the money paid 
by employers goes to recruitment agencies rather than workers, and most workers themselves also 
pay brokers and recruitment agencies in their own countries. Moreover, the worker is obliged to 
work for longer than would be required simply to repay the costs of her recruitment. Many 
employers do not pay domestic workers for the first two or three months in ordt..'T to offset 
recruitment agency charges, and even once these charges have been fully recouped, the worker 
continues to be tied to her employer. She is not 'free' until she has completed the two-year 
contract, at which point she can return to her country or, if she is able to obtain a 'release' from 
her sponsor, be employed by someone else. Some recruitment agents and employers may allow 
domestic workers to break their contracts and return to their countries early if they pay all of the 
costs that were incurred in bringing them to Jordan. There is no formal procedure or stipulation in 
the contract allowing for this, however, and I am not aware of a single case in which a domestic 
worker was able to 'buy' her freedom in this way. The costs usually exceed $2,000, or more than 
a year's salary, and are more than the vast majority of migrants are able to pay. Further research is 
needed to determine the extent to which workers employed in other sectors or who come from 
100 Special restrictions apply to Iraqis; in 2008, the government began requiring them to obtain visas prior to 
entry. 
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countries closer to Jordan, for example Egypt, are able to break their employment contracts and 
return home early. 
Due to the cost of recruitment, there is a great deal of insecurity on the part of employers that 
domestic workers will desert them. To minimise the risks, workers' passports are confiscated as 
soon as they arrive. To reduce the likelihood that they may gain knowledge of how to escape, 
their movement outside the household is restricted and they are usually discouraged from 
communicating with anyone outside the home. IOI Thus, working conditions involve an extreme 
form of social alienation. This is meant to deter workers from fleeing and also to prevent gossip 
about employers' private affairs from reaching the neighbours. While not all employers limit 
mobility and communication in these ways, these restrictions appear to be the norm.102 Unlike 
accounts of debt bondage in which workers are attracted and then controlled by the payment of 
advances (De Neve 1999: 384-9; Kapadia 1995: 447), here such payments are extremely rare, 
given only to trusted, long-serving workers. Wages are more often withheld as a way of 
immobilising labour. Some employers also resort to physical violence, and domestic workers and 
employers alike have reported incidents of physical abuse by recruitment agency staff. 
Once in custody of the employer, the domestic worker's position is legally governed by the 
unified working contract that all employers and migrant domestic workers are required to sign 
(included as Annex B). When the contract was first introduced in 2003, it was touted as a 
breakthrough for domestic workers' rights.103 However, the majority of workers I spoke with in 
2007 and 2008 who had migrated after the contract had been introduced did not recall having read 
it prior to migrating. None had copies of the contracts they had signed. Contracts are printed in 
Arabic and English, which only a small minority of workers are able to read. The contract 
stipulates that employers must provide workers with return airfare, accommodation, meals, 
101 These patterns are also evident in Lebanon. An NGO carried out a study of employer attitudes in 2010 
(Abdulrahim 2010). Out ofa sample of roughly one hundred employers, 88 percent said they believed they 
should have the right to keep domestic workers' passports in order to prevent them from escuping. The 
majority opposed the practice of locking domestic workers in the house, but 31 percent reported that they 
did so. Fifty-four percent said they gave their domestic workers time off from work, but of those only 20 
~ercent allowed them to leave the house independently during time off. 
02 These practices were described as widespread in several countries in the region by Human Rights Watch 
(2007) and the ILO (Esim and Smith 2004). Women reported working 16-18 hours a day and almost none 
had regular rest days (Human Rights Watch 2007: 62). Ninety to one hundred percent of those domestic 
workers interviewed by the ILO reported having their freedom of movement controlled, and few were 
allowed to visit friends or go for a walk on their own (Esim and Smith 2004: 19-20). Of complaints the Sri 
Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment recorded from migrant workers, 80 percent were from women, 
most of whom were working as domestic workers in the Middle East. Approximately 18 percent related to 
non-payment, 15 percent concerned breach of employment contract, 13 percent involved restrictions on 
communication, and 12 percent pertained to physical or sexual harassment (SLBFE 2008: 54). 
103 Before Jordan introduced the unified contract, workers signed contracts in their home countries that were 
not legally binding in Jordan and then were often asked to sign contracts with diffcrent terms upon arrival in 
the country of employment. This has been reported in many other parts of the region as well (Manseau 
2005: 30). Similarly, the ILO has reported irregularities in contracts for domestic workers in other countries 
in the region (Simel and Esim 2004: 20·21). 
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clothing and medical care and states that workers are entitled to an additional IS days of pay at 
the end of the two-year contract period. But it also states that domestic workers must 'faithfully 
and loyally perform his/her duties without violating the general social norms, morals and laws' 
and stipulates that they must not leave the employer's residence without permission (Article 6). 
Workers are entitled to one rest day per week on the condition that they do not leave the 
employer's residence without approval (Article 8). The only two grounds under which the worker 
can terminate the contract is if the employer fails to pay the worker or fails to obtain the required 
residence and work permits (Article 9). The contract does not specify punishments for employers 
if the conditions of the contract are breached and places a heavy burden of proof on workers in 
cases of abuse or non-payment. 
Until 2008, persons employed in agriculture and domestic work were not considered workers 
under Jordanian law. I04 Article 3 of the 1996 Jordanian Labour Law stipulates that the labour law 
applies to all employees except a) public servants and employees of the municipality, b) unpaid 
family members, c) domestic workers and cooks, and d) agricultural workers. The rationale 
behind these exclusions is not clear. But in the case of domestic work, it was commonly explained 
with reference to the fact that it differs from other types of 'work' because it is performed in 
private homes. In practice this legal exclusion gives employers greater power and means that 
regulations regarding entitlements to holidays, social security, health insurance, severance pay 
and other rights do not apply to workers in these sectors. Disputes between employers and 
workers in the excluded sectors fall under the jurisdiction of civil or criminal courts but not the 
labour court, which has expedited procedures and in which workers do not have to pay legal fees. 
In 2008, Jordan became the first Arab country to extend labour law coverage to domestic workers 
and some categories of agricultural workers. Following on from this, in 2009 new rel:,'Ulations on 
the employment of domestic workers were issued stipulating that employers must pay workers on 
a monthly basis, restricting working hours to 10 per day, and guaranteeing 14 days of paid leave 
at the end of each year of employment, along with 14 days of paid sick leave per year. Under the 
new regulations, employers must also allow domestic workers to write letters home and are 
entitled to one phone call home per month at the expense of the employer. It is unclear what 
impact these regulations will have given that there is still widespread opposition to the prospect of 
government oversight of household labour. When asked about carrying out labour inspections in 
private homes, Ahmed lIabahbeh, president of the Domestic lIelpers' Agencies Association and 
an owner of a recruitment agency, remarked that this would be unfair to employers. 'No one can 
enter your house to check if your maid is OK or not. We are Bedouins in this country!' (Seeley 
104 Similarly, in Sri Lanka the government docs not regulate the work of those persons employed in 
domestic service. Domestic work is excluded from labour laws in Saudi Arabia (Silvey 2004: 146), Kuwait 
(Longva 1997: 94) and Lebanon (Jureidini and Moukarbel 2004: 596). The legality of excluding particular 
groups of workers has been challenged by Jordanian legal scholars (see Malkawi Undated: 2-4). 
106 
2009). Employers and Ministry of Labour officials alike subscribe to the idea that the home is an 
inviolable space. Without enforcement mechanisms, the effectiveness of the legal regulations is 
extremely limited. In fact, there appears to be an almost total lack of enforcement of workers' 
rights. Guidelines about the minimum salary are often flouted. As of 2006, the contract stipulated 
that migrant domestic workers should earn a minimum of $125 per month. While some earned 
more, others earned less or were not paid at all. lOS Some employers withhold pay until the end of 
the contract period in order to discourage workers from running away, and some fail to pay the 
full amount even then. Though forbidden by the terms of the contract, employers also frequently 
dock workers' wages to cover the cost of visas, recruitment agency fees, phone calls, medical 
care, food and other items, meaning that some workers receive only a fraction of the promised 
pay. 
Domestic workers may be disciplined with physical force as well as the threat of dismissal. 
Employers who are dissatisfied with domestic workers' performance can either send them back to 
their countries or take them to the agency responsible for recruiting them. Workers who are 
'returned' to recruitment agencies are usually deployed to work on a full-time basis in another 
employer's home or can be made to work on a daily basis in multiple homes until a permanent 
position is found. The story of Elsie - a Filipina domestic worker whom I met in the spring of 
2007 - provides an example. Elsie's first employer sent her back to the agency that recruited her, 
which then sent her to clean several office buildings during the day while a new employer was 
sought. Elsie slept in the recruitment agency at night during this period. By her account, the 
offices where she worked paid the agency 7 JD ($10) per day, of which Elsie received only 3 JD 
($4.25). After several months, she was employed on a live-in basis by an elderly woman and paid 
$100 per month. Other migrants described similar experiences, and some said they were not paid 
at all while being held by recruitment agents. 
Residence and work permits are issued for one year, but migrant domestic workers are employed 
on two-year contracts. Employers are responsible for renewing their permits after the first yenr, 
but there is no procedure in place to compel them to do so. A fine of I.S JD ($2.12) is levied for 
each day a foreigner remnins in the country without a valid visa. Although according to the 
standardised working contract employers are liable for paying the fines if they have not renewed 
the worker's visa, those who fail to do so are seldom held to account. In most cases, it is the 
worker who is punished. Workers who cannot afford to pay the fines themselves are prevented 
from returning to their countries. Amnesty International reported that 14,000 migrant domestic 
workers were trapped in Jordan due to overstay fines (2008: 4). In one unusual case in which legal 
105 Human Rights Watch (2007: 40) found that 20 percent ofdomestic workers interviewed in Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Lebanon and the UAE had not received their full salaries. Similar figures were reported by the ILO 
(Esim and Smith 2004: 18). 
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proceedings were initiated against an employer who had not paid a domestic worker's salary for 
one year and the worker accrued overstay penalties due to the fact that the employer had failed to 
renew her work permit, a judge found the employer guilty and issued a decision requiring him to 
pay her salary, overstay fines, indemnity damages and a return ticket to her country (Ta'amneh 
2003: 41). However, the sentence was never enforced, the plaintiff was deported due to lack of 
legal status in the country, and the employer faced no consequences (ibid). 
Enslavement or Bondage? 
The main UN agency responsible for international labour standards has identified six basic 
indicators of forced labour: 1) the threat or use of physical or sexual violence, 2) restrictions on 
the worker's movement andlor confinement to the workplace, 3) debt bondage or bonded labour, 
4) withholding or non-payment of wages, 5) retention of passports, and 6) threat of denunciation 
to the authorities (ILO 2005: 20-21). According to the ILO, one or more of these elements can 
constitute a criminal offence in many countries. In the case of migrant domestic workers 
employed in Jordan, all six of these elements are frequently combined at once. Some elements, 
such as confinement to the workplace and retention of passports, are standard practice. By the 
ILO's criteria, then, migrant domestic workers are held in conditions which qualify as forced 
labour. 
Does this form of unfree labour fall under the category of slavery? Jureidini and Moukarbcl 
(2004: 582) and Gardner (2010: 58) suggest that it docs, referring to the ka/ala system as 'contract 
slavery'. They adopt Bales' (1999) conception of 'new slavery' in which total control over 
another person - rather than ownership - is the defining feature. Bales' understanding is at 
variance with most studies of slavery, which view ownership as the essential characteristic of 
master-slave relations (Meillassoux. 1991: 73). The original definition of slavery as laid out in the 
League of Nations Slavery Convention of 1926 (Article I (I» was 'the status or condition of a 
person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised'. 
According to most historical accounts, slaves were captured and made to work without pay. They 
could be bought and sold. They were usually property-less, and their situations were usually 
permanent. In contrast, unlike slaves, migrants enter into employment at will with the expectation 
that they will be remunerated for their work. The extent to which any worker 'freely' offers his or 
her labour varies, but a distinction can be drawn between people who presumably migrate of their 
own volition - and in fact pay recruitment agency fees to do so - and slaves who have been 
abducted or born into situations of forced labour from which there is no foreseeable exit. Mil"rrants 
in the context at hand are separated from their social milieus, and limits are imposed on their 
ability to reproduce socially, much like slaves (Meillassoux. 1991: II, 35). But for migrants, 
unlike slaves, the condition is temporary. Given these distinctions, I have concluded that migrant 
labour in the ka/ala system should be understood as bound rather than enslaved. Migrants submit 
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to captivity for a finite period. As in cases of bonded labour described in India, the unfree element 
lies not in the bondage being imposed from the start but in the inability to break the bond once it 
has been contracted (Breman 1993: 12). Comparisons can also be made with indentured labour. 
Like indentured servants, migrants are expected to work for a fixed period, usually but not always 
in exchange for transportation and lodging, and are not permitted to sell their labour freely on the 
market during that time.106 But unlike most indentured labourers, they are not then free to settle in 
the country after the period of indenture.107 In light of the temporary nature of their situation and 
the fact that they do not have the option of permanent settlement, bonded labour appears to be a 
more fitting descriptor than either indentured labour or slavery, although as I have described, 
these workers are not bound by debt alone. They are tied to their sponsors for a two-year period 
through their employment contracts regardless of the amount the sponsor may have paid in 
recruiting them and whether this money has been recouped. 
Coercion and Enforcement: Scenes From the Sri Lankan Emba.\·sy 
The meaning and structure of the contractual bond between employers and domestic workers is 
best revealed when it is violated. One November morning in 2006, in a cmmped office at the back 
of the Sri Lankan embassy in Amman, a red-faced Jordanian taxi driver in a plaid shirt shouted at 
the top of his lungs that he wanted to be paid. Abier, a woman employed in the bustling labour 
relations section of the embassy, pleaded with him to be patient. She calmly explained that she 
could not pay him stmight away, that he should fill out a form and return later. After completing 
the form, the driver stormed out. Earlier that morning, he had driven a Sri Lankan domestic 
worker who was running away from her employers' house to the embassy. I laving fled without 
any belongings, the woman had no money to pay the fare. This was not the first time the taxi 
driver had encountered a customer wanting to go to the embassy without money. I Ie expected the 
embassy to reimburse him. As I later learned through discussions with embassy stafT, the problem 
of women running away from their employers without money for taxi fare occurred so often that 
the embassy had created a fund specifically for such occasions. Although migrant domestic 
106 Migrant domestic workers' food and lodging is usually provided by their employers. but this is not 
always the case for migrants working in other sectors. For those in the garment industry and construction, 
for example. the costs of food and accommodation are usually deducted from their wages. Many migrants 
heading to the Middle East pay a portion or in some cases all of the eosts of transportation. 
107 In the North American context, indentured servitude appeared in the seventeenth century as a way of 
facilitating migration, and thereby enabling the supply of labour. to the British colonies by allowing 
migrants to borrow against future earnings to cover the high cost of passage across the Atlantic (Galenson 
1984: 24). Between one-half and two-thirds of all European immigrants to North America between the 
1630s and the American Revolution in the second-half of the eighteenth century came as indentured 
servants (ibid: 1). Most of these predominantly British, Scottish, Irish and German migrants settled 
permanently in the colonies after finishing their contracts. Indentured emigration of Indians in the 
nineteenth century also usually led to permanent settlement abroad. Carter estimates thllt at least two-thirds 
of all Indian indentured migrants in the British Empire did not return to India at the end of indenture (1996: 
56). Indian indentured migrants brought to Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Malaya (Malaysia) in the nineteenth 
century were not only permitted but encouraged to settle permanently by being allowed to bring their wives 
and children (Grieco 1998: 713). 
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workers in Jordan are forbidden from leaving their employers' homes without permission, many 
do so anyway. Consequently, the Sri Lankan embassy had become a temporary haven for 
'runaways'. 
In the autumn of 2006 I spent several weeks in the Sri Lankan embassy with the permission of the 
labour attache in order to learn about the process of migration from Sri Lanka to Jordan. During 
that time I sat on the leather couch in the labour attache's office drinking cup after cup of the 
sweet tea the embassy staff served me and observed the goings on of the labour relations section. 
The labour attache and his staff handled a daily barrage of crises involving recruitment agencies, 
employers, migrant domestic workers and the police. Women arrived in droves seeking shelter. 
Employers came to complain that workers had run away, and recruitment agency staff came to 
fetch 'runaways'. The following passages describe how these issues were dealt with by embassy 
staff. 
One morning, a tall man in a green military uniform entered the labour attache's office and 
described a problem involving a Sri Lankan woman who until recently had worked in his home. 
She had been very demanding, he said, and eventually ran away. Severnl days after leaving his 
household she sent him a text message stating that she had found a new job working for an elderly 
man and that she would give him the money he had spent bringing her to Jordan ifhe returned her 
passport. He refused because she had run away. The employer and labour attache had the 
fol1owing conversation: 
Employer: If! can catch her, can I bring her back to the embassy? 
Labour attache: No, because we already have a high number [of women] in the embassy. We will 
have to send her back to Sri Lanka. We can do this through the help of a charity who can help get her 
a ticket. The charity is called Caritas. 
Employer: Do you have any housemaids here in the embassy right now? Any good ones? 
Labour attache: No, we cannot act as agents at this embassy. We are representatives of the Sri 
Lankan government. I'm very sorry. But we'll try to help you in any other way. If I find her, I will 
call you and I will translate for her. 
Employer: Well, thank you. I will try to find her. I have a friend helping me from the police and we 
are trying to trace the text message she sent to us. We may be able to find out who the owner is based 
on the number. It depends on how the number is registered. 
The labour attache and the employer discussed whether it would be possible to find her, and then 
the man left. This episode itIustrates the fact that responsibility for policing the forcib'll workforce 
rests with individual employers. Confiscating workers' passports is an important mechanism of 
control. This exchange also reveals the way in which embassy staff act as brokers between 
workers and employers. 
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During another visit to the embassy, I sat in the labour attache's office and watched as a dozen 
workers presented their cases to him. Almost all wanted to return to Sri Lanka before their two­
year employment contracts had expired. With tears streaming down her checks, one woman 
pleaded with him to help her go home. When she had left the office, the labour attache turned to 
me and said: 
I have to keep up public relations. Many of these women are very, very poor. They come from 
remote areas. I cannot say unkind things to them. Many of them really suITer. I'd say 80 percent 
come to the embassy from homesickness. You have women with babies of just seven months who 
come here. They leave their children behind. They don't tell the [recruitment] agents in Sri Lanka 
that they have such youn~ babies. They don't disclose everything. because otherwise they might be 
prevented from coming. I 8 So, you see, you cannot blame the [recruitment] agents in Sri Lanka, 
either. They are just desperate to earn some money for their families because they have nothing else. 
He added that he did not blame employers either. 'You have to put it in the context of slavery. 
There are previous practices and the idea of democratic rights is very new. It will take time for 
things to get better.' Sri Lankan embassy staff were not insensitive to the plight of their 
compatriots, but the fact that workers were made to perform labour against their witt or for 
employers they did not want to work for was accepted. Embassy stafT said they had no legal 
jurisdiction to intervene in matters occurring in private households. The situation of many Sri 
Lankan domestic workers was recognised as miserable but was rationalised by the fact that they 
were poor and had come to Jordan in the hopes of earning more money. The prevailing discourse 
framed the plight of migrant women as problematic but justified by economic necessity. 
I did not visit the embassies of the Philippines or Indonesia and cannot comment on their 
practices, but based on what I observed at the Sri Lankan embassy, the policy was that any worker 
seeking shelter at the embassy without having completed her two-year work contract would be 
sent back to the agency that recruited her unless she was believed to have been abused. Those 
workers who were anowed to stay in the shelter in the basement of the embassy were not 
permitted to leave the premises, and visits from non-embassy personnel were strictly limited. 
During the period of research, the embassy housed between 80 and 100 women. I made several 
requests to speak with them and on each occasion was told that special permission would be 
required, and that I would have to wait. Nearly one year after I had first asked, I was granted 
permission to speak with several women on the condition that I did not record their names and 
that the labour attache remained present. In this way, I came to meet four women, each of whom 
was brought upstairs into the labour attache's office. 
One of the women was Neeta. When she arrived in the office, her blouse was dirty and her face 
was puffy and swollen from crying. The labour attache questioned her, and she explained what 
108 The labour attache refers here to the regulation prohibiting women with children under the age of five 
from going abroad for work. But as I have mentioned previously. this regulation was largely ignored by 
recruitment agencies, and women with young children continued to migrate. 
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had happened. Neeta was a married mother of two who had arrived in Jordan the previous year. 
She was placed in the home of a family who had a fifteen-year-old son. Neeta said that the 
madame of the house sometimes hit Neeta as well as her own son. On one occasion when the 
madame had been unsatisfied with Neeta's work, she slammed her into a wall, causing a painful 
bump to fonn on her foreann. Neeta held out her ann to display the bump. The family owned a 
second home on the outskirts of the city. One day, the husband drove Neeta to the second home so 
that she could clean it. Neeta and the man entered the house alone. When she began cleaning the 
main room, the employer locked the door and forced himself on her. Neeta wept as she recounted 
the story. She said that later that day the man drove her back to Amman. As soon as she had the 
chance, she jumped from a window on the second story of the house in an attempt to escape. She 
injured her back in the fall, and the husband and wife heard her cry and found her lying on the 
ground outside the house. They took her to hospital, where she was treated. Several days later, she 
jumped from the window again, this time landing unscathed. She came directly to the embassy. 
Despite what had happened, Neeta wanted to stay in Jordan because her family badly needed the 
money she earned. At this point I interjected, saying to the labour attache that Neeta's case should 
be documented, and that she should be taken to the police station immediately so that they could 
collect evidence. He said this would serve no purpose, since the police assume Sri Lankans lie, 
and that on the following day he would arrange for the recruitment agency that had brought Neeta 
to Jordan to come to the embassy and that they would try to persuade the employer to pay to send 
Neeta back to Sri Lanka and give her $500 in compensation. I was unable to find out what 
occurred subsequently in relation to her case, but the labour attache's response was typical; in 
further discussions with him and attorneys employed by the embassy, I learned that in the vast 
majority of cases in which domestic workers alleged abuse or sexual assault, reconciliation was 
sought through private channels. If the employer admitted wrongdoing, they would agree on a 
financial settlement and the worker would be sent home. Few cases were brought to the attention 
of police. Embassy stafT explained this in relation to the fact that court cases can last several 
years, and arriving at a settlement through private negotiations is faster and thus in the worker's 
best interests. This means, however, that there is little meaningful deterrent to mistreating or 
exploiting migrant domestic workers. 
These episodes reveal the ways in which embassy stafT help to enforce the bond between migrant 
women and their employers. When faced with allegations of abuse, the labour attache's response 
was usually to attempt to resolve the matter through informal bargaining. The embassy did 
blacklist employers and recruitment agencies who mistreated domestic workers, but it is unlikely 
such blacklists were effective given that they were not shared among the various embassies, and 
an employer or agency banned by one could recruit workers from another country. The Sri 
Lankan embassy's lack of support for domestic workers is underpinned by the government's 
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financial interest in promoting labour migration. Sri Lankan diplomats are expected to maintain 
good relations with labour-receiving countries, a goal that conflicts with protecting workers' 
rights (Gamburd 2009: 76). As a result, they adopt policies of accommodation. As was examined 
in chapter 2, Sri Lanka markets subservience as its comparative advantage in the global 'maid 
trade'. Aggressively pursuing labour disputes on behalf of its citizens could threaten Sri Lanka's 
standing as a labour supplier. The lack of support means that seasoned migrants tend to be cynical 
about the embassy. Many criticise the fact that women in the shelter are not allowed to leave. 
Others warn women who have run away from their employers not to seek assistance at the 
embassy because they may be forcibly returned to the recruitment agency if they have not 
completed their two-year contracts. 
The Jordanian State and Legal System 
Having considered the Sri Lankan embassy's role, what role has the Jordanian government taken 
with respect to migrants employed in domestic work? In 2006, the Ministry of Labour established 
the Division for Domestic Workers to oversee the employment of domestic workers. Foreign 
domestic workers can be recruited legally only through one of95 registered recruitment agencies, 
all of which are monitored by the Division. The Division addresses complaints from employers 
and works to prevent Jordanians from recruiting domestic workers privately without agency 
involvement. Here is an excerpt of an interview with the Ministry of Labour (MOL) staff member 
who was then serving as Head of the Division for Domestic Workers. I09 
EF: I understand that your work involves monitoring recruitment agencies. Have you had to close 
any agencies for not foHowing the regulations? 
MOL staff member: Yes, we have. Since our office opened, we have closed three agencies. 
EF: Why were they closed? 
MOL staff member: Because they didn't follow the rules. In each case, they had not followed up on 
promises made to the employers. 
EF: What about promises made to workers? Are these a problem concerning recruitment agencies? 
MOL staff member: The recruitment agency's responsibility to the worker ends as soon as she begins 
her employment in a home. 
EF: Do you receive complaints ofabuse or other problems from domestic workers themscl ves? 
MOL staff member: No, we have never received complaints of abuse or violence from domestic 
workers. These cases are sent to the Family Protection Unit. 11o 
EF: Is this not a problem, if part of your mission concerns the employment of domestic workers? 
Would you not want to hear about the problems they encounter? 
109 Interview at the Ministry of Labour office in Abdali on March 8, 2007. Our conversation was in Arabic. 

This is my own translation. 

110 This is a unit ofthe Public Security Directorate that deals with cases of domestic violence. 
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MOL staff member: Yes, we want to protect domestic workers. We are working on trying to amend 
the law. The labour law currently does not include domestic workers. III There is an initiative now to 
extend it to cover them. I hope in the future this wiII happen. So, yes, of course we care about 
protecting domestic workers. This is very important for Jordan's reputation. But since the division 
was established, we have only had one or two domestic workers come to the office to complain. 
These are always money-related complaints, not involving abuse. 
EF: In your view, is abuse of domestic workers a problem? 
MOL staff member: It's not common. With relation to our recruitment agencies, they maintain very 
strict controls. We undertake awareness-raising programmes and training seminars for them. We 
teach them not to abuse the workers, either verbally or physically. We also warn the offices that if 
employers complain that workers are being abused there, they will have to be shut down. We have set 
up a special unit concerned with random visits to the agencies. 
At this point the staff member asked me to wait and then left the office. When he returned he was 
accompanied by the woman in charge of the Ministry of Labour's Inspection Unit, which carries 
out random inspections of recruitment agencies in Amman. She remained present for the rest of 
the interview. The stafTmember introduced her before continuing: 
MOL stafT member: We try to be as civil as possible when we visit the offices. We try to be 
objective. Most domestic workers prefer to work in Jordan because it's a stable country and they 
enjoy it more. As Jordanians, we treat the domestic worker as part of the family. Some run away, and 
that is because they were forced to come here, they were made to come against their will. Many 
agencies in their countries promise women jobs doing other things, so they come not knowing they 
wiJI be housemaids. We try to cooperate with the embassies as much as possible to solve tbese 
problems. 
EF: If a worker were not being paid or were being mistreated in some way by her /((Iftl, what 
procedure should she follow to make a complaint? 
MOL staff member: She should come here in person. We will then contact the recruitment office and 
pull her file. And we'll bring in the kafil. We try to be as objective as possible. We tend to side with 
the domestic worker, because that is the weaker party. 
EF: You mentioned that only one or two women have come to your office to make complaints. Do 
you ever hear about other complaints about employers? Is this a problem? 
MOL stafTmember: We do not receive a big number ofcomplaints. Abuse is rare. 
[The woman in charge of the Inspection Unit interjected to say: 'Mistreatment of domestic workers is 
not common because our religion and our traditions guide employers in their conduct.'] 
EF: In tbe course of my research, I have had the opportunity to meet many migrant women in Jordan. 
I recently met a woman who has been working for a family for 8 years and has never been paid. lIer 
residence permit has been expired for the past 6 years. lIer employers admit they have not paid her, 
so there's no dispute about that. What should a woman in her position do? What advice can I give to 
her? 
MOL stafT member: Is this woman in Irbid? 
EF: Yes. 
III This interview was carried out before the labour law was amended to inelude domestic workers. 
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MOL staff member: We have been in touch with the Irbid Municipality. I have been told that the 
mayor ofIrbid will meet with this woman and her employers. A woman from the women's section of 
the Ministry of Labour is also involved. This matter is being resolved. 112 
EF: That's great news. But what about other women in her position? What steps should they take? 
MOL staff member: Since 2003, a policy has been enacted to ensure that workers are paid and their 
visas are renewed on time. Since then, there have been no unresolved complaints of non-payment. 
All ofthe cases we have received have been solved. When you entered the room this morning, I was 
speaking with the Sri Lankan embassy, ifyou recall. We were discussing an ongoing case involving a 
woman. She was working in a home for a man and made an agreement with him to set aside her pay 
each month so that she could collect all of it at the end of her contract. After one year, she ran away 
to the embassy saying she wasn't paid. The embassy contacted us. We have spoken to the employer, 
and he sent the embassy a check for the woman's pay. But the embassy refused to accept this. They 
haven't given her the money. We think that some of the workers in the embassy are taking some of 
the money. They're ripping her otT. 
EF: But, again, what should women in the position of the girl we spoke of in Irbid do? 
MOL staff member: We will address any complaint that comes to us. 
EF: There are large numbers of migrant women in Jordan who have run away from their employers 
and who continue to live and work as part-time domestic workers. Are these runaways a concern? 
MOL staff member: No, this is a police matter. We do not deal with runaways. 
EF: But they still work as domestic workers? 
MOL staff member: I met a woman who has been in Jordan for more than twenty years and she earns 
more than 1,000 JDs a month. Her daughter goes to an English-language school. She's doing fine. 
The problem is that in some cases, these women who run away lure other women to run away from 
their employers' homes. Most of the women who run away don't run away from abuse. They run 
away to engage in prostitution. 
EF: What about the problem of women who have overstayed their visas and owe fees? Whose 
responsibility is this? 
MOL staff member: The kafil is responsible to pay the visa fees. Ifhe doesn't, hc'lI be juiled. 
EF: How often does this actually happen? 
MOL staff member: We don't deal with these cases. This is 11 police malter. Rut there are cases, yes, 
in which employers have been taken into custody. The law is very strictly enforced when it comes to 
domestic workers. Sponsors are held to account. We're now dealing with a case of a member of 
parliament who had a domestic worker who ran away a year ago. The police just called and said that 
aller a year, they've found her. Now, her employer must pay the overstay fees, even though the 
womun husn't been there. 
112 This case involved a domestic worker I will call Shanthi. When we met in Junuury 2007, Shanthi had 
been working for a family in Irbid, a town in the north of the country, since 1999. She had been promised 
80 Jordanian dinars as a monthly salary but had never received her pay. I learned of her case through 
another Sri Lankan worker, who had been eontacted by her fumily, who wanted help to bring her back to Sri 
Lanka. When I visited the home where she worked and spoke with her employers, they confirmed that her 
wages had not been paid; they had at one time given her a gold chain as a gift but admitted owing more than 
6,000 10 ($8,466) in unpaid wages. Her employers e1tplained that the fumily business had failed, and one of 
their sons had fallen gravely ill, placing a great financial strain on the family. They plllnned to pay her, they 
said, but could not yet do so. For the same reason, six years earlier when Shunthi's residence permit 
e1tpired, they had not paid to renew it. So, in addition to working without pay, Shanthi had no legal status in 
Jordan and had accumulated overstay fees in e1tcess of 3,300 10 ($4.655). It was only when a number of Sri 
Lankans took up the case with the Sri Lankan embassy that action was finally tuken and in June 2007, she 
was sent back to Sri Lanka with a portion of her earnings. 
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EF: Has there been discussion of doing home inspections, similar to those you do with recruitment 
agencies, to ensure that workers are being treated properly, are being paid, are being fed and have 
adequate accommodation? 
MOL stafT member: No, the law does not allow this. It is prohibited to go into private homes. But 
with this new initiative to extend the labour law to include domestic workers, this might be possible. 
EF: What is the biggest challenge your division faces? 
MOL statT member: The recruitment offices don't live up to the promises they make to the kafil. 
They say they'll bring workers at a certain time, and then they don't. We receive complaints from 
employers and work to try to resolve these disputes. 
This exchange reveals the fact that although the government has taken steps to regulate the work 
of domestic servants by monitoring the activities of recruitment agencies, the objective in doing 
so is to protect the interests of employers. Private households are considered inviolable spaces, 
and there is reluctance on the part of the authorities to interfere in household affairs. The 
phenomenon of women absconding from their employers' homes is attributed to false promises 
having been made to workers before arrival in Jordan. The problem of abuse is denied, and there 
is no clear procedure by which workers can seek redress without violating the terms of their 
employment contracts by leaving their employers' homes. Thus, seeking legal assistance entails 
criminalisation. 
On a practical level, migrant workers and employers are not treated as juridical equals. When the 
law is enforced, it is usually in the employer's favour. Many migrants assume that approaching 
the police to lodge a complaint against an employer is futile or could even make the situation 
worse, as employers are known to level false counter-accusations of theft that result in the migrant 
being detained. ll3 According to Firas Ta'amneh, an attorney who worked for the Sri Lankan and 
Philippines embassies in Amman representing migrant women, those who approach the police 
because they cannot afford to pay their overstay fines and want to go home can be detained or 
turned away if the authorities do not want to deal with their cases (Interview, 22 May 2007, 
Amman). 
Most legal proceedings against employers are handled as civil rather than criminal matters, even if 
a worker has been physically abused. This is true throughout the region. According to Roland 
Tawk, an attorney who represents migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, while the penal code 
would act as a stronger deterrent to abuse because it entails stiffer penalties, judges tend to be 
unsympathetic to migrants and it is difficult to persuade them that employers' actions constitute 
criminal offences (Interview, Beirut, March 19, 2009). Similarly, according to one source, there 
has only been one case in Bahrain's history in which B sponsor was convicted of abusing a 
domestic worker in a criminal court; the employer was sentenced to three months' imprisonment 
113 The problem of false counter-accusations has been reported by migrants, lawyers and NGO workers in 
Jordan 8S well as Lebanon. It has also been described as common in Bahrain (Stroble 2009: 173). 
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for beating her housemaid on a daily basis (Stroble 2009: 168). These examples are part of a 
wider trend with respect to the legal treatment of violence against women. Jordan's criminal code 
is gendered such that crimes such as rape tend to carry lighter sentences when the victim is female 
and the act is committed within the domestic sphere, which is deemed private (Warrick 2009: 63). 
Domestic violence between relatives can be tried as a criminal matter, but in practice few victims 
report incidents and cases are rarely prosecuted (Warrick 2009: fn 7). 
Domestic workers who file legal cases against employers are stymied by expensive and lengthy 
court proceedings during which time they are not anowed to work because they are only 
authorized to work for a single employer. There are seldom witnesses willing to testify on their 
behalf, and it is often difficult to obtain physical evidence of abuse. As a result, there have been 
few convictions against employers. The United States Department of State's annual Trafficking in 
Persons Report for Jordan for 2008 (p. 152-3) stated that while the government received 2,479 
labour complaints, including some for conditions of forced labour, and the authorities reported 
resolving 77 percent of the cases, the government provided no evidence of any prosecutions, 
convictions or jail sentences for forced labour involving domestic workers. The same report stated 
that well-documented cases of forced labour in garment factories were primarily resolved with 
administrative penalties. Although Jordan banned slavery with the passage of the Anti-Slavery 
Law of 1929 and ratified ILO conventions 29 and 105 abolishing forced labour, legal protections 
which could protect workers against forced labour are rarely invoked. While it is a violation of 
international law as wen as Article 18 of the Jordanian Passport Law to hold someone else's 
passport, the practice remains routine. Human rights lawyer Alef MajaJi from Jordan's National 
Council for Human Rights told me that he was aware that the practice of confiscating workers' 
passports was widespread but had never heard of a case in which an employer or agency had been 
prosecuted for it (Interview, Amman, 4 August 2008). 
The story of Jennifer Perez illustrates how the justice system fails domestic workers. Perez was a 
Filipina domestic worker who was paralysed and eventually died after falling two stories from a 
kitchen balcony in 2005.114 She had been employed in her Jordanian employer's home for only a 
few hours when the incident took place. According to her statement, soon aft~'I' she arrived in 
Jordan and was brought to the house, a quarrel broke out between her and the madame over the 
fact that she had a mobile phone which she was unwilling to give up. The dis8!:,'feemcnt turned 
into a physical struggle, and Perez bit the employer's hand when the employer took her phone. 
She said the madame then grabbed her and pushed her over the balcony. According to the 
employer, Perez jumped from the balcony in a suicide attempt after their argument over the 
phone. With the help of the Philippines Embassy, Perez pursued legal action against the employer. 
114 Full details of the case were reported by Seeley (2007). 
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Her neck had been broken in the fall and she would need life support for the rest of her life. She 
wanted compensation. Court proceedings Were ongoing when Jennifer was sent back to the 
Philippines to be with her family nearly a year after the incident. She died two weeks after 
arriving in the Philippines due to complications arising from her injuries. Upon her death the 
power of attorney allowing her embassy-appointed lawyer, Firas Ta'amneh, to represent her in 
Jordan was cancelled, and legal proceedings ground to a halt. The public prosecutor's office never 
pursued criminal charges against the employer. 
Another example is the story of Aminah, a 28-year-old Indonesian domestic worker. She arrived 
in Amman in January 2008 infected with tuberculosis. Aminah was employed in the home of a 
Jordanian doctor, where she worked for 19 months without pay and where she said she was beaten 
on the face and body by the doctor's mother when she failed to clean well. Her tuberculosis went 
untreated. Jordanian newspapers reported that in September 2009, the doctor abandoned Aminah 
near the Directorate ofChest Diseases and Foreigners' Health.1I5 She weighed 20 kilo&,'Tams, was 
bleeding from the mouth and was unable to speak. Her clothes were rotting and stuck to her skin. 
The employer subsequently denied that Aminah had ever worked for him, though investigations 
later proved that she had. In response, the Indonesian embassy announced that it would file a 
lawsuit against the doctor. Such action by an embassy is rare. But despite the severity of the 
mistreatment Aminah endured, the case was handled as a civil mther than a criminal matter. 
Public prosecutors rarely file criminal charges against employers in response to allegations of 
abuse by domestic workers. Similarly, a study by lIuman Rights Watch (2010: 3) in Lebanon 
found that police and prosecutors fail to treat domestic workers' allegations as potential crimes or 
ignore them entirely. More than 100 judicial decisions were reviewed in which migrant domestic 
workers were either plaintiffs or defendants. The cases involved allegations of employers locking 
workers inside homes, confiscating passports or withholding food, but in no case were criminal 
charges filed against an employer. 
Amendments to the Sponsorship System in Bahrain 
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning that changes have been implemented in Bahrain that 
appear to have introduced an element of flexibility in the kafala system. In 2009, Bahrain became 
the first Arab state to take measures to change the sponsorship system by passing an amendment 
allowing migrants to transfer from one employer to another without the first employer's consent 
and without losing their residence permits. If the mi&,'Tant stops working for his or her first sponsor 
and is not transferred to a new sponsor within 30 days, however, his or her residence permit can 
be - and in most cases is - cancelled by the first sponsor. The amendment excludes domestic 
115 See coverage in AI-Chad by Hanan AI-Keswani on 12 September 2009 
(http://www.alghad.jonnews=448074) and in the Jordan Times by Khetam Malkawi on 14 September 2009 
(http://www.jordantimes.coml?news=19977). 
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workers, whose work visas continue to be tied to their employers and who are legally required to 
reside with their employers. Further empirical investigation is needed to analyse the impact of this 
amendment, but at this stage a number of loopholes and problems in implementation suggest it 
has resulted in little change for most workers. Under the new law, a company or individual 
seeking to hire a foreign worker must apply to the Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA). 
which then issues a visa for the worker. If the worker wishes to change jobs after arriving in 
Bahrain, he or she must file an end-of-contract notice three months in advance, and a new 
employer can then apply to re-register them. These changes were touted as amounting to a 
cancellation of the sponsorship system, but in fact they appear to simply transfer the right to 
release workers from their jobs from individual sponsors to the state (Gardner 2010: 23). They 
have the potential to allow greater flexibility in employment but have not altered the fact that 
workers still require an individual or company to oversee their stay. There is a great deal of scope 
for abuse. For example, because workers must apply three months in advance, vengeful 
employers can cancel the visa beforehand. False accusations made against workers who try to 
leave also continue to be a problem and can result in detention and deportation for the worker. 
Many migrants remain unaware of the new policies or face difficulties extricating themselves 
from employment contracts. Moreover, many do not possess copies of their employment 
contracts, which the authorities demand to see if they wish to change jobs. 
It is no coincidence that Bahrain was the first state in the region to amend the sponsorship system. 
It has fewer oil and gas reserves than other Gulf states, and in comparison to the UAE, Kuwait 
and Qatar, higher rates of unemployment and underemployment among its own citizens. The 
kafala system was amended not due to concerns about foreign workers' welfare but rather in order 
to make them less attractive to employers by limiting their control over expatriates.116 It was 
hoped that this would give nationals a leg up in the labour market. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the amendment excludes migrants employed in domestic work, a sector in which there is little 
competition from Bahraini citizens. It is possible that concerns about joblessness elsewhere in the 
region could prompt other governments to implement similar amendments; discussions about 
reforming the ka/ala system have been initiated in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and several other states. 
Conclusion 
The recent changes in Bahrain aside, all workers subject to the ka/ala system face the same basic 
predicament: while they willingly enter into employment, having done so, they cannot exit and 
are at the mercy of their employers until they complete their contracts. The kafilla system is not 
116 Bahraini Minister of Labour Majid bin Muhsin AI-Alawi reportedly said that the move was prompted by 
a desire to make local workers more attractive to employers in comparison to foreigners. See coverage in 
KUNA Online, 'Free Movement Adds to Dynamism of Luhour Markel', 25 Oct 2009. 
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the root cause of their exploitation, but it is the key mechanism for it. Those employed in 
domestic service are at an even greater disadvantage. Their cloistered lives and the fact that 
domestic work is socially stigmatised mean they lack the networks and respectability that might 
otherwise afford them protection. There is virtually no government oversight of their working 
conditions. Although domestic work is now included under the labour law in Jordan, domestic 
workers continue to face hurdles in seeking redress against errant employers through the formal 
justice system. In many cases, no sovereign power defends their interests. Sri Lankan migrants' 
rights have been trumped by their own government's economic interests in continued remittance 
income and the Jordanian government's political interest in appeasing its own citizenry over and 
above foreigners. Without the ability to access trade unions or engage in collective action, migrant 
domestic workers lack an effective base from which to make claims. By tying migrant workers to 
individual employers, the lea/ala system creates an impetus for this form of labour to be unfree. 
Comparisons can be drawn with guest worker programmes in other parts of the world that also tie 
migrant domestic workers to their employers, for example those in I long Kong (Constable 2002; 
Kennelly 2008: 115), Malaysia (Chin 1997), Singapore (Yeoh et al 1999) and the UK (Anderson 
1993). 
We may be inclined to think that forms of enslaved and coerced labour died out with the 
emergence of 'modem' capitalism. Yet the context at hand suggests that far from becoming 
obsolete, unfree labour can emerge in new forms at any time. As we have seen in this chapter, the 
bonding of labour through the kafala system is a recent phenomenon, having been formally 
instituted with the emergence of the oil economy in the last four decades. Workers in various parts 
of the world have experienced similar working conditions, albeit with local specificities. What 
distinguishes those in Jordan and other countries in the region is the highly asymmetrical way in 
which migrant labour is employed through the administrative framework of the kafala system. 
Unlike many other instances of unfree labour, in this context the coercion is state-sponsored and 
endorsed through official administrative procedures. The fact that this system is maintained by a 
wide-ranging web of actors including recruitment agency staff, diplomatic officials and the 
Jordanian authorities makes it that much harder to escape. In the final chapter of the thesis, more 
will be said about how this instance of unfree labour compares with others. But first, it is worth 
considering the ways the kaJala system is negotiated in practice by workers and their employers. 
This is the subject of the next chapter. 
120 
6 

Inherent Tension: Employer-Domestic Worker Relations 
!\)WW .,..". --::.. ~4~'~_'~ 
Figure 10: Abu Mahjoob cartoon entitled <Denial' 

Speaker 1: 'My God! Does this country need an awareness campaign for servants' righL'i!!? What 

exaggeration!! True we hit them sometimes ... True they don't have days lllT...True they wurk day and 

night ...True we treat them like slaves at times ... But [what goes on in) houses is secret. I'm satisfied and 

her father is satisfied. so why the scandal... Or am I mistaken?!' 

Speaker 2: 'Right onll' 
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These caricatures are part of the well-known Abu Mahjoob ('Father of the 1Iidden') series 
produced by political cartoonist Emad Haijaj. His satirical comics in Jordanian newspapers are 
renowned for poking fun at social and political life. Haijaj was commissioned by UNIFEM to 
produce these illustrations for a 2007 advocacy campaign calling attention to abuses against 
domestic workers.1I7 
Like the cartoons, much of what has been written about migrant domestic workers in Arab 
countries focuses on their vulnerability to exploitation and abuse (e.g. Esim and Smith 2004, 
Haddad 1999, Jureidini and Moukarbel 2004, Jureidini 2003, McMurray 1999, Moukarbel2007, 
Sabban 2002, UNlFEM 2000). Much of the English-language press coverage falls into this 
category, with stories focusing on cases of extreme physical violence. This focus is 
understandable given the highly unequal and coercive conditions under which they are employed, 
but from a scholarly perspective it runs the risk of casting migrants as hyper-exploited. Few 
studies have approached the issue from employers' perspectives (Ayoub 1996, AI-Raqeb undated, 
Roumani 2005). Roumani (2005) examines the widespread use of domestic workers for childcare 
throughout the Gulf and concludes that it has 'harmful effects on children's social and emotional 
development'. AI-Raqeb (undated study) also describes the adverse effects of employing foreign 
domestic help. These include disruptions in children's acquisition of Arabic (p5), the weakening 
of mother-child bonds (P5), and a risk of depression among children when domestic workers 
return to their home countries (p4). Similarly, Ayoub (1996) examines whether migrant domestic 
workers are a negative influence on the families who employ them. Based on a survey of 112 
Jordanian families with children between the ages of three and five, Ayoub concludes that in most 
cases domestic workers play a supportive but not integral role in childcare and so, do not 
adversely affect children'S growth (p78-79, p91). This view of domestic workers as inherently 
problematic is also reflected in some of the Ambic-Ianguage media coverage; the little Arabic­
language reporting that has been done has tended to vilify migrants by focusing on their 
involvement in crime or the threats they pose to the families who employ them. III There are, of 
course, exceptions, but on the whole employer-centred accounts tend to see domestic workers as a 
'problem', whereas migrant-centred studies portray them as victims. Few scholars have carried 
out intensive research with both groups. 119 
When the perspectives of both employers and workers are tuken into account, it becomes clear 
that there is often a great deal of despair on both sides. While some manage to build harmonious, 
117 I am grateful to Emad Hajjaj for kindly giving me permission to reproduce his cartoons. (Personal 
correspondence 28 October 2008.) 
118 For example, on January 19, 2007, the Jordanian television channel AI-Urduniyya broadcast a 
programme on the show '60 Minutes' about the trend of hiring foreign domestic helpers. It identified 
employers' children as the main 'victims', warned of the dangers of allowing servants to become substitute 
mothers, and pointed to the risk of child abuse. 
119 Noteworthy exceptions include De Regt (2008, 2009) and Nagy (1998). 
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mutually-beneficial relationships, the dynamic in many cases is fraught with conflict. The 
acrimony felt on both sides was impressed upon me throughout the course of my research, as I 
met workers who complained of abuse or ran away from their employers, and employers who told 
horror stories about domestic workers' misdeeds. Following on from chapter 5 on the legal and 
administrative framework of employment, this chapter considers the norms and practices 
governing worker-employer relations in everyday life and explores why their relationships are so 
often problematic. 
Ambivalence and Ambiguity 
Soon after I arrived in Jordan in 2006, I joined a women's social club in an effort to meet more 
employers. Roughly 30 members - most middle-aged from prominent Palestinian and Jordanian 
families - assembled each week to socialise and practice public speaking skills by giving prepared 
and impromptu speeches. Domestic workers are a perennial topic of conversation among 
Amman's ladies of leisure, so I was not surprised when one of the speeches focused on the trials 
and tribulations of employing household help. The speaker described her frustration trying to 
communicate with a newly-arrived maid who spoke no Arabic, knew nothing about housework 
and broke countless appliances and dishes. On one occasion, she found her feeding fish bones to 
the dog, she presumed because she was tired of taking care of it. 'You cannot survive without 
them, and at the same time you cannot live with them', the speaker said. The sentiment that 
domestic workers are a necessary burden is often expressed. 
After I had been a member of the club for nearly two years, I asked if the women would be 
willing to participate in a tape-recorded discussion as part of my research. Seven of them agreed 
to join me one afternoon. As part of our chat, each described her arrangements for housework. 
Bania and Hala had employed domestic workers when their children were young but no longer 
want live-in help and think more Jordanian women should do without it. Instead, Ilala employs an 
Egyptian man to do the heavy cleaning once a week. She is trying to convince her friends, most of 
whom have live-in help, to give up their maids. The underlying problem, she says, is that the 
young generation do not want to clean up after themsclves, and rcllltives and neighbours no longer 
help one another with childcare. Amira agrees; although she employs a Sri Lankan domestic 
worker, she wishes there were an alternative. Arwa's family hires a part-time cleaner because her 
father does not want a stranger living in the house. Similarly, Nesreen employs a freelance 
domestic worker who cleans several times a week. Deema has two live-in domestic workers from 
Indonesia. The following is an excerpt of our discussion: 
Hala: Look, here in Jordan the first thing is we have very big houses. And we have big families. And 
when our children grow up, we want them to come to our homes to feed them. All of this requires a 
Illt of work. We can't do it alone, so we nced to recruit someone to help. Thurs why there is a need 
for them. Not everyone can afford to bring them. Now they are becoming very expensive. They are 
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putting more taxes and the offices that are bringing them are taking too much money from the girls 
and from the employers. 
Deema: Tijarat al-raqiq. [slave trade] 
Hala: Yes, it is. It's like a slave trade. 
Amira: Excuse me. They have more rights than anyone here. Sorry ... Excuse me. In the new laws ­
the Ministry of Labour has put strict laws. When you want to hire one, it is not easy. 
Hania: Nevertheless, they are abused money-wise. When they come, they have to work for two 
successive months without pay. [This is a reference to the fact tlrat recruitment agencies and 
employers often deduct the first two or three months ofdomestic workers' earnings to recoup clrarges 
associated with travel and recruitment. Although officially forbidden. such deductions are common.] 
Hala: No, no, but they come under this condition. 
Amira: I'm bringing one now from Indonesia. And I will pay her all of her salary from the first 

month. 

Hania: Yes, but not everyone does this. 

Hala: She paid in advance [to come]. Her family paid in advance. [Hilla is suggesting tlrat tire worker 

paid agency fees in advance. so furtlrer deductions would be unnecessary.) 
Amira: Tayyib, this is not our problem. 
Hala: Listen. we're talking about what people do to them. But what you have to understand is that 
maids are also making problems for the families. 
Nesreen: Yes. 
Hala: Before, the women used to be older, aged 35, 40, 45. Now they are very young. 18 years, 20. 
They are young and beautiful. Their minds are more open to life. They see what the woman 
[employer] is wearing, and they want to wear it. 
Deema: [laughing in reference to tire fact that she has a filII figure] I'm lucky I don't have that 
problem. 
lIala: They might use your bedroom ... It's not taboo for them to sleep with anybody, like the 
chauffeur or anyone who knocks on the door. Even my friend, the girl who works for her asked her, 
'If the master asks me to sleep with him, should 11' And many do, because they think they will be 
able to do whatever they like ... They don't fecI shame. Even though they are Muslim and they pray, 
when they do these things they don't consider it haram. They accept it. And a lot of problems are 
happening because of this. 
The women go on to discuss their experiences employing domestic help. llunia says, 'They come 
here without knowing how to take a bath, how to take a shower, how to cat, how to denl with 
anything.' Hala adds, 'Maybe the trained ones go to other countries, like to Europe. But not to 
Arab countries.' Of the woman she employs, Layal says: 'I don't trust her. Just cleaning the floor, 
she doesn't do it right. I have to look at the glasses and the platcs after shc's washcd them. I think 
I work more than she does.' Ncsrcen mentions a Sri Lankan woman hired by her cousin who did 
not know how to use the shower when she arrived and washed her body with dish detergent. 
This exchange highlights one of the first sources of strcss in domestic worker-employer rellltions 
- a knowledge gap. Women who migrate for the first time from rural or impoverished areas may 
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be unaccustomed to household cleaning regimens in Amman. The fact that many arrive speaking 
little or no Arabic exacerbates the problem and contributes to the idea that they are ignorant. In 
the hopes that they will be better understood, some employers simplify their Arabic by not fully 
conjugating verbs, for example using only the present tense masculine.120 Even when this is done, 
overcoming the language barrier is a lengthy process. 
Many employers are ambivalent about employing domestic help. Domestic workers are reputed to 
be cunning, morally deficient and sexually promiscuous. Suspicion sets the tone for employment 
relations. Employers who have had problems with domestic workers in the past are even more 
likely to be wary. One employer explains: 
One of the first Filipinas we had, I treated like a daughter. She had plenty of freedom, and I didn't 
ask questions. I was too easy with her. One day, we went to the pool, and she came along and wore 
this little bikini, and everyone told me, 'What arc you doing? What arc you letting her do to your 
family?' I didn't understand what they meant. When she left, it was not on good terms. She had been 
lying to me .... Before, I didn't ask any questions if she was gone from the house. But starting in the 
last three years, I've been more strict with them .... I used to think this was extreme-a friend of mine 
has so many rules for her maid. When the bus comes to pick up her children, if the maid isn't outside 
with them, ready for the bus when it comes, she takes five dollars away from her. I used to think this 
was crazy. No way. You can't just have a contract on the one hand and then mllke up your own new 
rules when the girl comes to the house. But now I sec. This mllkes some sense. 
Strict rules are thought necessary to keep domestic workers in line. Lamis, a woman in her early 
thirties, provides another example of how employers' previous experiences with workers shape 
their approaches with neophytes. One afternoon I met Lamis and her mother Rula. I was 
interested in the manner in which employers talk about domestic workers, so I asked and was 
given permission to record our conversation, excerpts of which I include below. Lnmis sutTers 
from chronic back pain and has employed a string of domestic workers since the birth of her first 
child, though she has never liked having them in her home. 
All my privacy is taken from me because I can't talk to my husband, I can't sit near him. lie can't 
wear his shorts. When I talk to my children, I feci there's someone interfering. You know, she's 
looking at me, I'm looking at her. I don't know how to tell you. I hate maid:; in the house. It's not that 
I worry about my image in front of her because I don't think she thinks right. I feel that there's an 
invasion in my home. But it's like, I have to get her because of all my back aches, and she's doing 
let's say half of the work. And I'm happy with half of the work being done. But for me, I hllte them. I 
have some sort of discrimination against them. 
When I asked whether hiring an Arab woman to do the work would solve some of the problems, 
Lamis responded: 'But I want to have someone who doesn't understand my language. Who 
doesn't understand what I say. I want that separation. I don't want us to be equals.' For Lamis and 
many other employers, emphasising linguistic and social distinctions facilitated the control of 
labour. 
120 On how dialogue between Sinhala-speaking maids and Arabic-speaking employers has produced a new 
Arabic pidgin in Lebanon, sec Bizri (2005). 
125 
Not long after Lamis' first child was born, her maternal grandfather fell ill. Lamis wantcd to 
spend time with him and so brought the baby and the domestic worker to stay in her parents' villa 
while her grandfather recuperated. Four Indonesian domestics were already working in the home 
at the time, so this made a total of five, all of whom slept in the bascment. Late one evening, 
Lamis went downstairs to find four of the domestic workers missing. She later discovered that the 
women had made an arrangement whereby one woman would stay at home and keep watch while 
the other four crept into an empty house next door to have sex with several Egyptian men who 
worked nearby. In the end, all of the women were dismissed from their jobs and sent back to the 
recruitment agency. 
The second domestic worker Lamis employed, a woman from the Philippines, also proved 
untrustworthy; she ran away, taking some of Lamis' jewellery with her. Embittered, Lamis now 
takes measures to ensure that she is not cheated again. She locks the door when she leaves her 
house, ensuring that the current domestic worker cannot escape. She does not allow her to use the 
phone or to know the phone number. She tries to reduce all personal contact, instructing the 
woman to clean parts of the house only when she is not present. 
Lamis: I have my privacy now and I don't interact with the maid. I never ask her anything. If she does 
something bad or wrong· because they cheat all the time and lie· I just tell her to do that job again. I 
don't want any relationship with her. I don't want her to know anything about me. 
Elizabeth: Because you're afraid she'll take advantage of you? 
Lamis: Yes, I don't trust her, and I show her I don't trust her. I tell her to her face, 'You arc B liar. I 
don't trust you. I will never trust you.' This is my system. And when I went to the office that brings 
the maids, I asked them specifically for a maid that does not want to leave the house at all. She's only 
here for staying at home. So she's always inside, locked. And I'm always suspicious. I'm going to buy 
a camera ... and I'm going to wutch her. 
Rula: You will live your life watching the maid. 
Elizabeth: That must be a horrible feeling. 
Lamis: I know. I hute them. I don't trust them. I don't like them. I don't like their energy. But I really 
have problems with my back, so I can't do all the work .... 
Elizabeth: I don't doubt that there are some who come here with the intention of cheating fllmilies and 
steuling. But... do you not feci badly on behalf of the one you have now ... hecause you were burned 
by the maid before and now this one, how does she feel? 
Lamis: No. I mean, I'm responsible for what I say. I had another Sri lankan lady. She was older. I 
thought maybe ifI had a really mature lady it would be better. She was, hik, complaining all the time. 
She would follow me to my room. I would be, you know, lying down. I wanted to tllke I hreak. She 
used to open the door and tell me her stories. I was like, oh my god, leave me alone! I hlld to lock my 
door. She was really a big problem for me. She didn't work well, and she said her salilry was too low. 
She wanted 150 JDs but her contract said only 100 JOs because Sri Lankan girls are only paid this 
amount. I told her, it's not me. This is your government. This is how they rate you. It's not my 
problem. It's not something personal. 
Lamis' statement, 'It's not something personal', echoes Keith lIart's hit man (2005), who tells his 
victim - 'Don't take this personal, it's just business', lIart uses the idea to demonstrate how 
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people manage to see highly personal matters in terms of impersonal business. The hit man's 
dilemma is also Lamis's - how to depersonalise relationships that are necessarily personal. She 
deals with domestic workers in the intimate context of her home on a regular basis, but constantly 
pulling against this is Lamis' desire to detach and maintain boundaries. 
Later in the conversation, Lamis and her mother describe domestic workers who practice magic 
against employers. Rula mentions an Indonesian domestic worker who put menstrual blood in a 
relative's Turkish coffee in an effort to make him fall in love with her. 'Sick. Sick. They are 
crazy,' Lamis said. Rula then described an incident involving an employer who discovered that 
her domestic worker was pregnant. When confronted about the pregnancy and asked who the 
father was, the domestic worker replied: 'It's either your husband or your son.' Enraged, the 
employer picked up a heavy glass ashtray lying on a nearby table and hurled it at the woman's 
head, killing her. Lamis and Rula did not condone the employer's actions but referred to the story 
as another example of the problems domestic workers cause. 
Lamis's views are more hostile than those of most employers, but her account is telling of the 
distrust felt by many. The horror stories she and her mother refer to are part of a wider pattern. 
Tales of domestic workers having sexual liaisons with Egyptian men, teaming up with other 
migrants to organise robberies and committing bizarre or unscrupulous acts are common. An 
editorial in the Lebanese Daily Star provides an illustration (Atiya 2005). The author accuses Sri 
Lankan domestic workers, with their 'shy exotic smiles', of entering 'our homes already briefed 
on clandestine ways', of smuggling whisky, gin and fine liqueurs out of the house in trash bags, of 
gossiping and revealing their employers' 'habits, ticks and quirkiness' and even of fabricating 
rape allegations. Such depictions reinforce fears about what can happen if domestic workers are 
not closely monitored. Control over women's sexuality is linked to control over their labour. 
Without discipline, there is a fear they may usurp their female employers. Rula expressed it this 
way: 
If they are caring for the children and doing everything the mother is supposed to be doing, then they 
become like ladies of the house. What is to stop the husband from marrying them? These women 
come, and if you give them the role of mothering, they look very closely at you, at what you are 
wearing, at your jewellery, at your house, and they want the same thing. 
According to her, when confronted with wealth and privileges in Jordan, women from poorer 
countries develop 'al-hiqd al-tahaqi' (~I .u.,JI), or class-based envy. In light of this, she and 
Lamis believe it is better to maintain emotional distance and avoid getting personally involved 
with the women who work for them. Not all employers adopt this approach, however. Some 
become closely involved in workers' pcrsonallives; examples of employers who criticise the way 
their employees use their earnings or give them loans to help them resolve problems at home are 
discussed below in the section 'Dependency and Patronage'. 
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As in Lamis' case, some employers hire several domestic workers. Where this is the case, the 
employer may give one worker responsibility for training and disciplining the neophytes. This 
was the ease with one woman I eame to know well, Darshini, who played the role of inducting a 
newly-arrived worker from Sri Lanka into her employer's household. This was both helpful and 
annoying for the new woman. Darshini acted as a translator. which was certainly helpful. But 
Darshini is also bossy and kept the young woman under her thumb. Later. when the young woman 
had an affair with a boy who worked in a nearby garment factory and became pregnant. Darshini 
was instrumental in helping smooth things over with the employer so that the woman could go 
back to Sri Lanka before her contract ended. Ultimately, much depends on how well the two (or 
three or four) workers get along - in some cases they help one another, and in others they jockey 
for power. 
The Household as Battlefield 
In August of2010 a woman named Lahanda Purage Ariyawathie returned home to Sri Lanka after 
having worked for five months as a domestic worker in Saudi Arabia. Iler hands. legs and feet 
were covered with small. oozing wounds. According to Ms. Ariyawathie, more than 20 nails had 
been hammered into her skin by her Saudi employers because they were dissatisfied with her 
work. Her inability to understand instructions in Arabic was part of the problem. Almost as 
striking as the punishment was the fact that Ms. Ariyawathie remained in her employer's house 
and endured the abuse for several months because she said she feared her employers might kill 
her if she tried to leave. It was only after they sent her back to Sri Lanka and she sought medical 
care that her family discovered what had happened and reported the case to the authorities. III Ms. 
Ariyawathie's story is not the only high-profile case of its kind involving a Sri Lankan domestic 
worker. In November 2010, a Sri Lankan woman working in Jordan alleged that her employer 
forced her to swallow six nails when she asked for her salary. Recruitment agency staff in Jordan 
claimed she had purposely swallowed the nails so that her employer would be blamed and she 
would be sent back to Sri Lanka. lll The mere fact that this scenario would be contemplated is 
telling of how difficult it is for domestic workers to break the bond with their employers. The 
same week, a Sri Lankan worker who had been employed in Kuwait had nine metal pins 
surgica1Jy removed from her hands and leg. She accused her Kuwaiti employer of driving the 
nails into her skin when she asked for her pay.12l 
121 This story was widely reported in thc Sri Lankan prcss and by other news outlets. See 'Slave Punishment 
for a Sri Lankan Maid', The Sunday Leaeler. August 29. 20 I0; 'I 1 lave No Rca!«lIllo Lie: Ariyawathic·. The 
Sunday Times, September S, 2010; 'Sri Lankan Maids Recome Victims in Saudi Arahia" Time, Novemher 
16,2010. 
122 'Sri Lankan maid "swallowed nails to blame huss·... AFP, November 23. 2010 
123 'Sri Lankan maid alleges nail torture in Kuwait', AFP, Novemher 14, 2010 
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These accounts of abuse are extraordinary. The vast majority of employers do not use such 
extreme forms of violence to intimidate or discipline workers. But barning stories of cruelty 
against domestic workers crop up regularly in the press. When I heard about such incidents during 
the course of research, my initial response was to dismiss them as exceptional. I also struggled to 
make sense of domestic workers' accounts of employers who did not give them enough to eat or 
locked them at home when they went out. These aspects of employers' behaviour pU7z1ed me 
because they seemed incommensurable with other aspects of Jordanian culture. But as I 
discovered, while the examples presented above are extreme, they are telling of a wider context in 
which migrant workers' relationships with their employers are highly asymmetrical. This section 
describes the contours of those relationships and shows how the circumstances under which 
women from Asian countries are recruited create the conditions for a perfect storm. 
Relationships between domestic workers and employers are like many other employment relations 
in that employers typically try to extract as much work as possible and implement various 
methods ofdiscipline and control to do so. But work in a domestic setting is intrinsically different 
in several ways. First and foremost is the issue of physical proximity. Most domestics live where 
they work. This means their work hours are potentially limitless and all of their activities, sleep 
and leisure time can be regulated. Equally, this affords workers intimate knowledge about 
employers. Due to their permanent presence in the household, they are in a unique position as 
witnesses to household dramas. This intimacy and the possibility of what family secrets may be 
revealed compel employers' demands for full control of the worker's personhood (Coser 1973: 
35). Allegiance and loyalty are sought in order to preclude betrayal; this is what makes domestic 
workers with few external social ties so appealing and explains employers' attempts to isolate 
them (ibid: 35-36). In the context of this intimacy, a number of techniques are commonly used to 
accentuate social distance between worker and employer. A hierarchy of social space is often 
created such that servants eat, wash and sleep separately from other household members (Nagy 
1998: 97, Rollins 1990: 79-80, Tellis-Nayak 1983: 69, Qayum and Ray 2003: 526). For example, 
while there is no standard formula for living arrangements in Jordanian homes, as illustrated by 
the floor plan below, maids' quarters are often located some distance from other bedrooms. The 
fact that the domestic worker's room is an offshoot of the kitchen, far from the other bedrooms, is 
telling of the social boundary separating her from the family. In other homes, the domestic worker 
may sleep outside of the house altogether on a balcony or rooftop. 
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TOTAL GROSI AREA: 302.11 eqm 
3 Bedroom Ap.ortment ~... - A 
Figure 11: Floor plan for an apartment in Amman as advertised by Oamac Properties 
A number of other features are typical of this occupation. It is almost always devalued and 
stigmatised, entailing long hours of work for low wages (Colen and Sanjek 1990: 5). The fact that 
it occurs in what is commonly construed as private space has meant that in many countries, 
domestic workers are excluded from the labour rights and protections afforded other workers. 
Hidden from public view and without government oversight, domestic workers are subject to the 
whims of their employers. Their work is often considered an extension of wifely and motherly 
duties rather than 'work' in the true sense, regardless of how difficult or time-consuming it may 
be. As I have described in chapter 5, although domestic work is now legally considered 'work' in 
Jordan, this has not yet led to substantial regulation; households are not inspected or monitored, 
and basic problems such as the non-payment of wages go unchallenged. 
In these respects domestic worker-employer relations in Jordan are not unusual. nut the 
employment of migrant domestic workers in Jordan, Lebanon and the Gulf states is distinctive in 
several ways that heighten the potential for conflict. Paramount in significance is the kafilla 
system. For reasons outlined in chapter 5, guest workers can be disciplined by the threat of 
deportation and lack the right to quit, strike or organise. Employers have absolute power within 
the household. Although the lack of government oversight is not in and of itself unusual, the 
reluctance on the part Jordanian authorities to intervene on behalf of migrant workers and in 
household affairs more generally is particularly great. Parallels can be drown with attitudes 
towards domestic violence; while domestic violence mayor may not be more prevalent in Jordan, 
when cases are reported the authorities are especially reticent to get involved. Crimes committed 
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against women in the domestic domain are treated less harshly than those against men. For 
example, the average sentence for honour killings in Jordan is a mere seven and a half months, 
which reinforces the idea that certain types of punishment against women are acceptable (Zuhur 
2005: 403). All of this is to say that there are few legal and social sanctions against treating 
domestic workers badly. When cases of abuse do come to light, it is rare for employers to face 
punishment greater than a fine. The fact that most migrant domestic workers come to Jordan alone 
also means there are even fewer penalties for cruelty than might be the case with a Jordanian with 
a network of kin to defend her. Aside from withholding their labour, domestic workers have 
limited bargaining power. 
The money paid by employers to recruit domestic workers from abroad often makes them feel 
they are owed a debt of service and that workers should suspend their personal lives when they 
arrive. It is also used to justify a heavy workload. The chief complaint expressed by domestic 
workers is that they are overworked and underpaid. They engage in labour which is often only 
acknowledged when it is not done correctly. For some, the spaces of their employers' households 
can aptly be described as 'taskscapes' (Ingold 1993: 157-8), with seemingly endless ensembles of 
jobs to perform.124 This can require adhering to a taxing schedule of late nights and little rest. 
Some employers purposely establish busy work regimens to keep domestics constantly occupied, 
claiming they become lazy with idle time. The fasting period of Ramadan tends to be especially 
arduous, as domestic workers rise before daybreak to prepare suhur, the meal before sunrise, and 
serve large quantities of food and drinks for iftar. the meal after sunset. Those who are fasting 
often exhibit frayed tempers. Not coincidentally, this is when embassies report the highest 
numbers of migrant domestic workers absconding. Many domestic workers submit to being 
overworked and held under house arrest, but not all do, and while designed to keep the peace, 
these conditions can actually inflame tensions. 
Domestic workers must learn to adapt to a range of new customs in Jordun. Sepurated from loved 
ones, many suffer from loneliness and homesickness. The stress of culture shock can compound 
problems with their employers. Food can be a thorny issue. The Sri Lankan diet is basl.'<l on rice, 
and a meal isn't complete without it. Each meal is cooked freshly and accompunied by several 
vegetable dishes or curries, often flavoured with green chillies and spices. In Jordun, on the other 
hand, bread is the staple, and meals only occasionally include rice. Those who can afford it 
regularly eat meat, usually lamb or chicken. Some domestic workers are critical of the large 
quantity ofmeat consumed in the households in which they work. The Five Precepts of Buddhism 
enjoin devotees to abstain from killing all living creatures, stealing, being unchaste, lying, or 
consuming intoxicating substances. Many workers do eat meat, but not on a pur with their 
124 Johnson and Pingo\ (undated) also use the term 'taskscnpcs' to dcscrihc Filipino migrunt workers' 
experiences of life in Saudi Arabia. 
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Jordanian employers. Many particularly dislike lamb, which, though popular in Jordan, is not 
eaten in Sri Lanka. The difficulty of adapting to a new cuisine is a source of frustmtion for many 
domestic workers. Some also express resentment about having to eat refrigerated 'leftovers'. The 
problem of employers not giving domestic workers enough food is a common complaint.12$ Some 
women who cook their own food surreptitiously prepare extra parcels for Sri Lankans living in 
their neighbourhoods who do not have enough to eat. In some cases, low-income families trying 
to cut costs may indeed provide insufficient food. There are also cases of deliberate deprivation. 
But at least some of the time, it is the kind of food rather than the quantity that is problematic. 
Employers and workers have different expectations, in this case about what constitutes a proper 
meal. This is just one example of how tension can arise not as the result of a power struggle but 
from differences in custom and socialisation. 
Fear and prejudice play an important role in the way migrant domestic workers are treated. 
Buddhists and Hindus are thought not to be God-fearing and, hence, morally deficient. Dark skin 
tones do not help matters given that fair skin is favoured. Cultural and racial difference is often 
glossed in terms ofhygiene; some employers claim domestic workers themselves are not clean or 
know little about hygiene and, as a result, should not be trusted with food prepamtion. Domestic 
workers are viewed as a potential source of pollution. Banning them from swimming pools is one 
example of the many rituals of discrimination. 126 South and Southeast Asian domestic workers 
belong to a category of people who, on the basis of race, ethnicity and faith, are judged inferior. 
As part ofa stigmatised group, they have little honour. 
One December afternoon I paid a visit to a friend's house in Amman. We sat in her marble· 
floored living room on a set of sumptuous leather couches as one of three domestic workers 
brought us Nescafe and chocolates. My friend's mother joined us and told us about her recent 
package holiday in Sri Lanka. She had been cajoled into going by a group of friends and was 
surprised by how much she liked it. 'You know, we think of them as animals, and I couldn't 
believe their country.' She went on to describe Sri Lanka's lush green landscape and showed me 
photographs of her five-star hotel in Bentota, on the island's southern tip. 'Most of the Women 
who come here from Sri Lanka are no good. They come from jungly [sic] parts. But in the city, 
there are very wealthy people, very well-educated, beautiful people. 'Anjac/c/ [Really] I was 
surprised when I saw it.' Her surprise is telling. Many employers' ideas about mcial inferiority 
have been influenced by labour market segmentation; the fact that the majority of the Sri Lankans 
125 Food deprivation is commonly reported by domestic workers throughout the region in human rights 
rer0rts (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2007: 65-68). 
12 Hibr Lubnani, a citizen media network, polled 36 beach resorts in Lebanon about their policies towards 
domestic workers (Lynch 2010). Three refused to let domestic workers enter; 14 allowed them inside but 
forbid them from using the pools, and five allowed them to enter but would not let them swim in pools or 
the sea. 
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they encounter in Jordan perfonn menial work infonns their impression of the country as a whole. 
Class and racial distinctions inter-mingle. Hence, the tenn 'Sri Lankiyya' (Arabic for 'Sri 
Lankan') has become synonymous with 'housemaid'. 
Arab domestic workers are not immune to these problems. One of the few studies of Arab 
domestic workers in a contemporary context is that by Ismaili (2002) on the psychological health 
of Egyptian domestics in Egypt. When asked how they felt they were viewed, 20 out of the 30 
women interviewed said 'zay al-ziJt', or 'like dirt' (ibid: 102). Of the problems they faced at work, 
they mentioned physical exhaustion, being underpaid and not being respected (ibid: 98). These 
dynamics are not entirely unique to foreign domestic workers, but discrimination and prejudice 
against non-Arab women is more pronounced. Racial, ethnic and religious 'othering' provides 
added ideological support for what are already unequal relationships. 
Given this context, it is little wonder domestic worker-employer relations in Jordan are often 
turbulent. This helps to explain, although not to justify, certain types of mistreatment. It may also 
go some way in explaining why migrant domestic workers appear to have a high suicide rate. In 
2008, Human Rights Watch (2008a) released a study showing that migrant domestic workers 
were dying at a rate of more than one per week in Lebanon. Of 95 recorded deaths between 
January 2007 and August 2008, 40 were classified as suicides, 24 as the result of 'falls' from 
buildings (as often occurs when workers try to escape), 14 due to health problems, 2 murders, and 
the rest due to accidents. Police rarely investigate the circumstances, so some fatalities recorded 
as suicides may have other causes, including homicide. In the absence of evidence about the 
women involved, it is impossible to conclude with certainty what the Lebanese statistics might 
mean. But in at least some cases, intolerable and degrading working conditions may playa role. In 
Kuwait, a survey of newspaper reports found that 17 mil,'fant workers attempted or committed 
suicide in the month of May 20 I 0 (Mil,'fant Rights 20 I 0). According to the human rights group 
that conducted the survey, one of the incidents involved a Filipina domestic worker who had 
requested to leave her sponsor because she was being mistreated and had received a better offer of 
employment. The sponsor refused, and the domestic worker left a suicide note and attempted to 
kill herself. Similar patterns have emerged in Jordan. Amnesty International (2008: 3) reports that 
'domestic workers are much more likely than any other group in Jordan to take their own life. The 
National Institute for Forensic Medicine told Amnesty International that of around 45 people who 
commit suicide each year, between five to 10 are domestic workers.' A Sri Lankan woman 
reportedly attempted suicide as a result of the fact that her employcrs did not allow her to rcturn to 
her country (Qteishat 2010). In such cases, suicide may result from a sense of futility and 
alienation brought on at least in part by working conditions. 
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Although there is much working against harmonious relations, the household is not always a 
battlefield. And while the situation appears profoundly unjust to an outsider, only some workers 
end up leaving their employers' homes. The remaining sections of the chapter address how 
domestic workers and their employers deal with this context, and how their relationships can 
become less prickly over time. 
Dependency and Patronage 
There is a great deal of diversity in living and working arrangements of Sri Lankan domestic 
workers in Jordan, but in broad strokes they can be divided into three main categories, 
differentiated by the length of stay and place of residence (whether on their own or with an 
employer). The first is comprised of women whose stay in the country is limited to one or two 
two-year stints and who reside with their employers. Manoja's story reflects the broader 
experience of this group. Manoja is a 21-year-old woman from a village near Kalutara who 
worked for an elderly Palestinian woman in the district of Jebel Ashratieh. Iler mother had 
worked in Lebanon when she was growing up, and both of her parents are now unemployed. At 
the age of 19, Manoja came to Jordan in the hopes ofearning money for her dowry. I first met her 
in Amman at a Christmas party for Sri Lankan migrants organised by a church group. Ilcr 
employer had escorted her to the party and remained by her side until it was time to leave. This 
was Manoja's first interaction with other Sri Lankans in Jordan, and she knew none of the other 
migrants in attendance. I later visited her and her employer at their home in Jebel Ashratieh, a 
lower-income neighbourhood in Amman. Manoja told me she earned $100 per month. Aside from 
her first two months' pay, which was deducted from her salary by the recruitment agency in 
Amman that placed her, she had saved all of her earnings and sent them to her mother. When I 
interviewed Manoja in early 2007, 1 asked how she fclt about living in Amman. 'I had a good 
experience,' she said. 'I am happy I came. When I came, 1 didn't know any English. Now I can 
understand. I learned many things. How to clean such a big house, take care of money, take care 
of myself. But I want to go back and be with my family. I don't like being so far away.' In June 
2007, after completing her two-year contmct, Manoja returned to Sri Lanka. I visited her at her 
parents' home near Kalutara in September 2007. Only weeks after she returned, her parents 
arranged a marriage with a man in her village. Manoja was excited for me to meet him and tllke a 
ride in the trishaw with which he earned a living. Much of Manoja's remittances hud been spent 
on clothing, jewellery and home furnishings for her husband's family, with whom she has lived 
since marriage. The fact that she had amassed these assets greatly enhanced her marriage 
prospects. Her limited mobility outside of her employer's home in Jordan had meant that Manoja 
was able to save considembly more than she might have otherwise. 
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The second group is comprised ofdomestic workers who also reside with their employers but who 
stay in Jordan for longer periods, sometimes as long as twenty years. Many are fluent in Arabic or 
English and have managed to win certain privileges from their employers by building trust over 
time. This may include higher salaries and being permitted to leave their employers' homes 
unaccompanied to attend church, migrant gatherings or shopping trips. Kamini provides an 
example. Kamini is a 39-year-old mother of two from Panadura. When I first met her, she had 
been living in Jordan for eight years and had gone home to Sri Lanka only once in that time. Iler 
husband, a former bus driver, had a hernia five years ago and has not worked since, making 
Kamini the sole breadwinner. Her husband has a gambling and drinking addiction, so she sends 
her earnings to her daughter, who is 22 and spends the bulk of the money on the construction of 
the family's new home. The house that she has never seen is Kamini's life's work. When I 
interviewed her, she had spent $6,000 of her remittance money to buy the land and lay the 
foundation. She had also borrowed an additional $2,000 from the bank. She expects to work in 
Jordan for at least five more years to complete the house. Kamini earns $250 per month working 
for an elderly Palestinian woman in the upper middle-class neighbourhood of Shmcisani. She also 
works one day a week for her employer's daughter, earning an additional $20 each time. Kamini 
accompanies her employer on all of her outings. She has two Sri Lankan friends who work in the 
same apartment block, and the three sometimes take short trips downtown to buy small gifts or 
cards to send back to their families in Sri Lanka. Otherwise, they rarely venture far from their 
employers' homes. Buying land and building a home is a primary reason many women decide to 
work abroad, and as Kamini's case illustrates, doing so often takes many years. Like Kamini, 
many of the women in this group remain focused on their economic goals and their eventual 
return to Sri Lanka. I should add that while the majority of domestic workers who reside with 
their employers are sponsored by them, a minority buy their visas from other individuals and 
reside with employers who are not their sponsors. 
Although the practice is legal\y prohibited, increasing numbers of domestic workers now opt to 
reside independently of their employers. These so-called 'freelancers' comprise the third group. 
At the time of research, one source estimated that as many as half of the 40,000 Sri Lankan 
women working in Jordan fell into this category (Samnth 2004). Frcclancers live in rented 
apartments or single rooms and work full-time for a single household or on an hourly or daily 
basis as housekeepers or office cleaners in multiple locations. Some are brought to Jordun by 
family members or friends already working in the kingdom and pay Jordunians to act as their 
sponsors, while others initially come on two-year contracts as live-in domestic workers and either 
decide to live on their own at the end of the contract period or run away from their employers' 
homes prematurely. Some women have plans to abscond from their employers' homes before they 
even set foot in Jordan; for them, si!,'Oing an employment contract is a ticket out of Sri Lanka. 
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Others flee in moments of utter frustration or as a last resort when they have no other option. 
Escaping is not always easy, as some employers literally lock workers in the house when they go 
out. In most cases, domestic workers who run away are not accepted back. Leaving is viewed as a 
breach of trust. Those who abscond usually leave their identify documents behind, and employers 
and recruitment agencies often ask for large sums of money in exchange for returning them. 
Those who are unable to obtain a 'release' from the first sponsor allowing for the transfer of 
guardianship to a new sponsor are not able to work legally for a new employer. In light of this, 
those who run away from their employers usually forfeit their legal status in the country. 
Figure 12: A shop selling saris in downtown Amman 
Some freelancers feel trapped in Jordan because they do not have their passports or are unable to 
pay their overstay fines and so cannot leave. Others have no desire to return to Sri Lanka anytime 
soon. Women in this category have more opportunities to socialise with other migrants, and many 
form romantic relationships with fellow migrants. During time ofT from work, they frequent South 
Asian restaurants and stores in downtown Amman selling Sri Lankan music, clo1hing and food. 
On Fridays, they organise parties and outings to the Dead Sea and Aqaba. Some operate informal 
revolving credit schemes ('seelu' in Sinhala) whereby members make monthly contributions 
towards a common fund. Once the fund reaches a certain amount, it is handed over to each 
member in tum. Such saving schemes are common in Sri Lanka and require a good deal of trust 
among the members. They are not always successful, and stories of members disappearing with 
the money are common. Although domestic work is the chief source of income for most women 
in this group, many supplement their incomes with self-employment projects, such as milking 
'hoppers'. a Sri Lankan delicacy made of rice flour, and selling them out of their homes or at 
shops downtown. Prostitution also provides income for some. 
136 
Sujani's story provides an example. Sujani is a 46-year-old woman from Ja-Ela who has been in 
Jordan for 16 years. She lives in Muhajirin, a low-income area named for its migrant population, 
along with her husband, who is a hotel cook from Bangladesh, her 25-year-old daughter, and her 
husband's son from a previous marriage, who works in a garment factory. Sujani left Sri Lanka in 
1991, when her two children, a son and daughter, were 12 and 10. She left, she says, because her 
husband drank heavily, was abusive, and was unable to support the family. She placed the 
children in the care of her husband's mother and came to Amman on a two-year contract to work 
as a live-in domestic worker. She worked for the same family for six years, but when they moved 
to the US, leaving her jobless, Sujani decided to stay in Amman and live on her own. When her 
daughter turned 20, she brought her to Jordan and found work for her, also on a live-out basis. 
Sujani returns to Sri Lanka every two years to visit her mother and son, for whom she has bought 
a track of land and built a sman house. She has no contact with her first husband, whom she never 
divorced. She suffers from severe back pain and can no longer do the heavy cleaning required of a 
domestic worker. She makes a living as a seamstress, working several days a week in a shop 
sewing sequins and other decorations onto blouses, and tailoring clothes on her own sewing 
machine at home. 
Freelancers such as Sujani can eam two or three times the amount live-in domestic workers make, 
particularly if they secure coveted jobs with expatriate families. But given that at the time of 
research the going rate for freelance domestic work was 2 JD per hour ($2.82), many had to work 
long hours six or seven days a week to cover their own living expenses. They have the freedom to 
decide where they work, how much and for whom. But the autonomy gained from living 
independently comes with disadvantages, as they face uncertainty in finding well-paid jobs and, 
unless they have valid residence and work permits, avoiding deportation. They also tend to be 
more vulnerable in times of sickness than workers who live with their employers and may have 
their medical care paid for. Freelance work is both freeing and constraining. Workers in this 
category have much in common with those in the informal sector, with an important difference 
being that those without legal status face the risk of arrest and deportation. 
While there is a great deal of variety within each of these three groups, in broad strokes these 
categories reflect the divisions migrants identify amongst themselves. freelanccrs emphasise the 
fact that they have more freedom than their live-in counterparts. Live-in domestic workers, on the 
other hand, say they are wilting to trade personal liberties for the financial rewards of living with 
their employers. They also tend to express a distrust of those living ·outside.' Migrants frequcntly 
reproduce Jordanian employers' discourses about 'correct' behaviour and propriety when talking 
about other migrants. Those who run away from their employers, live independently, and have 
boyfriends may be seen as disloyal and even dangerous. This is not surprising given gender 
dynamics in Sri Lanka. From an early age, Sri Lankan boys are given more freedom to roam 
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outside the home than girls. In contrast, the culture of femininity demarcates the home as a safe 
zone outside of which girls are at risk of being kidnapped or seized by demons. In principle if not
• 
in practice, women should remain sexually pure until marriage, and their respectability hinges on 
their display of modesty and fear of social ridicule. As Obeyesckere put it, they are inculcated to 
'fear shame' (/iijja-baya) (1984: 504-505). The notion of thanikama (loneliness) is also pertinent. 
Individuals who are physically outside of the web of kin feel bereft. Women who are left alone 
are vulnerable to spirits and sexual advances by men. Several Sri Lankan women told me they had 
never slept in a room alone before coming to Jordan, having previously always slept alongside 
female relatives. Many were terrified upon first travelling abroad. They are also predisposed to 
the idea that traversing the city on one's own is dangerous. Gender identities and patriarchal 
ideologies in Sri Lanka and Jordan converge on these points, influencing the position of women in 
their own households as well as those of the Arab families for whom they work. This helps 
explain why some live-in domestic workers find it natural to heed employers' advice about not 
going out. 
Unlike those who live with their employers, freelancers are casual workers and are not unfree. But 
those I came to know tended to be less economically successful in the long-term than those who 
resided with their employers. This is in part because live-in domestic workers have fewer 
freedoms and, hence, fewer chances to spend money. But more importantly, domestic workers 
who reside with their employers are better positioned to establish their employers' trust and 
develop relations of dependency.127 These relations are constructed and maintained on the basis of 
highly affective, personal ties rather than contractual rights and obligations. 
127 The distinctions between live-in and live-out domestic workers arc akin to those descrihed for 'attuched' 
servants versus unattached labourers in Bremon's account (1974) of honded luhour in Gujorut and Martin's 
description (2009) of the same in the Pakistani Punjab. Though ex.ploitative, being bonded to a single 
employer brings with it the possibility of financial support and security in times of scarcity. 
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Figure 13: A domestic wo rker holds one of the twins she looks aner 
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speak about the ability to understand and predict the desires of their madames as an important 
asset. Maintaining a pleasant countenance when dealing with employers is itself a type of work. 
Domestic service entails intimate interactions, such as feeding, grooming and bathing the elderly, 
young or infirm. These tasks require patience, and success in performing them can depend on how 
well the worker manages her own feelings. As Manalansan (20 I 0) writes of Filipino care workers 
in Israel, 'disaffection', or the ability to maintain emotional distance and suppress feelings of 
disgust, boredom or frustration, can be an important part of the job. Those frustrated by their 
employers sometimes resort to veiled forms of revenge, or 'weapons of the weak' (Scott 1985). 
When rankled by unreasonable demands from her madame, for example, Rita took retribution by 
opening the taps to let the water run and allowing the vacuum to run unmanned in a single spot to 
drive up her employer's utilities bills. Subtle tactics helped her maintain a sense of dignity while 
doing otherwise demeaning work. Similarly, some workers who pilfer do so not only out of desire 
for specific objects but in revenge for oppressive treatment. Some also express a sense of personal 
superiority, commenting on the fact that their employers are lazy. But for Rita and many other 
veteran domestic workers, the ability to suppress one's own anger and perform deference, even if 
it not genuine, is crucial. 'As soon as I went into the bathroom to bathe, she [female employer] 
would bang on the door and say, "Eh, you wasting too much water." So I bathed quickly and 
came out, and then she'd say, "Eh, what's this, you smell. Don't you use soap? Don't you wash 
well?'" Rita says she felt as though she could never win. She was criticised constantly. 'Now I'm 
talking to you about it without getting upset. But when it happened, it was terrible.' Rita worked 
as a domestic worker for more than 20 years, during which time she learned to ignore rebukes 
from her employer. She says other Sri Lankans make mistakes by over-reacting. 'If you take the 
broom because you're going to sweep somewhere, and she sees you, she'll tell you to go sweep, 
and you think, "What does she think I was going to do with this broom? Dance with it? She's 
stupid.'" Rita says she learned to shrug it off. 'You have to understand your employer. She will 
try to keep you busy. She will find some work for you to do, for sure.' She and other domestic 
workers described the ability to cultivate the appearance of deference as an important skill. 
Harmonious relations between employers and domestic workers take time to develop. One 
employer, Rana, referred to the importance of longevity. She currently employs a Filipina 
domestic worker whom she does not permit out of the house. She contrasted this with her 
memories of the woman who worked for her family when she was growing up: 
One of them stayed for seven years, starting from when I was four. I just loved her. She was so 
wonderful. She was a very hard worker. She used to have muny privileges thut we dun't nnw ulluw 
whe~her. they feel like it or not. For flight attendants, for example, 'the emotionul style of olTering the 
service IS part of the service itsclf...seeming to "love the job" becomes part of the job... • (llochschild 2003: 
5-6). 
140 
our maids to have because she worked so well and we trusted her. She had a day ofT and used to go 
out of the house. She even had a mobile. 
When I asked Rana why the previous employee had these privileges while her current domestic 
workers do not, she responded: 'Because she stayed with us for longer, and she had become one 
of the family.' Rana's comments suggest that certain privileges are not a right, but something that 
must be earned. The notion that migrant workers arrive with a set of inalienable rights is not 
presupposed. De-personalised rules about how domestic workers ought to be treated according to 
employment contracts carry little weight in everyday life. More often, treatment hinges on 
personal relationships. 
Hemawathi, a Sri Lankan woman who has lived with and worked for a family in the Jebel 
Webdeh district ofAmman for twelve years, told me, as many domestic workers did, how she had 
to 'win' her freedom from her employer. 
When I first came, she didn't like my long hair and made me cut it. I cried and cried and was so 
ashamed. But time passed, and I got my way. I had to fight for things, like for them to pay for my 
toothpaste and shampoo and things. They didn't want to pay for these in the beginning. And I had to 
teach them, even though I am a housemaid, you must speak to me in a nice way. I am a human being. 
A year ago, Hemawathi's mother fell ill in Sri Lanka and her family pawned the deed to their 
home to pay for her medical treatment. As the interest compounded on their loan, the 
moneylender threatened to keep the deed, leaving the family with the possibility of becoming 
homeless. Despite her long time abroad, Hemawathi had continued to support her parents and fclt 
obliged to help them. Her employer loaned her $1,500, which she sent to her family to payoff the 
debt. Hemawathi's case illustrates how long-term, live-in service for a single employer can afford 
some workers the resources with which to respond to crises at home. There are exceptions, but 
generally those workers who live with their employers are deemed more credit-worthy. Trusted 
domestic workers well-versed in running the household are not easily replaced, and employers 
may dispense gifts, advance payment and other forms of support to keep such servants in their 
employ. These rewards are not always merely instrumental. They also can be an expression of the 
debt of gratitude and obligation employers genuinely feel towards women who are providing an 
important service. 
This is reflected in Thanoja's story. Thanoja had long been estranged from her husband and first 
migrated at the age of 40 after her only child, a son, had married. After working for a year as a 
domestic worker in Iraq, she came to Jordan and worked for an elderly widowcr fllr ncnrly 20 
years until he passed away. She cleaned his house, prepared all of his meals and tcnded to his 
needs. She had her own room and managed the household affairs but apart from short errands did 
not venture out alone. When the elderly man passed away, his family felt indebted to Thnnoja for 
her years ofloyal service. His two daughters, who lived in Europe, were especially grateful to hcr 
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for caring for their father in their absence. Several relatives offered to hire her but Thanoja 
refused, wanting to return to Sri Lanka. Throughout her tenure in Jordan she had sent her earnings 
to her son, who was unemployed and used the money to build a house for his family. Iler 
employer's daughters had thought it a shame that Thanoja had given everything to her son, whom 
they considered a layabout. As she was preparing to leave Jordan, they called me to inquire about 
the cost of living in Sri Lanka. They wanted to give Thanoja an end-of-service bonus on which 
she could live comfortably, but they didn't want to give so much that it would end up in the hands 
of her undeserving son. Upon her departure, they gave her $4,000 with which to buy her own plot 
of land. Some months later, when she requested an additional sum of money to help cover the cost 
of urgent medical expenses, they complied. Thanoja's employers were more generous than most, 
but her relationship with them illustrates a wider pattern. A domestic worker's willingness to 
curtail her own personal freedoms is crucial to her ability to secure her employer's trust. Co­
residence, lengthy service and allegiance can lead to affectionate ties and more significant 
financial support. 
There are numerous cases in which this pattern is contradicted, however. For example, the woman 
in whose house I lived in Sri Lanka, Soma, also resided with an elderly employer in Jordan for 
whom she worked for nearly two decades. At his death, she hoped to be rewarded for her service 
but was instead sent back to Sri Lanka with $200. She and her family were devastated that she had 
not been better compensated, but there was nothing they could do. There are limits to domestic 
workers' ability to negotiate with their employers given that they can be dismissed at any time. 
Arundathie's story illustrates this point. I met Arundathie in her village in Sri Lanka a year after 
she had returned from working in Jordan. Arundathie recounted her experience working for a 
military doctor and his wife, an English teacher. A year after Arundathie had begun working for 
them, the couple planned a trip to Australia to visit relatives. Arundathie wanted them to take her 
along, but they refused. 'They were rich. It would have been nothing for them to take me. But 
they were greedy [/obml They wanted al\ their money for themselves,' she said. Arundathie 
asked to be sent to Sri Lanka while they were on holiday. They declined, instead placing her in 
the home of the husband's sister, who had recently had a baby. 'That house was not familiar to 
me. The madam was rude. She expected me to look after the baby and clean. She wanted me to 
wash the stairs in the apartment building every day. Just taking care of the baby, I barely had time 
to eat. I started losing weight.' In protest, Arundathie refused to do any cleaning, saying that she 
was unable to both care for the baby and do the housework. lIer employers eventually returned 
from Australia, and Arundathie resumed her usual household duties in their home. At the end of 
her two-year contract, Arundathie returned to Sri Lanka. At her departure, they gave her the rest 
ofher salary, which had been $100 per month, plus an extra $50. Arunduthie was furious. 
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I had to ask them for my salary in dollars. They weren't going to give me dollars at first. They didn't 
give me any gifts. No jewellery. No clothes. I gave them two years of loyal work. But they were 
heartless [hengin nefti, or without feelings]. In vain I sacrificed everything for them. 
Arundathie expected personal gifts in exchange for her personal work and sacrifice. She felt 
betrayed at the end of her employment, but there was little she could do. In oppressive or unfair 
situations, workers' modes of resistance may include everything from inertia or foot-dragging to 
leaving without notice, but seldom does this over-ride the overwhelming power of the employer. 
Do Sri Lankan domestic workers in Jordan express a sense that their predicaments are collective, 
that they exceed their own personal experiences? Unsatisfactory as it may seem, the answer is 
both yes and no. Few would dispute the notion that migrant domestic workers are badly treated as 
a group. However, the ethics of labour tend to be seen in individualised terms; problems with 
employers are understood as being the result of the employer's personality rather than in terms of 
wider structural inequalities. This atomised view is at least in part a result of the isolated nature of 
their work. Among those Sri Lankan workers I knew best, there was little sense of 'togetherness' 
and no mention of the need for collective action to change the existing order. This may not be the 
case amongst all nationalities, for example workers from the Philippines, where a long history of 
NGD mobilisation in support of migrant domestic workers' rights and more engagement on the 
part of the embassy seems to have led to more assertiveness and cooperation among migrants. For 
example, with embassy support, Filipinos in Jordan have formed a network of associations that 
organise social activities such as sports competitions, rent houses where workers can meet during 
time ofT, and hold fundraising events to raise money for workers in distress. This level of 
collective organisation was not evident among Sri Lankan workers during the period of research. 
Relationships between domestic workers and their employers have been characterised elsewhere 
in terms of patron-client honds (e.g. Tellis-Nayak 1983, Muttarnk 2004, Gill 1994). Following 
Scott (1972: 92), the patron-client structure can be understood as an exchange relationship 
'involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic stutus 
(patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a 
person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and 
assistance, including personal services, to the patron.' This concept has some appeal given the 
interpersonal, affective, and dependent relations formed between domestic workers and their 
employers. However, the patron-client model has limited explanatory power for the situation of 
foreign domestic workers, particularly 'guest' workers who are hound to their cmploycrs by the 
ka/ala sponsorship system. As I have described in the previous chapter, under this system the 
worker's legal status is entirely dependent on the employer and she is restricted to the realm orthe 
employer's household. She has no choice of patron. This system diverges from accounts of 
traditional patron-client relations in Latin America and the Mediterranean in which the patron 
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must bargain for the relations of the client within a wider political and economic arena, competing 
with other patrons to retain clients. The ka/ala system prevents such competition by prohibiting 
the free circulation of labour. Through it, employers are endowed by the state with enough 
coercive power that they do not need to play the role of patron to gain a worker'S services. 
Moreover, patron-client relations normally imply that both parties belong to the same political 
system, which in this case they do not. Although the social ties that develop between Asian 
workers and their Arab employers often resemble patron-client relations, and domestic workers 
often seek and obtain patronage from their employers, the power imbalance is such that the 
workers may be better understood as captive labour. 
Conclusion 
To summarise, this chapter has highlighted the fault-lines of conflict between migrant domestic 
workers and their Jordanian employers. I have dwelled on the sources of tension because these 
relationships are messy in ways that are more complex than existing accounts suggest. The battles 
are not purely about domination and resistance. They also arise because employers and workers 
do not share a common cultural infrastructure. Often, they don't even share a language. 
Contradictions are posed when highly personal work is performed at close quarters, and when 
employers' desires for privacy run up alongside the convenience of having round-the-clock care. 
While mueh of the literature sees domestic worker-employer relations as inherently unequal, 
among employers, there is both power and fear. Their strategies to cope with that sense of 
vulnerability often lead to highly inhospitable working conditions. But as this chapter has also 
revealed, relationships between domestic workers and their employers are neither monolithic nor 
static. They often change over time as trust, loyalty and familiarity are established. Paradoxically, 
those workers who remain bound to their employers often fare better in the long term than those 
who are 'free', as dependency brings with it the possibility of financial security. This is only a 
possibility, however. There are no guarantees, as domestic work is unregulated, and migrants have 
little chance ortegal redress and few social protections. 
144 
7 

Buddhism By Other Means: Sacred Sites and Ritual Practice 
Until this point, this study has focussed primarily on the relations between domestic workers and 
their employers and how they are maintained. Here I would like to tum to an aspect of life that 
has received less scholarly attention, the issue of migrants' spiritual and imaginative engagements 
during their sojourns. In light of their closely controlled working conditions and the fact that 
many migrate for only a couple of years, it may be assumed that non-Muslim migrants suspend 
ritual practices while residing in predominantly Muslim countries. This is not the case. This 
chapter explores religious devotion in the context of Sri Lankan migrants' wider experiences of 
life and work in Jordan. As a religious minority with limited room to manoeuvre in Jordanian 
society, Buddhist migrants lack some of the spiritual and social resources they may otherwise tap 
into in times of need. Despite the limitations, they manage to create their own sacred spaces. 
Sinhala Buddhists and Catholics both use Christian churches as arenas for making and fulfilling 
ritual vows, known as bara in Sinhala.129 Many Buddhists also attend Catholic and Pentecostal 
church services, and some convert to Christianity. 
The ethnography is based on regular attendance of Roman Catholic church services conducted in 
Sinhala by a Sri Lankan priest and two Pentecostal church groups in Amman. Some of the 
evangelical Christian groups operating in Amman are not officially recognised. In 2007, the 
Jordanian authorities expelled or refused residence permits for several expatriate church leaders 
for illegal missionary activities. In light of this, I have not named the denominations or locations 
of the evangelical churches I attended. Data also come from accompanying migrants on 
pilgrimages, as well as social interactions and conversations outside of church. Observations of 
religious practices and festivals in Sri Lanka ofTered points of comparison with the activities of 
Sinhala Buddhists in Jordan. My interlocutors were predominantly Sinhala Buddhists and 
Catholics. and so the focus of this chapter is on their perspectives and practices rather than those 
of Muslims and Hindus. Discussions indicated that Muslim and Ilindu Sri l.ankans also attend 
churches in Amman, but for several reasons I was unable to learn about the significance of these 
activities for them. The focus of my research was on Sinhala speakers. Most Sri Lankan Muslims 
and Hindus speak Tamil as their mother tongue, whereas Sinhala Catholics and Buddhists speak 
Sinhala. The ethnic polarisation that has occurred in the wake of nearly three dl.'Cades of civil war 
in Sri Lanka extends to the diaspora in Jordan; Tamil- and Sinhllla-spellking mi~'fnnts generally 
maintain separate social groups. The religious dimensions of Sri Lankan Muslim migration to the 
The word bara is linked to the Tamil varam and also conveys a wider menning in Sinhala of pulling 
one's selfin the care of a superior (Goonasckcra 2006: 108). 
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Middle East would be fascinating to consider, but I have not been able to do so as part of this 
project. l3o Another gap in the present analysis relates to how women who are not aHowed to leave 
the house organise their spiritual lives. It was more difficult for me to spend time with these 
women, and so this remains a matter for further investigation. 
In the following sections, three types of religious engagement are described: attendance at 
Catholic church services, participation in Pentecostal worship, and the performance of ritual vows 
to Christian saints and the Virgin Mary. 
Catholic Church Services as Shared Religious Spaces 
On Friday afternoons, Sri Lankan workers of various faiths converge to attend Mass at the 
Annunciation Church (also known as the Latin Church), perched on a hilltop in one of Amman's 
oldest neighbourhoods, Jebel Webdeh. Resplendent in saris of every colour, from gold, orange 
and crimson to lime green, women gather in the church courtyard to chat before the service 
begins. Mass is held by Father Gabriel, a Roman Catholic priest recruited in 2006 to serve the Sri 
Lankan community in Jordan. He holds Bible study classes and services in Sinhala every Friday. 
He also blesses migrants' homes and provides pastoral services, including dispensing advice and 
supplying curative holy oil and water to Catholics and Buddhists alike. 
Between fifty and one hundred Sri Lankans attend Mass each week. Many are Catholic, but by 
my estimate approximately half are not. I derived this estimate from an imprecise method of 
counting how many took the sacrament and how many did not. 131 There are, of course, reasons 
why Catholics may not take the sacrament on a given day (e.g. if they failed to observe a fast or 
committed a sin they did not confess). As a general rule, both Catholic and non-Catholic attendees 
seem primarily preoccupied with the magical elements of the service - the proh ..'Ctive blessings 
they receive at Communion being one - and show comparatively less interest in the rationale or 
scriptural authority. Few bring bibles. Much like Ventura's (1992) account of Filipino workers in 
Japan, church services are an important arena for status competition. m Mib'Tants compete in 
aesthetics as well as ritual participation. Those who can afford to come in their best frocks, 
wearing make-up and gold jewellery. The all-Catholic choir group sits separately in the first two 
130 Although there is a great deal of diversity among Sri Lankan Muslims, most identify as orthodox Sunni 
followers of the Shafi'i school (McGilvray and Rahecm 2007: II). Thangarujuh (2004) describes Muslim 
women's migration to the Middle East from a village in Battical1l8 in castem Sri Lanka. 
131 I was able to keep count because I myself did not take the sacrament. I participllted in all of the other 
activities during Mass, but at the time of Communion I remained in my pew and did not go up to the altar. I 
was .not asked about this, nor was I questioned in detail about my beliefs by the women who attended these 
services. Assuming I was Christian and knowing the subject of my research, they scemed to accept my 
~:!endance as a matter of fact. 
As Ventura (1992: 65) writes, for Filipinos in Japan, church provides a respite from work, a chance to 
remember friends and family back home, a focal point for Filipino social lifc and a key site for conspicuous
consumption. 
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pews and its members wear lace veils and are particularly well attired. Acting as gatekeepers, they 
hush those who speak inside the church and keep tabs on non-Christians who try to take the 
sacrament. Although in practice the boundaries between religious traditions are porous, there are 
occasionally attempts to assert them, particularly by Catholic women who objcct to the extent of 
Buddhist and Hindu participation in church activities. Moreover, although churches provide 
places where migrants find solidarity, they are also platforms for gossip, which can be vicious and 
often includes allegations ofmarital infidelity and other illicit behaviour. 
An informal migrant association called the Sri Lankan Christian and Buddhist Community forms 
an elite corps among those attending Mass. Its membership ranges from twenty-five to fitly 
members at a time. The association accepted me as a member, and I attended their monthly 
meetings after Mass. Aside from small-scale revolving credit groups and Pentecostal church 
groups, it is the only Sri Lankan organisation in Amman. With Father Gabriel's oversight, 
members organise church services and community events at Christmas, Easter and for ovumddo, 
the Sinhala New Year. Serving as a mini welfare support system, the association lends money to 
members in times of illness or if an urgent trip to Sri Lanka is required. Members also organise 
alms-giving ceremonies in memory of deceased loved ones.133 Aside from church services, these 
are the only regular, large-scale communal activities of their kind among Sri Lankans in Amman. 
Domestic workers who live independently of their employers often take the lead in organising the 
association's activities. When I began research in the summer of 2006, the association's officers 
were predominantly Catholic domestic workers, many of whom worked for wealthy expatriates, 
were better paid and had more free time than other domestic workers. Dy the time I completed 
field research in 2008, Father Gabriel had persuaded the association to replace the elected women 
officers with men on the grounds that they were easier for him to work with because, not being 
domestic workers, they were more mobile. 
For Christians and non-Christians alike, attending church is an affordable way to socialise with 
other Sri Lankans and offers rare respite from housework. Another factor contributing to the 
popUlarity of churches among Sri Lankans in Jordan is xenophobia and prejudice against 
followers of non-Abrahamic religions (Jureidini 2003). Many employers express a distrust of 
Buddhists and Hindus, often assuming that they are not 'God fearing'; as a result, they prefer to 
hire Muslim or Christian domestic workers. Aware of the stereotypes, some mib't'ants wear crosses 
and say they are Catholic in order to obtain employment. Another salient factor is that the 
Catholic charity Caritas and concerned priests and nuns provide the only substantilll humanitllrilln 
133 S h . 
. ue ceremonies are held by a person's loved ones aftcr a death. In Jordan, they arc ollcn organised by 
migrants as a way of honouring kin who have died in Sri Lanka. Large meals are prerared on the seventh 
day, after three months and on the one-year anniversary of the death as a merit-making activity and to aid 
the deceased in movement towards the next level of life. 
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assistance to migrant domestic workers. They visit and feed those in administrative detention and 
hospitals, raise money for airline tickets to send stranded migrants home and help women who 
become pregnant out of wedlock.134 Many migrants may assume that affiliating with these groups 
by attending church will increase their chances of receiving aid. Churches are also more popular 
among migrant women than mosques, which, in Jordan, tend to be predominantly male spaces. 
Women do not normally attend congregational prayers and so women migrants could not walk in 
and pray as easily or be as active in a mosque as they may in a church. Most importantly, the 
popularity of the churches among non-Christians can be explained as an extension of a wider 
pattern of devotional, personalised and plural practices that have become characteristic of Sri 
Lankan religiosity. In the absence of Buddhist and Hindu temples, churches and shrines to the 
Virgin Mary and Saint George act as stand-ins to shrines to the more familiar deities that Sri 
Lankans petition for help at home. As such, church activity is a form of improvisation. 
Buddhist women are not the only ones to participate in activities formally associated with another 
tradition. Although there are no Buddhist or Hindu gurus resident in Amman, bhikkus (monks) are 
periodically recruited by the Sri Lankan embassy to give banas (sermons) on poya days (holy 
days in the Buddhist lunar calendar) and important holidays, such as Wesak.13S On such occasions, 
Buddhist, Catholic, Muslim and Hindu women alike assemble at the embassy dressed in white. 
They recite pirith (Buddhist verses), have protective white threads (pirith nllll!) tied around their 
wrists and eat kiribath (a dish made of rice and coconut milk, cut into squares and served on 
auspicious days). From the viewpoint of most lay participants, non-Buddhists' involvement in 
these events is neither inappropriate nor unusual. 
Pentecostal Worship 
In addition to Catholic services, equal if not greater numbers of Sri Lankan mil:,'fants are drawn to 
evangelical Protestant churches. At the time of the fieldwork, approximately eight evangelical 
denominations operated in Amman. A large proportion of their congregations consists of foreign 
workers, chiefly Filipinos and Sri Lankans, with smaller numbers from South Korea, China and 
African countries. It is impossible to estimate how many Sri Lankans attend such churches. There 
is no central registration system or single umbrella organisation covering all the groups, and many 
operate out of unmarked buildings or private homes and do not publicise their activities. The two 
Pentecostal churches I attended had between seventy-five and one hundred Sri Lankan attendees 
Parents who cannot present a marriage certificate may he refused permission to register a child's hirth 
with the Jordanian government. Children whose births were not registered and who do not leave the 
Kingdom within three months become subject to daily overstay fees of 1.S JD ($2.12). These fees 
accumulate as long as the child remains in the country. The total number of unregistered children hom to 
migrants in Jordan is not known. 
I3S Wesak is a holiday marking the birth, enlightenment and passing of Lord Buddha. In Sri Lanka. on this 
day Buddhists traditionally make offerings at temples and listen to sermons by monks. See descriptions by 
Spencer 1990: 58-63. 
134 
148 
each. I was told there were six other church groups with smaller Sri Lankan congregations. The 
spread of Pentecostalism in Jordan is part of a wider regional phenomenon. Evangelical churches 
with Sri Lankan congregations operate in Kuwait, Israel, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), among other places. Evangelical groups make a deliberate efTort to reach out to mib'fants, 
who are easier to approach and, separated from their own social networks, may be more easily 
persuaded to try new things. The fact that proselytising to Muslims is a criminal ofTence also 
encourages these groups to target non-Arabs, about whom the authorities are less concerned and 
who, in tum, are less likely to inform on the religious recruiters. Services are typically held in 
English, this being the language spoken by the American and Nigerian pastors, Sinhala and, if 
Tamils are present, Tamil. 
While my attendance at Catholic services was accepted unproblematieally, my presence at 
Pentecostal services was the source of more scrutiny, particularly among the church leaders. On 
several occasions I was asked if I was a 'believer'. The expatriate church leaders in particular - a 
Nigerian pastor and his wife, and several American pastors - seemed most concerned about my 
salvation. Keen that I play an increasingly active role, they urged me to sit at the front of the 
church, perform readings, say prayers aloud, and ofTer my own interpretations on points raised 
during the service. By attending multiple churches, I discovered that I was not the only one doing 
so. Church membership tended to be fluid and migrants often switched churches as a result of 
personal disputes with other members. 136 Splinter groups also formed; in one instance, a group of 
Tamil women left a Sinhala-Ied congregation to form their own group. Owing to thcir loose 
structures, such instability is not uncommon in evangelical churches, as others have remarked 
concerning churches in the United States and Latin America (Smith-llefner 1994: 29-30). 
While only a handful of migrants converted to Catholicism during my fieldwork in Jordan, many 
more converted to Pentecostalism. A Sri Lankan Pentecostal pastor interviewed in Amman in the 
summer of 2008 told me that he had baptised 30 new members during the preceding year. This 
compares with the half-dozen members who had been baptised by the Sri Lankan Catholic priest 
in Amman during the same period. At least two of the Sri Lankan women who converted to 
Catholicism had Catholic employers. To be baptised in the Catholic Church, one should be 
tutored for at least several months, whereas those ready to receive the lloly Spirit in many 
Pentecostal churches can take a one-month Bible study course and be baptised more quickly. This 
136 J k' 'dana I provi es an example. She was being groomed by American pastors to become a church leader and 
played an active role recruiting new Sri Lankan members. When she requested money to pay someone on 
th~ black market to make a visa for her husband, the pastors lent it to her. But the person she paid ran otT 
With the money without producing a visa, and so Janaki asked for a second loan. Upon doing so, she wall 
accused of cheating the church. In bitterness, she and her husband left the congregation and joined another 
group. 
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is linked to the belief, which is one of the tenets of evangelical Christianity, that people can be 
'saved' through personal conversion at any time. 
Evangelical churches appeal to migrants on sevemllevels. Services are uplifting, ecstatic affairs 
involving jubilant singing, loud music and bodily movement. Testimonials play an important role. 
Participants take turns verbally 'testifying' to the good work God has done in their lives and the 
miracles they have witnessed. These testimonials have strong persuasive power. They centre on 
several key themes: healing illnesses, fixing broken marriages and bringing financial prosperity. 
Such stories are alluring to migrants, as they are intended. But they also allow congrcgants a rare 
opportunity to air personal problems in public. American church pastors openly express sympathy 
and compassion for the plight of domestic workers. At the beginning of each service, newcomers 
are asked to introduce themselves and are then told, 'You are only a new member once. Now you 
are part of our family'. This familial structure and atmosphere of support and camaraderie 
provides psychological comfort and a sense of fellowship for those who may feci downtrodden 
and isolated in Amman. Church leaders organise meals, outings and other activities once a month 
or more to welcome migrants into the fold. They also hold weekly Bible school classes for 
children, which often involve lessons in Sinhala or English. Although most Sri Lankan women 
migrate to Jordan alone, leaving their families behind, a minority find ways of bringing their 
husbands and children to Jordan. A small number - most of whom are frcclancers • marry fellow 
migrants and start families abroad or have children out of wedlock. Foreigners cannot enrol in 
public schools in Jordan and, for those children whose parents cannot afford private school 
tuition, Bible schools may be their only source of formal education. 
The global expansion of Pentecostalism has been attributed, in part, to its emphasis on direct, 
personal contact with the Holy Spirit. These elements are also important to my Sri Lankan 
interlocutors, for it is through such contact that miraculous healings are believed possible. 
Pentecostalism provides a symbolic rhetoric consistent with beliefs in healing, possession and 
exorcism that are common in Sri Lanka (Kapfcrer 1983). Church services involve prayer sessions 
in which members lay hands on one another to relieve physical, emotional or demonic illnesses. 
Such group therapy activities are a regular feature of Friday services, although for those with 
especially grave afflictions, private sessions can also be arranged. For some migrants, the 
therapeutic potential of Pentecostal worship is paramount.1l7 
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. ere IS a WI e Iterature on the therapeutic appeal of evangelical ChristIan enomlnatlOns. nc uamp c 
~s ~rzcn's (2006) work on a Protestant ministry in the US with a 'heuling culture' Ulut provides a sense (If 
intimacy and belonging for those seeking to renounce long-term same-se1l relationships. Another is 
Gree~field's (1992) account of Brazilian spirit healing groups, in which African and Amerimlilln religious 
pr~ctlces find consonance with Christianity, and vulnerable and distraught people from middle and lower­
mIddle class backgrounds in urban Brazil are drawn to church groups for healing treatments. As Greenfield 
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Expressive of this point is Soma, a 42-year-old woman from Colombo who converted to 
Pentecostalism from Buddhism while working in Jordan. Several years after her arrival in Jordan, 
Soma became possessed by the spirit of her deceased father. In her account, the spirit had been 
unsettled and sent to pester her as a result of sorcery performed by a woman with whom her 
husband had begun an affair in Sri Lanka after Soma had left. The spirit was particularly 
meddlesome at night, revealing itself in the form of a legless torso and yelling at her. Soma was 
unable to sleep and, on some days, too exhausted to get out of bed. She visited a doctor who 
prescribed medication for an ulcer, but this did not resolve the problem. It was only after her 
friend Lanka brought her to a Pentecostal church that Soma's affliction began to abate. Soon after 
her introduction to the church, one of the church pastors visited her home to exorcise the spirit. It 
temporarily possessed Soma's aunt [father'S sister], with whom Soma lived at the time. Like 
Soma, the aunt was also a long-term resident of Amman, worked as a domestic worker and lived 
outside of her employer's home. The women began attending the church together and, according 
to Soma, as long as they continued praying there the spirit remained at bay. As Soma's case 
illustrates, for some women Pentecostal worship can have cathartic effects that ultimately lead to 
conversion. 
For others, the allure of such groups lies in the fact that Pentecostal ideas about sexuality and 
gender norms correlate with patriarchal attitudes about women and the family in Sri Lanka. 
Husband and wife missionary teams often emphasise the importance of strong conjugal bonds and 
enjoin men to be the spiritual leaders of the home, with wives standing by faithfully. This poses 
an unresolved tension: being a 'good' wife according to Pentecostal teachings clashes with the 
realities of life for many migrant women, who are separated from their husbands for years at a 
stretch and may have severed ties altogether. This might rcpel women who seek greater sexual 
freedom abroad. But for those attempting to distance themselves from stereotypes of mi!,'fant 
women as sexually promiscuous, conversion to Pentecostalism provides a sense ofrcspectubility. 
Illustrative of this is Rani, a 27-year-old Tamil woman from a village in the tea-!,'fowing 
highlands near Kandy who converted from Hinduism to Pentecostalism in Jordan. Orphllned at a 
young age, Rani was raised by her elder brother and sister, both of whom have worked previously 
in the Middle East. Upon completing secondary school at 17 years of age, Rani took a job in a 
garment factory. After 6 months in the factory, her sister urged her to go abroud to work so thut 
she could earn a higher salary. Rani visited a recruitment agent in Colombo who, because Runi 
was under 18 years of age, gave her another woman's passport and sent her to work in the homc 
of a family in Jordan. Rani said she was badly treated by her first employers, who gave her stulc 
food and did not allow her to leave the house or have a rest day. One night, after being struck 
(1992: 42) points out, spiritualist healers and patients do not need to share a common belief system in order 
for patients to be effectively cured. 
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across the face by the madame, Rani consumed a cocktail of pesticide and Pepsi in an attempt to 
commit suicide. She was hospitalised and, upon recovering, sent back to Sri Lanka. Rani vowed 
never to work in Jordan again. She moved in with her sister and took a job working in a pharmacy 
in Colombo. After several months, her sister again urged her to go abroad. This time, Rani visited 
a recruitment agency and requested to work in Malaysia, the UAE or Lebanon. A job was 
arranged for her. The day before her departure, Rani learned she was being sent back to Jordan. 
Upon her arrival, she was employed by the family of a wealthy doctor. They treated her well and 
she has been working in Jordan ever since. Rani told me that she began attending Christian 
churches because there was no Hindu temple in Amman and because it was the only place her 
employer allowed her to go on her own. Like many, Rani's conversion narrative began with a 
miracle. On one of her routine visits to church, Rani bought a poster depicting Jesus and placed it 
alongside an image of Lord Shiva in her bedroom. She regularly prayed before both images. Late 
one night as she slept, Lord Shiva's image burst into flames. Showing me the charred image as 
she related the story, Rani said this had been a message from Jesus that she should bl.'Come 
Christian. Following the lead of a friend, Rani began attending Bible school and was soon 
baptised into a Pentecostal church. 
In our conversations, Rani frequently expressed concerns about her reputation as someone who 
had worked as a domestic worker in the Middle East and what this would mean for her marital 
prospects: 'Ifl go back to Sri Lanka. I know I am still a girl [virgin], but people will say I am no 
longer a girl. What can I do? I know I am good, but that's not what they will think.' Rani feared 
she ~ould have to pay a higher dowry to compensate. She often contrasted herself with other Sri 
Lankans in Jordan who had boyfriends or went out late at night. She also emphasised ways in 
which she had changed since converting. She used to love llindi music, but now listened only to 
Christian songs. She altered her wardrobe, opting for long skirts and dresses in lieu of trousers. 
According to Rani, part of the reason people view women who return from the Middle East in a 
negative light is their manner of dress: 'returnees' wear tight-fitting jeans rather than long skirts 
and decorate themselves with too much make-up and jewellery. Such practices are not encouraged 
in rural Sri Lanka because they are said to be immodest. They are also strongly discouraged by 
the church Rani attended. Women are instructed to follow the example of female pnstors by 
wearing long skirts and refraining from the use of make-up and jewellery. The gold earrings worn 
by many Sri Lankan women irk American church pastors, who often try unsuccessfully to 
persuade women to give them up. Buying and wearing gold is both a status marker and an 
investment strategy, and so it is not surprising that migrants find this advice problcmutic. Rani 
dealt with the dilemma by taking off her earrings before church activities, but she said she 
conformed to the other rules. Her adaptations render a more wholesome self-portrait, providing 
her with a sense of distinction in comparison with other migrants. By emphasising modesty, 
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chastity and bodily discipline, Pentecostalism provides a moral counterbalance to notions of 
women migrants' sexual and behavioural impropriety. It is also worth mentioning that despite the 
emphasis on men as spiritual leaders, women play key roles in these churches as pastors, teachers 
and evangelists. In contrast with socially undervalued work as domestic servants, these activities 
are a source of pride for the Sri Lankan women who take part. 
Although the appeal of evangelical groups is clear, less apparent is the extent to which women 
continue Pentecostal worship after returning to Sri Lanka. This is difficult to assess without 
longitudinal data, but the wider context of evangelical Christianity in Sri Lanka has important 
implications.138 As a general rule, evangelical Christian groups are not highly regarded by non­
Christians in Sri Lanka. There is a widespread perception that they prey on poverty and suffering 
in order to gain converts.139 There is also suspicion that those who convert do so simply for 
handouts. In my field site in Gampaha District, villagers sometimes refer to evangelical churches 
as paripu palieh ('lentil churches') because they are thought to lure people with food parcels. 
Sinhala-speaking Christians typically refer to their own conversions by saying 'Christiani una' 
('we became Christian') or 'Api deng paliehte yannal'a' ('we now go to church') or 'Assemblies 
of God ekata benduna' ('we got tied up with the Assemblies of God'). The verb tense for 
'benduna' implies that the tying up was voluntary. Conversely, Buddhists tend to deny the 
voluntary nature of Christian conversion. One may describe a fellow Buddhist who regularly 
attends a Catholic church thus: 'Catholiea palieh egolamwe banJewa gaena' ('the Catholic 
church has caused them to be tied up'). Here, the emphasis is on involuntary action caused by 
another party. These differences in terminology reflect the negative attitudes many have towards 
Christian conversion. Although it would not be seen as wrong to attend a Christian service or pray 
at a church, renouncing one's Buddhist identity would be problematic. A fear of social censure at 
home may deter migrants from announcing that they have converted. A migrant may also be 
discouraged if she converted to a particular group abroad and waS unable find the same 
denomination at home. Pastor Nevil, a Sri Lankan church lead~'I' who oversees a congregation 
with approximately 500 members in a town south of Colombo on the western COllst of Sri Lanka, 
shared his thoughts with me on those who convert to Christianity while working in the Middle 
138 Some Evangelical groups, such as the Assemblies of God, have been active in Sri Lanka for more Ihl\n a 
century, but most have been in operation only since the 1970s (Perera 1998: 49). The Nlltionlll Christil\n 
Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL), an umbrella group for five Christilln denominlltioos, says it 
represents 200,000 evangelical Christians in Sri Lanka (NCEASL 2010). Other groul'S have rel'orted thllt 
there are between 300 and 350 evangelical church and para-church organisations throughout the island 
(Perera 1998: 52). 

139 S' 20 . . 
mce 02, Violent attacks against Christian churches and pastors have increased. Much oflhe Violence 
was .orchestrated to stir up support for an anti-Conversion bill sUl'ported by the Ruddhist monks' purty, the 
Jathlka Hela Urumaya (JHU). The bill was eventually shelved, but animosity against such groul'S continues. 
E~ange1ical groups reached out to tsunami survivors to provide relief and assistance and this, combined 
With proselytising activities in poor communities, has disturbed some Buddhists who view such groups 8!1 a 
divisive force. 
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East. Pastor Nevil had been instrumental in starting two Pentecostal churches abroad, one in 
Kuwait and one in Jordan, and we had been introduced by a domestic worker who was a church 
leader in Jordan. When asked whether migrants who convert while abroad remain in the church 
after returning to Sri Lanka, Pastor Nevil replied: 
Many of the women who return from the Middle East are not permitted by their families to come to 
church. But this is not always the situation. Some women are returning with certain abilities. They 
have earned money and built their homes and gained respect. They are able to influence their families 
with the money they have earned, and in some cases, we've had women who bring their whole family 
to the church with them. 
Such women appeared to be a minority. Most of those I knew who had converted to 
Pentecostalism in Jordan had not convinced their family members to join them. Likewise, Pastor 
Nevil noted that many returnees may find it difficult to locate a church at home and 
acknowledged that, if they could not do so, they would most likely revert to earlier religious 
practices. 'Faith is something you have to put fire into. It's a flame you have to feed or it will die 
down. Only a small percentage will fight for their faith without the church,' he said. 
Migrants' engagements with Pentecostal groups in Jordan are coloured by the fact of their 
eventual return to Sri Lanka. Although I am unable to argue conclusively in the absence of long­
term data, my tentative hypothesis is that, like their stay as guest workers in Jordan, migrants' 
participation in Pentecostal churches is temporary and contingent. For most, it appears not to 
entail a radical, lasting rupture with previous ways of living and believing. Furthermore, much 
like the participation of non-Catholics in Catholic Masses, their activities are an extension of a 
pluralist, flexible approach to not condoned by Penh..the supernatural, although one 'Costal 
doctrine, in which salvation can be achieved only by surrendering to Jesus Christ alone. Although 
sermons by American and Nigerian missionaries underscore the importance of Pentecostal 
worship in offering a direct path to an omnipotent God through which salvation can be achieved, 
this theological element was not emphasised in my discussions with most Sri Lankan church 
members. Their participation tended to be inspired by other concerns. Financial insecurity is one; 
affiliating with such groups creates the possibility for future assistance in the form of jobs or 
money. But, as described, there are also important noneconomic motives relating to healing and 
exorcism. And for those bereft of kith and kin, membership provides moral benefits, including 
intimate interaction and a sense of belonging and respectability, Many Sri Lankan migrants 
engage in Pentecostal services in Jordan principally for their emotional, therapeutic and social 
appeal and to address problems encountered in everyday life. In doing so, they do not challenge 
pre-existing Buddhist notions of self or salvation. 
The context at hand suggests that there may be a greater resistance to internlll religious 
transformation than some accounts of Pentecostal conversion may imply. In this respect, it 
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resembles Smith-Hefner's (1994) description of Khmer refugees from Theravada Duddhist 
backgrounds who moved to the United States through a government resettlement scheme 
sponsored in part by Christian churches. Many had been exposed to Christian prosc\ytising in 
refugee camps before they were resettled. Once in the US, frequent movement between Protestant 
churches and Buddhist temples was common; one quarter of the several hundred people Smith­
Hefner interviewed had attended Christian churches at some point (Smith-Hefner 1994: 30). 
However, the vast majority eventually stopped doing so when government assistance was halted. 
The few who remained within Protestant churches did so in part because of the appeal of the 
Christian belief, which runs counter to the Buddhist idea of karma, that one's sins can be forgiven 
and salvation achieved through a personal relationship with Jesus (Smith-Ilefner 1994: 31). This 
was appealing to refugees suffering from guilt about their own survival. But as Smith-Ilefner 
describes, from a Buddhist perspective the concept of born-again salvation and forgiveness is 
fundamentally unjust, and Khmer Buddhists suspected that those Khmer who had converted to 
Christianity did so in a futile attempt to escape atonement (1994: 31-2). For a few Khmer, 
rejecting previous lifeways in exchange for a new Christian identity was appealing. But for most, 
it was not. Likewise, for some Sri Lankan women, such as Rani, Pentecostal church membership 
offers a route to respectability. But the likelihood that most migrants will continue to espouse a 
Protestant Christian identity after returning to Sri Lanka is not great. 
In the preceding sections, I have described two types of communal religious activities in which 
Sri Lankan migrants in Jordan participate - those associated with a Catholic church and those with 
Pentecostal groups. In each case, I have described how such activities had both mom I as well as 
material appeal. Equally important, although less readily apparent to an outsidl.", are more 
individualised, private practices in churches involving contractual pmyer, as described in the 
following section. 
Vow Making and Pilgrimages to Madaba 
On the first Friday of each month, dozens of Sri Lankans working in Amman pile into minibuses 
and travel 50 kilometres south-west to the town of Madaba. They come to visit Saint Gcmgc's 
Church, a nineteenth century Greek Orthodox site famous with tourists for its beautiful 
Byzantine-era mosaic map of Palestine and the Nile Dellll. It is not the map that most come to sec, 
but a shrine to the Virgin Mary nestled inside the church. Most of the Sri Lankans who mnke the 
journey are not Christian but Buddhist. Some come in time to attend the officinl service, held in 
Arabic, but most come to visit the shrine. The first Friday of the month is the most popular duy, 
but migrants also come on other days. 
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ftgure 14: Church ofSt. George, Madaba 
Regardless of their religious backgrounds, many pause after crossing the threshold of the church 
to make the sign of the cross. They then head past the mosaic map and bypass the altar to enter a 
small room housing the shrine. The room's focal point is a plaque depicting the Virgin Mary with 
the infant Jesus in her anus. The image is protected by a glass-panelled wooden case. Gold chains 
and pendants adorn the image, and coins wrapped in white cloth are tied to the columns on the 
side as a pandura, or offering in Sinhala. Jewellery and other donations, as well as promissory 
notes written in connection with ritual vows, can be deposited into a box nearby. Devotees scrawl 
messages in wax with candle tips on the glass panels. On one visit to the shrine, I noticed that 
personal names had been written in Arabic. But the majority of the messages were in Sinhala. 
They read: 'Heal my daughter', 'Bless our family', '1lclp me get my visa and passport'. 
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Figure 15: Gold pendants and promissory notes adorn the 
Madaba 
rgc, 
Early one Friday morning In April 2007, I accompanied tw ri I ta fi nd 
Kumari , both Buddhists, on one of their regular outing t the 
journey was to make a payment for a vow (bar ak) to n ur her on 
his O-Level exams in Sri Lanka. Months before eeta had wed that if h r n r d hi >h 
hrin 
in 
marks, she would return every Friday for three m nths to Ii ht andle pray and mak 
in thanks for the Virgin Mary's interce sion on her on ' behal r. When th X3 111 
released, Seeta learned that her son had indeed excelled. 
By performing a vow (bara), a per on puts himself r her elf in the ar of fI lip I11ntural b in , 
promising that if his or her reque t is granted or probl 111 p titi n r \ ill mak 
payment honouring the divine entity. The upplicant pledge hi r h r d oti n t lip m atuml 
being in exchange for what he or he expects wi ll b a reward rdivin a i tan 140 Ith u h 
How these practices fit logically wi th the nibbanic and kammati d trin 
lay beli evers is discussed by Spiro (1982: hapter 6) . an ni al Buddhi 

otherworldly affair , nirvana and rebirth. One achieve alvati n thr u h ri dlt m ral ndll t. 11lri! Oil I 

meditation, with no as istance ITom a supernatural being ( pir 19 2: 140). Within thi ' fram \ rk. th 'r ' i ~ 
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vow making is popular in South Asia, it is by no means unique to the region and similar types of 
contractual prayer are practised by Jordanians of both Muslim and Christian faiths.141 
Vows made by Catholic and Buddhist Sri Lankans in Jordan are carefully delibemted petitions for 
help with an endless number of concerns relating to quotidian life. They can be requests to 
regularise one's visa status, obtain well-paid employment, bring a relative to Jordan, cure an 
illness or solve family problems in Sri Lanka. Payments typically take the form of an offering of 
money, gold jewellery or other valuable items in the name of the deity or saint, lighting candles, 
organising a dane (alms giving), fasting, or any combination of these. Throughout South Asia, it 
is not unusual for people to take vows involving devotion to deities outside their own religious 
traditions. As Raj and Harman (2006: 7) state, 'taking vows to deities of a different tmdition 
becomes a bit like investing spiritually in a hedge fund. It becomes a quick and easy way to 
supplement the resources - possibly the limited resources - that characterise your own religious 
tradition' . 
Devotees are ethically bound to fulfil the promises they make as part of a vow and those failing to 
do so face possible retribution from the deity (Goonasekera 2006: 108). Although vow fulfilment 
(bara oppukaranawa) is regarded seriously, it is difficult to assess the degree to which people do 
it. I encountered several cases in which Buddhist women who had made vows to the Virgin Mary 
and Saint Anthony did not carry out the promised votive acts. Although I cannot be certain, it is 
possible that because neither the Virgin Mary nor Saint Anthony is regarded as having a vengeful 
character or hot temper, as in the case of some of the gods from the Buddhist pantheon, notably 
Katamgama Deviyo, these women were less fearful of the consequences of failing to live up to 
their end of the bargain.142 Just as there is greater seriousness attached to vows made to certain 
gods in the supernatural hierarchy (Goonasekera 2006: 111), these women may have felt that 
abrogating vows made to Christian saints was a less serious offence. 
Among Sri Lankan migrants, the church in Madaba is the prime site for milking vows bt.'Cause it is 
said in Sinhala to have 'haskam', or divine potency. The other main site with this power is the 
Church of Saint George in Salt, an ancient town half an hour's drive from Amman. The churches 
in Madaba and Salt were likened to places with similar potency in Sri Lanka, namely Katnragnma, 
the Kalutara Bodhi. Sri Maha Bodhi, Sri Pade and Saint Anthony's Church in Kochchikade. This 
For examples from other regions, see research by Cannell (1999) on the role of proml'.m.f among 
Christians in the Philippines and Christian (1989: 118-35) on instrumental prayers in northern Spain. In an 
Arab context, Nabti (1998) has described the practice of contractual prayers, or nicllrrin, by Sunni Ilnd Shi'll 
Muslims and Maronite and Orthodox Christians in Lebanon, noting sect-specific differences with respect to 
~~; supernatural entities enlisted for assistance and the types of payments oITered by petitioners. 
Busby (2006: 82-5), in writing of Christians in the predominantly Hindu Indian stllte of Kerala. ha!! 
described the central importance of Mary, who was thought to possess sh"kti (divine power) and was 
considered a deity akin to Hindu goddesses. But in contrast with Hindu deities, Mary was not seen as 
having a hostile or vindictive character and her power was exerted only for good. 
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concept of power transcends religious boundaries; in Sri Lanka, Buddhist, Hindu, Roman Catholic 
and some Muslim sites can all have haskam (Bastin 2002: 5-6). Beliefs about the potency of the 
Madaba church may have been introduced to Sri Lankans by Jordanian employers, some of whom 
also believed in its efficacy. According to one local apparition story, thieves plotting to steal gold 
and other offerings crept into the church one night. As they entered the shrine room, Mary's hands 
came to life, glowing blue and waving to indicate that the men should not steal. The thieves fled, 
leaving the offerings untouched. Such stories may have inspired the notion that the place has 
haskam. But vow making in a place or to a certain entity is believed in on the basis of positive 
results. 
Figure 16: Lighting candles in front of the Church of Saint George, Salt 
Seeta's story illustrates the particular significance of vows in the lives of migrant women. During 
her 7-year tenure as a live-in domestic worker in Jordan, Seeta had made mnny pilgrimnges to 
Madaba to make and fulfil vows. Most concerned kin-related matters in Sri Lanka. On one 
occasion, Seeta's daughter's boyfriend had become violent and hnd threatened to kidnap h(..'l' 
unless she married him. Her daughter refused, wanting to attend university before mnrriage. Seeta 
was terrified that her daughter would be snatched away, but as long as she was in Jordan, there 
was little she could do. Seeta made a vow to the Virgin Mary that if the boyfriend len the girl 
alone, Seeta would return with two pigeons that she would set free. In time, the boyfriend stopped 
making threats and so Seeta brought two pigeons from Amman in a plastic carrier and released 
them in the church courtyard. She told me she had freed the pigeons as a way of releasing her 
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daughter from her boyfriend's clutches. For Seeta and other women, ritual vows playa crucial 
role in allowing them to react to crises at home despite their physical separation. In Seeta's case, 
vow making enabled her to fulfil her maternal duty to protect her daughter in a way she could not 
have otherwise.143 
Although it is common for Sri Lankan women in Jordan to visit shrines together, they generally 
do not discuss their own vows in detail with one another on such trips. Although not necessarily 
secret, vows are private, solemn matters. In some cases, however, several people may make 
coordinated vows. For example, three women who were close friends made a vow together. One 
was suffering from a back injury that prevented her from working. She and two friends made a 
vow at the shrine in Madaba in the hopes that her back would be healed. One of the women was 
unable to leave her employer's home to return to the shrine every Friday, and so the other two 
made the payments and performed the rites for her. Women also make vows on behalf of other 
domestic workers who are not permitted to leave their employers' homes. 
Making vows in Jordan does not supplant doing so in Sri Lanka. Vows may be performed in both 
places concurrently or in a series. The way in which vow making at churches in Jordan overlaps 
with activities in Sri Lanka is highlighted by the example of Neeta, who was employed as a 
domestic worker in Amman for nearly 10 years and with whose family I residt.'<l in Sri Lanka. 
While working in Jordan, Neeta often made vows at the shrine in Madaba. Upon returning to Sri 
Lanka, she made vows at Saint Anthony's church in Kochchikade, the National Basilica of Our 
Lady of Lanka in Tewatte and several temples, including Gangaramaya Temple in Colombo. I 
accompanied her on some of these journeys and came to know what her vows were about. At 34 
years of age, Neeta was unmarried, a fact that caused great distress. She was eager to tap all 
possible resources in the hopes that the problem could be solved and a suitable marriage partner 
found. Her sisters, who had never worked abroad, frowned on her frequent trips to the church in 
Kochchikade in fulfilment of her vow to Saint Anthony. They argued that spending money and 
time to get there was wasteful. It is possible that Neeta's exposure to churches in Jordan made her 
more inclined to seek assistance from saints than her siblings. Ilowever, it should be stressed 
again that it is not unusual for Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims in Sri Lanka, regardless of whether 
they have migrated, to make vows to Catholic saints or seck assistance from Catholic priests 
Several scholars have written about the particular importance vows hold for women and mllrginnlised 
groups. Uddin (2006: 94) describes sex workers in Bangladesh who, as a stigmntised group, are excluded 
from most formal religious practices in mosques and instead visit saints' tomhs to muke \'0\\"5. As lIurman 
(2006: 29) writes, women in south Asia often take vows for the sake of family harmony, for example to 
maintain good married life, for fertility or for the health of their relatives. 
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purpose. The manner in which Buddhists and Catholics made and fulfilled vows, and their reasons 
for doing so, appeared to be common. But evidence for this is sketchy and more information 
would be needed to draw a clearer picture of how migrants in Amman viewed the functional 
specialisations of the Virgin Mary or Saint George compared with the Buddhist pantheon. 
Although this chapter has focused on pilgrimages for the sake of vows, Catholics and smaller 
numbers of Buddhists also make pilgrimages to other holy sites in Jordan, chiefly to the site on 
the Jordan River where John the Baptist is believed to have baptised Jesus and to Mount Nebo. 
Visits to such sites may be opportunities for serious pilgrimage and pleasurable tourism. Among 
my interlocutors, these sites were visited less frequently than the church in Madaba in part 
because they are located a greater distance from Amman and are harder for migrants to reach 
using public transport. 
Pilgrimages to make vows at churches in Madaba and Salt were not viewed favourably by all. 
Father Gabriel tried to rein in these activities. During one of his Friday sermons, he instructed the 
faithful to put their trust directly in God rather than in such places. During the summer of 2008, I 
accompanied a large group of women on an all-day excursion that had been organised by Father 
Gabriel and several migrants. Three minibuses had been rented and dozens of parcels of rice and 
curry had been packed for the journey. The plan was to visit Madaba, enjoy a picnic lunch on the 
desert hills of Mount Nebo and then descend to the Dead Sea for a late afternoon float on its salty 
surface. When we arrived in Madaba, many were disappointed to learn that Father Gabriel had 
arranged for us to visit a new Catholic church on the outskirts of town instead of the far more 
popular Saint George's Greek Orthodox Church. This vexed some of my non-Christian 
companions, who did not wish to attend the service. They decided to skip it and took ofT in one of 
the minibuses, later rejoining the group on Mount Nebo. Father Gabriel's effort to discourage 
attendance at the Madaba shrine was not surprising given that it competed with his Friday Mass in 
Amman. As an alternative sacred source, it undermined his authority.146 But his attempts to put an 
end to such activities generally proved unsuccessful. Pentecostal church leaders also disapproved 
of members attending churches in Madaba and Salt. Exclusivity and superiority over other 
religious traditions was strongly emphasised in their sermons; worshippers of 'statues' and 'false 
gods', as one missionary put it, would be condemned. They viewed vow making as degenerate, an 
affront to the Christian belief in Jesus as the unique and universal saviour. None of the women I 
knew who regularly attended Pentecostal services talked about going to either site or making 
146 I . 
t IS not uncommon for religious clergy to disapprove of the performance of vows. This has been 
documented, for example, among Catholic bishops in Tamil Nadu by Raj (2006: 62). Stirrat (1981) has 
described the competition that developed between priests and cults to the saints in Sri Lanka with specific 
reference to a cult surrounding Saint Sebastian at Mirisgama. In another vein, in his work on South Indian 
Catholics, Mosse (2006) has written of how specific cultural practices relating to possession, exorcism and 
sorcery were regarded by Jesuit priests as non-Christian corrosive influences. 
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vows, although they may have done so. Overall, despite the views of some clergy, for those Sri 
Lankans who have the opportunity to visit churches, vows to the Virgin Mary and Saint Anthony 
play an important role as the most direct way migrants can access divine power. 
Magic and Miracles at the Church of Saint George 
In addition to the church in Madaba, the other primary site seen as having haskam is the Church 
of Saint George (Kineeset Abuna Jereis) in the town of Salt. Like the shrine in Madaba, it is a 
popular pilgrimage point for making vows. But it is also a site where magic is practiced. This 
includes protection spells to avert evil, cure illnesses or lessen negative planetary influences, in 
addition to sorcerous spells (kodiwina) and retributive charms to exact revenge for sorcery 
(paligahanawa). I use the term 'sorcery' to refer to acts designed to harm others using 
supernatural forces. 'Magic' denotes a broader field of action designed for beneficial or harmful 
purposes. Among migrants in Jordan, accusations of sorcery may crop up to explain illnesses, 
calamities or actions that might be considered shameful. For example, women may allege that 
they had been seduced by men after having been charmed. Stories about Sri Lankan women 
performing charms to make men fall in love with them are also common. Such charms of 
attraction, or vashi, typically come in the form of food and involve men from other countries, 
namely India, Pakistan and Egypt. Women also accuse other migrants of bringing charmed oils or 
sweets from Sri Lanka to destroy friendships or cause illnesses. I heard several stories about 
Keralan migrants in Amman who perform Malayali gurukam, a type of charm originating in 
Kerala that are reputed to be especially powerful and difficult to counteract. While simple charms 
Can be performed by non-specialists, in Sri Lanka it is common to tum to professionals to do the 
work, and I was not able to locate any in Jordan.147 People would have been reluctant to admit 
knowing how to perform sorcery, and even possessing knowledge of others with such skills could 
raise suspicion. Given that this was such a delicate subject, I only asked women I knew well about 
sorcery. My questions were often met with raised eyebrows and amused surprise that I would 
know about such things. One friend teased me for having asked and jokingly perfonned an 
impersonation of a yakka (demon) to see if I also knew about that. Many of the women I knew 
best had worked in Jordan for many years and had a cosmopolitan sense of what pt'Ople from 
other cultures did and did not believe. They assumed I did not believe in sorcery, and their 
amusement at my questions may have related to a sense of awkwardness about the matter. Those 
who spoke most freely about sorcery professed not to 'believe' in it. Upon further discussion, 
however, it often became clear that in fact they believed it was immoral to practice sorcery, not 
that doing so would necessarily be ineffective. They may not have believed a particular illness or 
147 S' 'I IIml ar y, although astrology is an important part of Sri Lankan culture,l was not able to identify any Sri 
Lankan astrologers in Jordan. 
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misfortune had been caused by sorcery, but they often had a degree of doubt and would not rule 
out the possibility. 
A case of alleged sorcery occurred in the summer of 2008. Hemawathi, a woman with whom I 
spent time regularly, and I went to visit the home ofher friend Delani. Both women are Buddhists 
employed as domestic workers. Unlike Hemawathi, Delani does not live with her employer. The 
previous day, Delani had moved into a new apartment, which she was renting with Lakmal, a man 
commonly known as her 'husband', and two of his male friends. This was our first visit to their 
new abode. In the main sitting area, Delani had arranged bowls of oil, water and tunneric to ward 
off ess vaha (poison eye) and evil spirits. Several weeks previously, I had made a trip to Beirut. 
Knowing that I would be going there, Delani had asked me to bring her a statue of the Virgin 
Mary. Like other migrants, Delani believed that having such a statue in her home would confer 
protection and ward off danger. She said there were nicer Virgin Mary statues available in 
Lebanon, and she wanted a large one. I brought one back for her, and when I gave it to her, she 
said my having done so would bring me pin (merit).148 She placed it on top of the television, a 
prominent spot from which it could be seen from all points of the room. Delani gave us a tour of 
the apartment, and we then went into the kitchen to prepare lunch. While doing so, Dc\ani and 
Hemawathi spoke of another woman, Lata, who was known to be jealous of Dc\ani 's relationship 
with Lakmal. Delani thought she would be especially envious to learn that they had moved into a 
new apartment together. They joked about whether Lata might try to do something bad to Dclani. 
As they were saying this, Delani placed a Pyrex dish on top of the gas stove to heat some food. 
Minutes later, the Pyrex dish exploded, sending chards of glass and bits of food shooting through 
the air. We froze in startled amazement. As we began to clean up the mess, llemawathi and 
Delani laughed about whether Lata had cursed Dc\ani's new home or if, as lIemawathi suggested, 
the accident had simply been the result of them foolishly having placed a Pyrex dish directly onto 
a gas flame. 
Jordanian employers could also be the victims of sorcery. In one especially grave example, a Sri 
Lankan woman whom I shall call Kumudu was said to have caused her employer's suicide. The 
employer was said to have treated Kumudu very well, even helping to bring her boyfriend to 
Jordan. When the boyfriend began spending too much time at the employer's house visiting 
Kumudu, the employer objected. Eventually, under circumstances not explained to me: the 
boyfriend had to return to Sri Lanka. Kumudu was incensed and blamed the employer for her 
boyfriend's departure. A year later, the employer committed suicide by taking poison. The women 
who relayed the story to me said that the employer had seemed happy, had been well educated, 
148 ~ud~hists acquire pin when they do actions conforming to Lord Buddha's teachings. and this assists in 
their ultimate salvation. As Spiro writes. ' ... the greater the merit, the more pleasurahle the rehirth' (1982: 
69). 
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had a good job at a bank, and had two children. Hence, they reasoned, she had no reason to kill 
herself. Sorcery was the most logical explanation. Kumudu, who was not well liked by the women 
who told me this story, must have cursed her. 
Tales of Sri Lankan, Indonesian and Filipina domestic workers who performed magic on their 
employers were also told by Jordanians. These stories, most often recounted by female employers, 
commonly involved a domestic worker performing a love charm on a male employer to seduce 
him.149 In several cases, such allegations explained why Arab men had married or taken Asian 
women as mistresses. They underlined fears that domestic workers might exceed their stations, 
threatening employers' own positions in the household or creating competition for the affections 
of men and children. Apprehension about sorcery parallels broader anxieties about the unseen 
practices and hidden motives of foreign women working under employers' very noses. 
Like Sri Lankans, Jordanians distinguish between different categories of magic (sihr, in Arabic). 
'Black magic', or that with harmful intent, is most commonly referred to as 'sh 'awadha'. 'White 
magic', on the other hand, is meant to have beneficial or protective effects. Although black magic 
is expressly forbidden in the Quran, both types are practiced. While the cultural inflections differ, 
some forms of magic performed in Arab contexts resemble Sri Lankan varieties. Tying knots and 
blowing into them, as mentioned in AI-Bukhari's hadith, is similar to string tying (nlllli 
bandinawa) in Sri Lanka. Sri Lankans and Arabic-speakers alike share a fear of evil eye, known 
as ess vaha (poison eye) in Sinhala and 'ain al-hasad (envious eye), or simply 01- 'ain (the eye), in 
Arabic. Verbal curses, or kala vaha (mouth poison) in Sinhala, are also a cause ofconcern in both 
cultures. As with the evil eye, they need not be intended to have results. One Sri Lankan woman 
told me she was recruited by her Arab Christian employer to perform charms on the employer's 
own children; one to break up her daughter's love affair with an unsuitable boy, and the other to 
encourage her son to study harder for his Tawjihi exams (the general secondary examination). The 
son eventually discovered the charm, which had been hidden under his pillow. When confronted, 
the employer blamed the domestic worker for having made it. 
Should a Sri Lankan migrant want to instigate or counteract sorcery in Jordnn, she could choose 
from several options. The first would be to bring, or have someone else bring, pre-prepared 
materials from Sri Lanka. lso Provided that she has the requisite knowledge, a second option would 
be for her to perform her own magic at home or at the church in Salt. Charms vary in their 
elaborateness. The simplest versions involve tying a string onto which mtmtras (incantations to 
These stories are not unique to Jordan. In 2007, four Indonesian domestic workers were accused by their 
Saudi Arabian employers of having practiced 'black magic' on the family's teenaged son (lluman Rights 
Watch 2008b: 88). Two died from the injuries inflicted upon them, Bnd the other two were detained by 
~~ud~ But~orit~es. Other domestic workers have been convicted of witchcraft in Saudi courts (ibid). 
LIkeWIse, In the absence of Ayurvedic practitioners in Jordan, many women brought their own pre­
prepared indigenous medical supplies. 
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invoke supernatural beings) are whispered. lSI Another simple charm involves writing the victim's 
name and/or name and birth date on a piece of paper and tying it lightly. The victim's personal 
effects, such as fingernail clippings or strands of hair, may be incorporated to increase the strength 
of the charm. Another common charm involves carving a yantra (ritual drawing) onto a thin metal 
sheet that then is rolled up and placed in a metal capsule. The item then can be hidden in the 
victim's home. If discovered, retaliatory charms can be enacted to reverse it. A final option 
involves soliciting the assistance of a ritual specialist through the mail and/or telephone. This 
requires a substantial sum ofmoney and access to the telephone or post. This latter option, and the 
practice of magic at the church in Salt, will be discussed in the following paragraphs. m 
One Friday morning in July of 2008, Hemawathi and I took a minibus to Salt. a town half an 
hour's drive from Amman that was once an Ottoman regional administrative centre. The town has 
retained some of its old charm, with beautiful though now ramshackle late Ottoman-era sandstone 
houses with high-arched windows. Hemawathi and I ambled through the town's winding streets to 
the Church of Saint George. We arrived shortly before 9 am, and aside from the church 
caretakers, the only other people present were half a dozen Sri Lankans, some of whom 
Hemawathi knew. Over the course of the three hours we spent at the church that day, dozens more 
Sri Lankans trickled in, most of them women in groups of two or three but also couples with 
young children. By 10:30 am, a group of 30-odd Arab Christians poured in, thronging the small 
church. There is an ebb and flow to the popularity of this site and the church in Madaba. During 
the summer of 2008, the Salt church was gaining ncar cult-status among groups of Arab 
Christians as well as Sri Lankans, but it was not clear how long its notoriety might last. Not all of 
the Christians in Jordan with whom I spoke had heard about the miracles associated with the 
church. Nevertheless, the site provided a rare instance in which Arabs and Sri Lankan domestic 
workers inter-mingled as devotees on equal footing. While Arab Christians frequently 
encountered Sri Lankans at churches, the extent to which non-Christians used such sites probably 
extends beyond what local patrons would imagine. Interestingly, however, Sri Lankans have been 
incorporated into the miracles told about the church by Arabs. 
Soon after we arrived, Hemawathi bought some candles and went to pray in front of a painting of 
Saint George. She then knelt in front of a statue to the Virgin Mary, touching its feet and then 
putting her hands on her face. Physical contact with such statues was common and played an 
important role, as has been described in other contexts (e.g. by Busby 2006: 90), for it enabled 
.~ome mantras are unintelligible to non-specialists, while others are known invocations to deities or other 
sElrJts. 
I 2 Another option, which I was unable to investigate, involves going to a local Arab specialist of mogic. I 
was told of a 'dark-skinned' Palestinian man in one of the refugee camps who performed magic. The 
brother of one of migrant was taken there before travelling to work in Iraq in the hopes that he would he 
protected. 
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people to transfer power from a shrine or statue to themselves. Hemawathi then went to the back 
of the church and knelt before a small, cavernous hole. There is no pre-established order in which 
to visit these parts of the church, but the cavernous hole was the focus of most of the attention. 
According to local legend, it marks the spot where a local shepherd was sleeping one night when 
Saint George appeared before him on his horse and asked him to build a church. Local residents 
say that when the church is shut at night. the sounds of Saint George's horse's footsteps can be 
heard from outside, alerting people to the fact that the church remains active with the presence of 
the saint. My Sri Lankan interlocutors said that the cave marks the spot where Saint George killed 
the dragon, and this is what gives it 'anuhas', or influence or power to grant wishes. For Sri 
Lankans, the church has a mixture of positive and negative energy. Positive for the good works 
that Saint George has performed, but also negative because it is associated with the dragon he 
slayed, and this lends it dangerous, violent potency.IS3 Inside the cave, devotees placed a bowl of 
oil and a small bouquet of jasmine flowers in front of an image of the saint, similar to the lotus 
flowers that might be left as offerings at a Buddhist devale (shrine room) in Sri Lanka. Behind 
this was a basket into which money had been tossed. The cave was also littered with strips of 
white paper, folded or crumpled up, onto which requests had been written. These strips of paper 
are available at the entrance to the church and both Arabs and Sri Lankans used them. Many Sri 
Lankans took off their shoes prior to kneeling before the cave, though Jordanians did not. Not far 
from the cave, an Arab woman was rubbing holy oil on the heads of other worshippers, some of 
whom were Sri Lankan. 
During our visit, I was greeted by one of the church caretakers, who gave me a tour. While doing 
so, he gave me a vial of holy oil, holy salt, a pamphlet about the church, and several strips of 
green cloth, green because Saint George is known as 'al-khidr' ('the green one', in Arabic). The 
green cloth was used in several ways. Sri Lankans tied coins in it and made vows, as in the 
manner described above for the white cloth in Madaba. lIcmawathi had tied a strip to her wrist on 
a previous visit and there it remained, frayed and worn. The caretaker recountcd stories of people 
who had been blessed by the church, including a woman whose diabetes had becn cured, and a 
crippled man who miraculously regained the use of his legs. The caretaker explained that a series 
of new miracles had begun taking place, one of which involved a Sri Lankan woman who had 
given birth to a blind child. According to the caretaker, in January 2008, the woman brought her 
daughter to the church and placed her on a spot on the floor where an imprint from one of Saint 
George's horse's feet is said to be visible. The infant's sight was miraculolLc;ly restored. This 
wondrous story was told by Sri Lankans and Arabs alike. According to Sri Lankans, the Salt 
church was unique in being the only church in Jordan where sorcery could be performed. Like the 
IS) This is similar to the dual nature of gods in Sinhalese Buddhism and Hinduism, in which they can be I 
source of help or destruction. Places like the Seenigrama Devale near Galle in Sri Lanka are soid to have 
both beneficial and perilous potency and can be visited for the purposes of sorcery or protective mogic. 
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Madaba shrine, it may have gained its fame among Sri Lankans from Christian Arab employers. 
But the emphasis on the site's dangerous potency due to its association with Saint George and the 
dragon represents a Sri Lankan interpretation. 
Although not connected with the use of sacred sites in Jordan, another option for the performance 
of magic available to the Sri Lankan diaspora involves transnational commercial networks. 
Medaperadiga, a Sinhala-language magazine popular with Sri Lankans in the Middle East, is 
peppered with advertisements for Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka performing astrological 
interpretations, charms and protective spells. Such charms run the gamut from help with 
addictions (suraava suduwa) and assistance in bad astrological periods (graha apa/a) to female 
and male attraction yantras (stri purusha vashi yantra). One such advertisement, from a Buddhist 
monk in Matara (which is located on the south coast and is an area infamous for the performance 
of sorcery), stated that people living overseas could use DHL to contact him and would receive a 
response with a solution within three days. The advert also mentioned that people of all religions, 
castes and nationalities would be treated equally. Another advertisement linked to a website, on 
which a Buddhist monk in Panadura whom I will call Ananda Thero offered to perform Malayali 
love charms, spells invoking 'evil spirits to make your business or anything successful', charms to 
expedite marriages or enable conception, as well as protection against black magic. During field 
research in Sri Lanka, I visited the Venerable Ananda Thero in the hopes of learning about his 
clientele in the Middle East. Having called in advance to make an appointment, my friend Roshini 
and I travelled to the town of Panadura to meet him. We arrived at his office early one morning 
and sat in a large room alongside 12 clients waiting patiently. While waiting, a woman in tattered 
clothes with three children in tow addressed all of those present and began to tell her story, 
sobbing as she spoke. She had travelled from Hatton, a town in the upcountry district of Nuwara 
Eliya, to see the monk in the hopes of being released from a charm cast by her husband's mistress. 
The charm had caused her business, a kadde (small shop), to fail. Ever since she had been cursed. 
she had been plagued by the smell of cigarettes. Indeed, a smell of smoke seemed to emanate 
from her, provoking mild alarm among those present. Hours later, when it was finally our tum to 
see Ananda Thero, Roshini and I entered his air-conditioned consultation room, depositing on his 
desk a thick stack of betel leaves, the customary gi ft for such occasions. Ananda Thero sat 
perched behind a computer. Stacks of mail and DI IL envelopes were scattered on his desk. lie 
explained that in addition to the Buddhist, Hindu. Muslim and Catholic clients in Sri Lanka who 
visited him, he served Sri Lankan migrants throughout the Middle East, Europe, Canada and 
Australia. He estimated that he received between 100 and 200 requests per month by mllil, three 
quarters of which were from the Middle East. He said that most of his clients were women, adding 
with a chuckle that this was because most problems were caused by men. and women had to deal 
with them. The most popular request he received from the Middle East was from domestic 
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workers wanting hithawath wenawa (friendship charms) for employers. They wantcd to 'win the 
hearts' of their employers so that they would be paid more, trusted, and given more freedom. In 
such instances, clients sent him a photo, the name and in some cases bodily substances and 
personal effects belonging to the intended target. Ananda Thero then prepared the materials, 
enclosing them in a metal capsule. He said he received requests for kodiwina (evil charms) but 
that these were less popular than charms to befriend employers or vashi to attract members of the 
opposite sex. Whereas he repeated a mantra 20 or 30 times for a client in Sri Lanka, he repeated it 
hundreds of times for a client living abroad. This was time-consuming and, hence, required more 
money. While those who came to visit his office could pay as little as 700 Rs ($6) for a charm, 
clients abroad paid a minimum of 12,500 Rs ($114). Given that many domestic workers earn only 
$125 per month, this is not an insignificant sum. The greater the distance the charm had to travel, 
the more mantras he had to repeat to ensure that it would retain its potency en route. Thus, the 
power of the charms was charged up like batteries and gradually wore off in time. IS4 It may seem 
paradoxical for monks meant to eschew material pursuits to profit by making charms. Some Sri 
Lankans, including my friend Roshini, frown upon the practice. But Ananda Thero evidently did 
not feel sheepish about his activities. Further information would be required to draw firm 
conclusions about the popularity of such long-distance charm providers, the kinds of charms 
performed, and their clientele. Ananda Thero's account, and the abundance of advertisements for 
similar services in magazines catering to expatriates, indicates that this is one of several options 
available to Sri Lankans in the Middle East. Given the high cost of such scrvices, however, it is 
one that few domestic workers could afford. 
I have included these sections on the practice of sorcery chiefly to illustrate another way in which 
migrants have appropriated Christian churches as places in which to access divine powers. Like 
Bastin (2003), I do not wish to pathologise the use of magic as symptomatic of social problems 
particular to migration. As I have described, many of these practices are routine throughout Sri 
Lanka. They do not necessarily playa more central role in migrants' lives. But given the limited 
supernatural resources available to migrants, they provide a valuable means by which individuals 
can assume an element ofcontrol over their lives. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how, faced with the curtailment of many of their personal freedoms, 
Sinhala Buddhists in Jordan have 'discovered' alternative rituals and places of worship. Inspired 
by local stories of miracles, many have made Christian churches sacred spaces where divine 
154 This is similar to Busby's description (2006: 87-89) of icons of Mary or the Holy Family in Christian 
households in Kerala; the images were brought into people's homes because they brought wilh them the 
presence of God and warded ofT evil and danger. but their power ran out over time and needed to be 
recharged in ceremonies performed by a priest. 
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powers can be tapped, whether for benign or malevolent purposes. Vow perfonnance is 
particularly important in this context. No involvement on the part of religious officials is required, 
enabling migrants to perform them on their own, undetected, as and when they wish. These rituals 
constitute a crucial means by which women maintain links with kin at home and gain a sense of 
authority in matters over which they otherwise may be unable to act. 
The private and individualised practice of vows is one of the most common reasons Sri Lankans 
patronise churches in Jordan, but it is not the only one. Other migrants find solace in shared 
communal activities, including Catholic Mass and Pentecostal worship. New engagements with 
evangelical groups provide a sense of belonging as well as a source of healing. Moreover, as 
Liebelt (2010) and McKay (2010) point out, such affiliations allow domestic workers to craft 
positive self-images amidst otherwise socially alienating work. They also enable migrants to cope 
with uncertainty, alienation and the difficulties of being separated from loved ones in Sri Lanka. 
One matter that remains elusive is what those domestic workers who are confined to their 
employers' homes do when their ability to display outward signs of religiosity is restricted. But 
for those who have the freedom to leave their workplaces, churches have acquired meaning and 
potency that exceed religious divisions. 
At an analytical level, this chapter makes two points. The first is that ritual activities and church 
attendance have important ideal, as well as pragmatic, functions and should not be viewed in 
narrowly instrumental terms. Communal religious activities provide migrants with a feeling of 
fellowship and belonging. Moreover, through ritual, migrants are able to negotiate social and 
ethical concerns about respectability, shame and insecurity. Vow performance enables those 
separated from loved ones to gain a sense of control over kin-related matters about which they 
may otherwise feel powerless. Although many of the activities described here are motivated by 
immediate concerns arising in the context of migration, they are not reducible to the 'problems' of 
being a migrant. Rather, they relate to wider moral and ethical questions about one's sense of self 
and place in society. This is a view of religion as affective, emotional and therapeutic. In this way, 
the analysis is complementary to other approaches that stress the importance of aesthetics and 
perfonnance in Sri Lankan religiosity (Kapferer 1983, Samuels 2008). 
The second point is that although some of the activities include the adaptive use of Christian sites 
of worship by Buddhists, this is not a case of Buddhism transfonned. Rather, these activities 
should be interpreted as Buddhism by other means, a further instance ofa pluralist approach to the 
divine. The context at hand intersects with other accounts of 'plural worship' in Sri Lanka (Bastin 
2002). Examples include Obeyesekere's (1978) work on the popularity of the Kataragama temple, 
Gombrich and Obeyesekere's (1988) studies of the rise of bhakli (Hindu devotional) religiosity 
among Sinhala Buddhists, Stirrat's (1992) account of Catholic shrines with miraculous efficacy 
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for Catholics and Buddhists alike and Bastin's (2002) work on a Hindu Munnesvaram temple 
where Sinhala Buddhists worship alongside Tamil Saivites. Belonging to one religious tradition 
does not preclude the possibility of seeking divine assistance from entities or sites associated with 
another. This is true for Sri Lankans in Jordan and at home. It is not something peculiar to 
Theravada Buddhism or Sri Lanka, as Mosse (2006) has shown with reference to Catholic 
communities in South India. Although the ritual practices described here represent varied 
influences, the paradoxes that may be implied by the interweaving of diverse elements are not 
conspicuous to most practitioners. Portraying their activities as 'syncretistic' or as a composite of 
different layers would not be accurate because such layers are often 'indistinguishable' to the 
worshippers themselves (Obeyesekere 1963). This is not to say that people do not recognise 
differing traditions. Indeed, the harmonious aspects of religious synthesis do not rule out conflicts, 
contradictions and competition when individuals attempt to impose boundaries. However, for my 
Sri Lankan interlocutors in Jordan, no particular problem is posed by members of one group 
invoking deities or engaging in practices associated with another. They have an implicit belief in 
the existence of a sacred continuum comprised of multiple religions. For them, several faiths 
make up an unbounded field from which they can pick and choose in their search for ways of 
coping with everyday life. This is not an instance of Buddhism capitulating to Christianity. but of 
Buddhism practised by other means in a diasporic setting. 
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Consequences and Contradictions 
It is generalJy assumed that people from 'poor' countries who take up higher-paying employment 
overseas gain from having done so. Much of the social science literature on migration is based on 
the premise - explicit or implied - that labour migrants are 'better ofT' for having gone abroad. 
though few authors elaborate on what 'better ofT' entails (Bartram 2010: 355-358). The 
conventional view has been buoyed by a 'new surge of interest' in migration as a driver of 
economic development in poor countries (Newland 2007). Academic studies and policy 
statements alike emphasise the positive results of migration for migrants and their home countries 
(Castles 2008: 2). More nuanced analyses of the impact of migration take into account the ways it 
is conditioned by the specific circumstances of employment, and the overalJ political and 
economic context. Yet the question of how migrants themselves evaluate the consequences is 
often overlooked. In the case of Sri Lankan labour migration to the Middle East, migrants' views 
are rarely straightforward. It is hoped that migration will lead to improvements in living 
standards, but this outcome is not automatically assumed, and the possibility of tragic 
consequences may even be emphasised. Migration is a gamble, but it has become such an 
entrenched pattern in Sri Lanka that a woman's decision not to migrate could raise questions, 
especially if her family's financial circumstances are poor (Gamburd 2008a: 24). This chapter 
brings migrants' own views into focus by posing the question of how they judge the material, 
social and emotional implications of their sojourns. 
A second line of inquiry that will be taken up relates to the 'temporary' nature ofso-calJed 'return 
migration' to Arab countries. Guest workers are regarded as entering Arab labour markets for 
limited periods before returning to their home countries. As discussed in chapter 5, this 
assumption lies at the heart of the kafala system, which precludes permanent settlement. Yet for 
many migrants, what is intended to be a temporary stay ends up being anything but such. Some 
Sri Lankan women stay in Jordan for dozens of years and may even decide to remain indefinitely. 
The possibility to settle permanently in legal terms is limited to those who marry citizens, yet 
migrants manage to stay on by paying Jordanians to act as their sponsors or residing without 
residence permits. Given the dismal conditions of employment described in chapters 5 and 6, why 
do some migrants choose to remain? And what are the experiences of those who eventually return 
to Sri Lanka after substantial periods abroad? 
To investigate these questions, I draw on the reflections of four women to illustrate, through brief 
sketches, the contradictions experienced by many migrants during and after their sojourns. Only 
172 
one of the four is Buddhist, the others are Christian. They do not reflect the demographic makeup 
of the majority of Sri Lankan women who migrate to the Middle East. While there are no reliable 
statistics, Christians appear to be in the minority, as they are throughout Sri Lanka as a whole. I 
met two of the women described in this chapter at Catholic church services in Amman, this being 
one of the only places we could meet and socialise regularly. I have selected their stories not only 
because these are some of the women I know best, and as a result they confided to me about their 
lives and difficulties, but also because they represent a range of attitudes in relation to the 
consequences of migration and what it means to go 'home'. 
Lucy 
Lucy and I met soon after I arrived in Jordan in August 2006, and over the course of my first year 
of research she gave me weekly Sinhala lessons. Lucy worked for a group of British expatriates, 
cleaning their office and preparing South Asian meals for a monthly salary of 150 JD ($212). 
Several days a week, she worked in a foster home for abandoned children. She also supplemented 
her income by giving private Sinhala lessons to a small group of children with Sri Lankan 
mothers and Arab or South Asian fathers. Those with Jordanian fathers had Jordanian citizenship 
and could attend Arabic-language, government schools, and apart from interactions with their 
mothers, this was their only opportunity to learn Sinhala. Lucy had been living in Jordan for 
twelve years, during half of which she had been without a valid residence permit. As a result, she 
owed more than 3,000 JDs ($4,231) in overstay fines. Not having a visa also meant that she ran 
the risk of being questioned by the police and held in detention, and that she had been unable to 
leave Jordan to visit her family in Sri Lanka. She longed to see her sons, Christopher and 
Malcolm. Christopher had come to Jordan briefly on a tourist visa but had himself been detained 
and sent back to Sri Lanka because he did not have a residence permit. Lucy spoke with or sent 
text messages to her sons nearly every day and sporadically sent them small amounts of money 
and gifts. When I planned a visit to Sri Lanka and told Lucy I would be willing to bring her sons a 
small parcel, she gave me three large shopping bags full of items, including mobile phones nnd 
other gadgets, watches, belts, clothing and candies. These were tokens of her love, ways she 
continued to act as mother to her sons despite her lengthy absence. 
At the age of 54, Lucy suffered from high blood pressure and arthritis and had experienced 
several bouts of illness during which time she had been unable to work. She earned more than 
many other Sri Lankan domestic workers in Amman but had no savings and was burdened with 
debt acquired during her illness. When unable to work, she had struggled to pay the 40 JDs ($56) 
she owed in rent for the small room she and her daughter Rose shared near the Second Circle, a 
neighbourhood in western Amman. When her health deteriorated further, a non-governmental 
organisation that assists migrants began negotiations with the Jordanian government to waive her 
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fines so that she could return home. In light of her condition, an agreement was eventually 
reached to allow Lucy and Rose, along with several other women in poor health, to go back to Sri 
Lanka. Several weeks previously, Lucy had told me her life had been 'ruined' by coming to 
Jordan; she believed she would be in a better position had she had stayed in Sri Lanka. She often 
expressed the idea that the time she'd spent working as a domestic worker had been wasted. Upon 
struggling to recall a name during a conversation, she said, 'My dear, this is what life in Jordan 
does to us [Sri Lankans]. We are cleaning and doing hard work all the time and don't get to use 
our minds. So our memories just go. My mind isn't like it used to be.' On another occasion, she 
said Sri Lankan women in Jordan didn't get to make full use of their own talents and skills while 
engaged in tedious work for others. The sense of wasted time or of not being in control of one's 
own time was expressed by other domestic workers but seemed particularly acute for Lucy, who 
had come from a relatively well-off family and had expected more from life. She often referred to 
her life as a series of missed chances and unfulfilled dreams. Although she had never been 
enchanted by Amman, once the prospect of departure was looming, she felt ambivalent about 
leaving. She looked forward to being reunited with her sons but was heartbroken that she would 
be returning without savings. 
Lucy grew up in the hill country south of Kandy where her father worked as a tea plantation 
manager. Her family had been relatively comfortable, and Lucy had excelled in school and 
completed her A-Levels. She fell in love with her cousin (FZS), but her father refused to let them 
marry. Although they were cross-cousins (neana-massinci) and might have been considered a 
perfect match, the parish priest frowned upon marriage between cousins, and Lucy's father, who 
was a devout Catholic, forbade the union. ISS The couple eloped and went to live with the groom's 
family (who evidently had not opposed the union) until they could afford a small, one-room home 
of their own. Lucy's husband was killed in a motorcycle accident some years later, and Lucy was 
forced to sell her saris, jewellery and other items to support herself and their three children. She 
worked as a private tutor, turning her home into a makeshift school and giving lessons to children 
in her neighbourhood. Inspired by the mother of one of her students, she eventually decided to 
seek work abroad. At the age of 42, she entrusted her mother and sister with caring for her 
children and left for Jordan. 
ISS S' h 
In alese kinship is related to the Dravidian type of South India. The offspring of ego's mother's brother 
and father's sister are considered 'cross-cousins' whereas that of the mother's sister and father's brother nrc 
'parallel . ~ousins', or classificatory siblings. Marriage between cross-cousins has been and in some 
c?mmumtles remains the 'ideal' (Leach 1961, Tambiah 1965 and Yalman 1967). There is, however, some 
dIspute as to whether cross-cousin marriage was prescribed, preferred or merely a seldom-attained ideal. ~each wrote that despite the formal rule, its actual incidence was rare in Pul Eliya, a Sinhala Buddhist town ~n the dry Zone of Kandyan hill country. (1961: 88). Marrying a close relative in a nearby locality was more 
Important. Leach also wrote that in practice, marriages may occur between classificatory siblings (1961: 1~8). Yalman writes that for the inhabitants of Terutenne, a Sinhala Buddhist village in the Kandyan 
hIghlands, cross-cousin marriage is 'strictly prescribed' (1967: 210). 
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Lucy initially worked as a live-in domestic worker, an arrangement she preferred because it 
enabled her to save her earnings. After just a year, Rose came to Jordan when it was decided 
Lucy's mother could no longer look after her. Rose, then seventeen years old, was mentally 
unwell and could not be left alone for long periods. Lucy's employer did not want both of them in 
her home, so the two sought other employment. For most of the eleven years they spent together 
in Jordan they lived in their own rented accommodation. They were cheated several times by 
people promising to act as their sponsors but failing to provide residence permits, and eventually 
they gave up and lived without visas. 
As the date of her departure for Sri Lanka approached, Lucy became increasingly anxious. One 
evening I visited her home as she was packing her belongings. 'My heart is in pieces. I cry all the 
time,' she told me. She felt conflicted - tired of feeling trapped in Jordan but saddened at the 
thOUght of leaving and uncertain of her future. Despite the financial problems she encountered in 
Amman, as long as she had been in good health she had been able to find work. Prospects were 
much more insecure in Sri Lanka. A main concern for many migrants in relation to going back is 
the fear of not being able to generate income. For Lucy, leaving Amman also meant bidding 
goodbye to many friends. She had been an active member of the Sri Lankan Christian and 
Buddhist Association and was well-known amongst the loose-knit network of migrants. The day 
before she left Amman in May 2007, I accompanied her to the market, where we bought several 
kilos of oranges and apples to take to Sri Lanka. Are oranges difficult to find in Sri Lanka? I 
asked. They are less expensive in Jordan, she explained. More importantly, people would expect 
her to have become wealthy during her tenure abroad. 'At least this way I will have something to 
give them. I won't come empty-handed,' she said. Migrants are expected to return laden with gifts 
and gold jewellery, an index of the success of their sojourns. Lucy felt ashamed not to have 
accumulated more savings. She had been able to send some money to her sons but aside from this 
had little to show for her time away. 
In November 2007, Lucy and I met in Sri Lanka. Her health problems had continued, and she had 
been unsuccessful in her attempts to find a job as a care worker or private tutor. She also had new 
worries. The plot of land and small home she had left behind in Kandy District had been 
neglected while she was in Jordan. The villagers said they never expected her to return, and her 
neighbour had begun encroaching on her land, laying claim to more than a quarter aere by 
planting fruit trees. 'Why didn't you ask a relative to look after it for you?' I asked. 'That would 
have been worse than giving it to a stranger. Then I'd never get it back!' Lucy laughed. The 
villagers and the local Grama Sevaka refused to involve themselves in the dispute. Lucy had the 
deed to the land but lacked the money to initiate what she assumed would be lengthy legal 
proceedings against the neighbour. When I spoke to her again several weeks later, her son had 
been hospitalised following a fight with the neighbour's son, and Lucy hoped the police might 
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finally take action on her behalf. Lucy's reflections about her decision to migrate shifted at 
various points during the time we spent together in Jordan and may have changed again since we 
last spoke in 2008. The fact remains that despite a dozen years abroad, she returned to a financial 
situation that had changed little. By her own assessment, her economic aspirations had not been 
met. 
Jayanthi 
At the age of 55 when I met her, Jayanthi had spent the better part of her adult life· more than 
two decades - working in Arab countries. From a family of eleven children in Jacla, a suburb 
north of Colombo, she married at the age of 16 and had four children. Her husband's salary as a 
bus conductor did not allow the young couple to build their own home, and at times Jayanthi 
resorted to working as a manual labourer to support them. In 1985, with the help of a sister who 
had migrated previously, Jayanthi travelled to Jordan with the goal of earning enough money to 
build a house. She worked for a French family and sent remittances to her husband every few 
months. At the end of her first four years in Amman, Jayanthi returned to Sri Lanka to discover 
that her husband had squandered her earnings by gambling. She had been suspicious about how 
he might use the money but was indignant upon learning the extent of the problem. The house she 
had intended to build was only partially constructed and was infested with weeds. 'lie had no 
money left. None. My daughters had no gold earrings in their ears • the holes had even closed up! 
He owed money to so many shops. I was so fed up, absolutely fed up. I was through with married 
life,' Jayanthi said bitterly. This time she left her children with her mother and returned to Jordan. 
Months after arriving in Amman, she received word that her husband had been killed during a 
JVP uprising. IS6 In haste, she returned to Sri Lanka, where she learned about yet more debts that 
her husband had incurred and for which his creditors now held her responsible. Jayanthi's 
husband had been the local JVP treasurer and gambled with party money, using Jayanthi's 
remittances to cover his debts. 'He wasted every last bit. That's why I have no house. I could only 
send my children to school. I paid for them to be educated. I'm glad for that, that I did that for 
them. But I couldn't do more after that, and they've never done anything for me. I don't ask them 
for anything, and they don't ask me for anything.' Sending money home is an act of faith. Stories 
about husbands spending their wives' earnings on alcohol, gambling or other women are 
frequently told. Research on husbands who are 'left behind' suggests this behaviour is common in 
contexts in which men are expected but unable to live up to the idealised role of breadwinner 
(Gamburd 2000, Oishi 2005: 136-7). Aware of the risks, some women send only a portion ofthcir 
earnings home or remit money to female kin, though even this does not guarantee that their 
The IVP, or lanatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front), is a populist Sinhalese political 
p~. Te.ns of thousands were killed in JVP uprisings in 1971 and in 1987·9. On the political violence 
dunng thiS period, see Wickramasinghe (2006: Chapter 6). 
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savings will remain intact; I encountered several stories about women whose remittances were 
misused by their mothers or sisters. 
Saddled with debt, Jayanthi went abroad again, this time to Kuwait. Months after her arrival in 
1990, Iraq invaded and she was forced to flee. She spent two years working as a nanny in Dubai 
before returning to Jordan, where she has remained since 1992. Jayanthi now works on a freelance 
basis for six expatriate families, cleaning their homes, and caring for children and pets. I Ier tics to 
her own children have diminished over the years. She seldom mentions them in conversation and 
has no specific plans to return to Sri Lanka. 'What is there for me to go back to?' she said on one 
occasion when asked about her plans. When she does return for short visits, she stays with sisters 
rather than her children. Over time Jayanthi's focus shifted from Sri Lanka-centered projects to 
enjoying life in Jordan. Her home is an indication of this. She lives with a new husband, a Punjabi 
tiler who has been working in Jordan for 24 years. Together they rent a small, ground-floor flat in 
Jebel Akhdar, a low-income neighbourhood in eastern Amman. The owner of the building is 
Jayanthi's kafil. She and her husband have decorated their home with great care, which is telling 
of their settled existence. Two noisy parakeets in a pink cage greet guests as they enter through 
the front door. An eclectic mix of Bollywood posters, Indian magazine cut-outs and depictions of 
Hindu deities adorn the walls. In the living room, a large television with digital reception provides 
access to Sinhala and Punjabi channels. Jayanthi's settled existence in Amman has not meant a 
complete severing of ties to her family. Four of her nine sisters have worked in Jordan at some 
point, and two remain. One is married to a Sri Lankan man and has an eleven-year-old daughter 
who was born in Jordan. The other is married to a man from Pakistan and lives across the street 
from Jayanthi. 
Jayanthi's story echoes those of other 'freelance' domestic workers who have been in Jordan for 
long stretches. Many stay longer than initially planned. While none of those I know said they 
imagined staying in Jordan until they died, many had no imminent plans to return. In such cases, 
connections to kin in Sri Lanka may weaken over time. But the expectation that Sri Lankan 
mothers should maintain close relations with their children does not just evaporate. This may 
partially explain Jayanthi's impulse to blame her former husband for the fact that she has no home 
in Sri Lanka, and hence no reason to return. This glosses over other complicating factors relnting 
to the life she now shares with her new husband in Amman. Jayanthi's relations with her family in 
Sri Lanka appear to resonate with performative models of kinship as a process to be developed 
and negotiated through close contact (e.g. Carsten 1997, 2004). Years of separation put her 
relationship with her children at risk. But long-term physical separation does not invariably erode 
familial bonds, as is suggested by Lucy's relationship with her two sons despite hcr twelve-ycar 
absence. One important difference is that Lucy's children were over the age of 10 when she first 
migrated in comparison to Jayanthi's children, the youngest of whom was a toddler. Other 
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accounts of long-distance mothering suggest that women redefine their roles, demonstrating 
'motherhood' by providing for their family's material well-being even if they cannot provide 
nurturing in close proximity (Asis et al 2004, Gamburd 2000: Chapter 8, Hondagneu-Sotelo and 
Avila 1997, Parreiias 2005a). The contrast between Lucy's case and Jayanthi's reminds us of the 
flexibility of kinship and how it may be redefined rather than simply deteriorate when family 
members are separated for long periods. 
Theresa 
Like Lucy and layanthi, Theresa spent more time abroad than initially intended, first for four 
years in Lebanon and later 14 years in Singapore. Although she never worked in lordan, I have 
included her story because her experiences in Lebanon were not substantially different; salaries 
and working conditions in the two countries are similar. Theresa's story also illustrates a wider 
point about migrant trajectories. An initial period of work in the Middle East can serve as a 
stepping stone to employment in more desirable destinations in Southeast Asia, Europe or North 
America. As Liebelt writes of Filipina domestic workers in Israel, in contrast to binary models of 
migration suggesting that migrants move 'back and forth' between sending and receiving 
countries, many move 'on and on' through a hierarchy of destinations (Liebelt 2008b: 568). 
Countries are typically ranked according to differences in salaries and benefits, the financial costs 
associated with migrating, and their subjective and imaginative attractiveness (ibic/). Amongst Sri 
Lankan migrants, Jordan, Lebanon and other Arab countries occupy spaces at the lower end of the 
hierarchy, below Southeast Asian, European and North American destinations, where one can 
eam higher wages. 
Theresa and I met in Sri Lanka in January 2008, and during the course of a series of over-night 
visits to her home we did several recorded interviews about her life. When narrating the story of 
how she decided to go to the Middle East, Theresa began with her childhood. 'When my mother 
and father married, my father was in the Royal Navy. He was well paid ... But then the British 
were sent away, and my father [began working] for the Sri Lankan Navy. When my mother was 
pregnant with me, my father lost his job. My mother thought I was bad luck for the family.' 
Theresa pointed to this as the reason she was sent to be her grandmother's servant while she was 
sti11 a young girl. When she was a teenager, her grandmother passed away, and she was sent to 
live in a convent, where she looked after elderly nuns. One day the convent was visited by a man 
working for a recruitment agency who was hiring women to work in the Middle East. 'lie made it 
sound like a dream. He said we would only work for 8 hours a day. We would have one day ofT 
each week, and we would earn good money.' Theresa said the opportunity to see a new place 
initially attracted her, but like many migrants, she rationalised her decision in terms ofdevotion to 
her family: by going to Lebanon she would eam money for her younger siblings' education. In 
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1979 at the age of 18, Theresa travelled to Lebanon as part of a group of 20 women. She 
remembers the first days in vivid detail. She and the other women were brought to a recruitment 
agency, where they waited to be chosen by employers. 'The office was on the seventh floor. There 
was an elevator, but they wouldn't let us use it. We were so tired carrying our bags up those stairs 
after the long flight. This was the first taste of the hard work we would have to do.' She was 
brought to the home of a Lebanese family, where she was paid a monthly salary of $150 in 
addition to an occasional cash bonus, the bulk of which she sent to support her siblings. llcr 
employers owned four houses, including a summer home in the mountains and a large flat in 
Beirut. 'Cleaning was easy in the main home because there were vacuum cleaners and washing 
machines. But in the summer home, I had to carry buckets of water from a stream up four flights 
of stairs. They had all-night parties on the weekends, and I barely had time to rest. But I never 
grumbled. I just worked.' 
After four years in Lebanon, Theresa returned to Sri Lanka for what was meant to be a three­
month visit. Her mother had been ill and died soon after her arrival, leaving Theresa responsible 
for looking after her thirteen-year-old sister and eight-year-old brother. She worked as a cashier in 
a grocery store, earning 3,000 Rs per month ($27), a fraction of her pay in Lebanon. She resolved 
to go abroad again when her siblings were older. Several years later a relative arranged for her to 
work for a Chinese family in Singapore. Comparing them to her previous employers, she said: 
'They treated me like a family member. We all ate around the same table. It wasn't like Lebanon. 
There, every woman is a madame. In Singapore, I called [my employers] "uncle" and "auntie", 
not "sir" or "madam". In Lebanon, they told me never to eat with my hands, but in Singapore they 
also eat this way, and the food was more to my taste.' She emphasised the fact that her life in 
Singapore was not necessarily easier, however. 'When I came to Singapore, I was already trained. 
I knew how to do everything .... But the Chinese do not like to praise you. They think if they 
praise you, you will not learn to do things better. So they never say you've done a good job. 
Whatever you do, they say you could have done better ... Their way of saying I'd done a good job 
was to ask me to do it again.' Theresa said the key to her success had been her deternlination to 
work hard without complaining. 'Whatever job they gave me I did. I didn't say,t am a maid, not a 
cook. Or I'm a maid, I'm not here to look after granny. Whatever they wanted, I did. I earned 
more money that way.' Theresa worked in Singapore for 14 years, initially earning a salary of 180 
san ($140) that was eventually raised to 520 san ($405). Cognisant of the fact that by law she 
could not continue working in Singapore past the age of 60, and having saved more than $20,000, 
Theresa decided to return to Sri Lanka. 
She stayed with her sister and brother-in-law until his frequent requests for money prompted hl.'f 
to move to a house of her own. She chose a small plot of land and newly-built two-bedroom house 
an hour's drive away in a housing development near the town of Seeduwa, on the western coast of 
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Gampaha District. Hers is one of fifty houses built in neat rows in the planned community which 
Theresa refers to as 'the settlement'. Like Theresa, most of the inhabitants come from other parts 
of the island and have moved within commuting distance of Colombo. Buying a home there 
enabled Theresa to make a fresh start. Like many migrant domestic workers, she did not want to 
discuss the details of her life abroad when she returned. She had no interest in telling people of 
her hardships, nor did she want to be identified as a domestic worker. To avoid stigma, Theresa 
tells people she was a secretary in a legal office in Singapore. Theresa serves as the treasurer of 
the settlement's welfare society, a position she believes she would not have obtained if they knew 
her previous job. IS7 
Theresa's house is noteworthy because it differs dramatically from the homes of other people 
from her socio-economic background in Sri Lanka. During my first visit, she gave me a tour in 
which she proudly indicated items imported from Singapore. The front parlour has a large couch, 
an exercise machine, and a coffee table on which sits a stack of Good Housekeeping magazines. 
On the walls hang dozens offramed needlepoint tapestries featuring idyllic American or European 
pastoral scenes. In the living room, a collection of photographs in silver frames show Theresa at 
various stages in her life. Aside from a few photos of her Chinese employers in Singapore, most 
of the images depict Theresa alone. The water pressure in the bathroom is low, Theresa explained, 
so only a trickle of water comes out of the faucet. She considered fixing it until she discovered it 
offered an advantage: with only a trickle of water, guests are less apt to splash water on the 
bathroom floor, making it dirty. This is one of dozens of strategies with which Theresa ensures 
that her house stays in pristine condition. Her countertops are lined with new appliances, 
including food processors, Pyrex casserole dishes, a water filtration system and microwave, all of 
which are spotless. Theresa's home is striking not only because it is so well-appointed but 
because it shows how fastidious she is about cleanliness. Its sparkling, white tiled floors are swept 
and polished each morning. Like all guests, I was encouraged to rinse my feet upon entering her 
home - Theresa dislikes visiting houses in which the floors are not clean. She has acquired habits 
while living abroad which set her apart from her siblings, whom she seldom visits. 
Theresa's story iJlustrates several points. Unlike Lucy and Jayanthi, she lived with her employers 
throughout her entire career abroad. On the basis of her long-standing relationship with them, she 
was able to negotiate pay increases and accumulate savings that substantially altered her financial 
situation. The fact that she worked in Singapore, where wages are higher, also made a difference. 
Jayanthi was able to purchase and furnish her own home, and five years after returning to Sri 
IS7 Th . . 
. e socIety acts as a communal collective. Members pay dues each month, and the money IS then used 
for Improvements in infrastructure or maintenance work, for example cleaning the well or purchasing a new 
water pump. 
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Lanka still had savings off of which to live. Her financial gains have come at a cost, however. To 
save money for her own use, she spumed requests from relatives. 
When you come back, everyone is asking for money. They think you are rich and must help them. 
But they never ask how you spent your life there, how hard it was. I was in Lebanon, and they knew 
there was a war. They never asked what it was like, whether I was scared. We are also shy to tell 
people about our problems ... Only when we get together with others who have also been outside Sri 
Lanka do we share. 
In many cases, unless there is a radical break from the family, requests for money and assistance 
from migrants' relatives continue, and those who deny them may be regarded as selfish. Migrants 
can also feel a sense of estrangement during their sojourns and upon their homecoming, and in 
Theresa's case this has led to social isolation. Though she initially defined her decision to migrate 
in terms of her responsibilities to her siblings, she has since grown distant from them. She values 
her own independence over companionship, a disposition she attributes both to her years abroad 
as well as her upbringing. When asked how she thought she differed from women who had not 
gone abroad, she replied: 
Some women are like roses. They have thoms, but you can still pluck them. I am like a cactus. There 
is a beautiful flower there, but no one can reach it. I cannot be united with other people. If I had 
grown up with my family from a small age, and if I had never been outside of Sri Lanka. I could 
never live the way I do now. 
Not long after returning from Singapore, Theresa briefly considered a marriage proposal from a 
lecturer from Anuradhapura who was a widower and had three children. When he requested a 
dowry of 1 Lakh rupees, or nearly $1,000, she refused. 'I don't want to have to beg money from a 
husband... In Sri Lanka, women give everything to men when they get married and then they 
have to ask him when they need something. 1 didn't want this. 1 have worked all my life. Now I 
want to enjoy it.' 
Theresa's status as a single woman is at least partially a legacy of the years she spent abroad. 
Although she is perhaps more socially isolated than most, she was not the only migrant I met who 
had decided not to marry. Some women who do marry upon returning to Sri Lanka find that they 
cannot have their own children. Shanika, first introduced in chapter 2, worked in Jordan for 13 
years and used her earnings to construct a house which is now one of the bcst-equipped and 
spacious in her village and is one of only a handful with electricity. By her own account, 
migration had mostly positive results, but she says she paid a price: having spent most of her 
childbearing years abroad, when she returned she discovered she could not bear children. While 
many women migrate after having had children, it is possible that women's out-migration has 
played a role in decreasing Sri Lanka's overall birth rate. As Theresa's and Shanika's stories 
suggest, taking advantage of economic opportunities can require making trade-offs in terms of 
family, marital or parent-child relations. 
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Diviya 
It is just after mid-day, and Diviya is preparing a lunch of dhal, rice, leeks and jackfruit curry. She 
cooks on an outdoor fireplace at the back of the house, and as we chat smoke and ashes come 
streaming into the bedroom. She lives with her daughter and husband in a small, two-room wood­
panelled shack in a town near Galle on the southern coast. Rusted metal sheets have been cobbled 
together to form the roof. Next to the entrance, a cracked fragment of mirror hangs from a nail 
next to a window that is missing its glass panels. The front room is crowded with worn, blue 
plastic chairs and a rusty metal container used as a table and study space for Diviya's seven-year­
old daughter. In the bedroom is a refrigerator imported from Jordan which no longer works and 
now acts as a storage space for clothing. Next to it is a large television, another import from 
Jordan that is broken. 
Diviya and I were first introduced by Malini, in whose home I lived during the course of field 
research in Sri Lanka and who had become friends with Diviya in Jordan. Malini had lived in her 
employers' home, and Diviya, who lived in her own rented flat, would come to visit on the 
weekends. Malini and Diviya had not seen each other for several years, and one day in March 
2008 I accompanied Malini on her first trip to Diviya's home in a small seaside town near Galle 
on the southern coast. When we arrived, Malini was shocked by the dishevelled and run-down 
state of the house. Diviya's circumstances were considerably worse than Malini had imagined, 
and she wanted to know how this had come about. 
Diviya speaks in mostly positive terms about her experiences in Jordan. With assistance from her 
punchi amma (father'S brother's wife), Diviya trvaelled to Amman at the age of 25. She was 
married at the time but had no children. She initially lived with her employers in Jordan but left 
after one year because she could not cope with the burden of looking after their five young 
children. Diviya went to live with her aunt and worked on a freelance basis in private homes and 
as a cleaner in the South African embassy before being hired by a recruitment agency. She ach..'<1 
as a liaison between Sri Lankan domestic workers and agency staff, collecting new arrivals at the 
airport, explaining the conditions of employment, and acting as a translator. Out of every 10 
women the agency placed in employment, Diviya estimated that at least three returned to the 
agency complaining of abuse or other problems. It was hard to know whether they were telling the 
truth or lying because they did not want to work, she said. She earned a monthly salary of $150 
and was given a bonus when agency profits were high. With no bank account of her own, she 
invested her earnings in home appliances and gold jewellery. She occasionally sent money to her 
husband and spent the rest on her own living expenses. When Diviya received word that her 
mother had become ill, she returned to Sri Lanka for what she expected would be a three-month 
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visit. She became pregnant during this time and subsequently felt she had no choice but to remain 
in Sri Lanka. 
While she was in Jordan, Diviya's husband began consuming large amounts of alcohol. He had 
resented her absence, felt lonely and began spending time with friends who drank. Soon he began 
indulging in even larger quantities of alcohol. While she alluded to the fact that their marital 
troubles had started before she left, their relationship deteriorated further while she was away, and 
his drinking had become a source of constant quarrelling. According to Diviya, he wastes what 
little money they have on booze and is unable to hold down a job. Diviya blames the alcohol for 
their problems but also points to the fact that her absence precipitated his heavy drinking. 'Ninety 
percent of families have problems if the husband or wife goes away to work. Going to the Middle 
East is better for unmarried ladies. Married people should go together or not at all.' She said her 
story should be a warning to other women about the risks migration could pose to families. 
Diviya now works for an Italian NGO that provides psycho-social counselling to children and 
earns barely enough to cover their daily expenses. Bit by bit, she has sold all the gold she bought 
in Jordan. At one point during our visit, Malini asked why Diviya's mobile phone was turned off 
at night. Diviya explained that her husband is jealous of her job and suspects her of having a 
boyfriend. If the phone rings at night and he hears it while under the influence of alcohol, he will 
smash it to pieces. Divorce is not an option, and though Diviya would like to migrate again, her 
mother passed away and there is no one on whom she can rely to look after her daughter. Our visit 
ended on a sombre note. After we left, Malini expressed dismay at how sad Diviya seemed in 
comparison to the light-hearted woman she'd known in Jordan. 
Heavy alcohol use among men is frequently blamed on wives' absence while working abroad. But 
as we saw in chapter 2, alcoholism and marital conflict often precede migration and may be one 
of the reasons women migrate in the first place. Other accounts have suggested a similar pattern. 
As Gamburd writes, 'in cases where a husband drinks heavily, in most instances he drank before 
his wife went abroad, and continues to do so after her return' (2008b: liS). In this instance, 
Diviya herself alludes to migratory separation as the trigger, although she rcft.>tTCd to the fuct that 
they had had problems before she left. How her husband viewed matters I cannot say, but their 
situation can be interpreted as part of a wider pattern. Alcohol use is a potent symbol of 
masculinity in Sri Lanka, and because it provides temporary physical and emotional relief, men 
may be more apt to drink during difficult periods (Gamburd 2008b: 110). In their search for self­
esteem and supportive social networks, many turn to the bottle, and their reasons for doing so may 
be heightened if their wives are abroad earning money that they cannot (Gamburd 2008b: Chapter 
5). 
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Analysis 
In presenting these four sketches, attention has been paid to the economic and social aspects of 
migration in order to reflect the emphasis women themselves place on these dimensions. Migrant 
narratives overwhelmingly centre on issues relating to the material well-being, and it is primarily 
on this basis that the success or failure oftime abroad is judged. ISS But as each of the four stories 
also reveals, social issues, including potential disruption to familial and marital relationships, may 
be of equal if not greater concern in the aftennath of time spent abroad. 
What do these stories indicate about the financial consequences of migration? For some migrants, 
income earned abroad can improve their families' circumstances, enabling better housing 
structures, greater access to education, or simply additional support for daily living expenses. But 
not all remittances are directed towards family projects. Jayanthi and especially Theresa provide 
examples in which working abroad has afforded women their own economic and personal 
independence. Moreover, working abroad does not guarantee financial security. Lucy and Diviya 
returned to financial circumstances little different from those they had left. Domestic workers who 
reside independently of their employers have greater freedom and flexibility in employment but 
may also have a harder time saving their earnings. Even when migrants are able to budget 
carefully and save large sums, remittances may not be used in the ways intended. Lucy and 
Jayanthi's experiences in this regard are specific but not unusual. They reflect the fact that a 
migrant's sacrifices may not yield the anticipated results. In a context in which migrant women 
are stereotyped as greedy and selfish for leaving their families, returning without having made a 
significant contribution the family's financial well-being can be a source of shame. Leaving home 
may not be as hard as coming back empty-handed, and so those who have been unable to save 
significant sums may be reluctant to return. According to one study, after working abroad for five 
or more years, only 54 percent of Filipinas and 67 percent of Sri Lankans said they fdt they hud 
saved enough (Oishi 2005: 139). These figures dropped to 23 percent and 18 percent respectively 
among those abroad for four years or less (ibid}. The length of time one stays abroad tenus to 
increase the ability to save large amounts, but it may also reduce migrants' desires to lwml to 
return as they adjust and build new relationships abroad. An example of this is 60·year-old 
Malkanthi, who arrived in Jordan in 1981 at the age of 34 and has remained ever since. She 
initially migrated with the goal of purchasing land and building a house. Gradually over the 
course of26 years, she has accomplished this goal, and her house is nearly complete. She plllnsto 
return to Sri Lanka eventually but for now is content to stay put in Amman, where several of hl-'f 
family members also live. Four of Malkanthi's seven sisters and one of her sister'S daughters 
worked in Jordan for periods ranging from three to twenty years. ller eldest daughter arrived 
us I "1 
n a simi ar vein, Constable (1999: 205) describes Filipina domestic workers who stress economic 
elements over and above other more complex factors relating to their decisions to migrate Bnd to remllin. 
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seven years ago and married another Sri Lankan migrant, and the couple now have a two-year old 
daughter. Malkanthi's son-in-Iaw's mother and several other relatives are also in Jordan. 
Figure 18: Friends enjoy a picnic lunch atop Mount Nebo 
Migrants' narratives about their experiences abroad tend to change depending on whether they are 
still overseas or in Sri Lanka. Many of those who have returned concentrate on the economic 
benefits achieved by migrating rather than the hard work they did overseas, which is a point of 
emphasis among those still in Jordan. Women's day-to-day experiences working in the Middle 
East are seldom discussed with people at home in Sri Lanka. Working undt."I' someone else, doing 
other people's work (wena keneku yatathe weda kirima) or 'low work' (pcJIlIllh ",f'lia) can be 
considered demeaning. Also, because there is some stigma against women who have worked in 
the Middle East, migrants avoid talking about the problems they encountert.'<l ahrolld bt.'CIIUSC 
doing so may reinforce the idea that they should not have left home in the first plnce. 
An element which emerges clearly in migrants' accounts while they are ahroud rclutes to the 
emotional hardships of being separated from loved ones. The mugnzine McliIJ/)('rolligl', which 
caters to Sri Lankans employed in the Middle East, includes a section culled '!digas Arallll' 
(Palm tree Grove) featuring poems submitted by expatriates. The following examples nre English 
translations from the March 2008 issue. I$9 
Sal/III In 
Ralak walina pUlhek ekka 
159 :h.e English translations convey the general content of the poems but do not provide eont~)\t fur .11 of 
the Idiomatic expressions. The order and verb tense has been changed to clilrify m~nning in Enlliish. I 1m 
grateful to Jagath Perera for helping with the trnnslntion. 
IRS 
Thidenek doowaru heduwa 
Hetak unta hadala denna 
Boho Weeriya deruwa 
Reyak dawalak nomethiwa 
Un gena mama sithuwa 
Kalak guya thenadi 
Un loku than wala wisuwa 
Mathak wana witadi 
Mage nethu aga 
Sathutu kandalu reduna 
Happiness 
I raised three daughters and a son for the country 
I made many efforts 
To provide them with a bright future 
I have thought about them day and night 
With the passage of time 
They are living in better positionsl60 
Tears of happiness come to my eyes 
When I think of it 
By Seeta Ranjani, Jordan, from Watinapaha 
Thanikama 
Ada thaniwela sahara we ma dukakse 
Kal gewanawa wedapala 
Karamin dawase 
Dewasara gewa yannata 
Mawbima wetha situse 
Dina sathi ganinawa ma hema dawase 
Loneliness 
Today I am living alone with pain in the Middle East l61 
Spending time doing work 
Counting days and weeks 
To go back to my motherland 
After two years 
By Rohini Gunasekera, Kuwait, from Minneriya 
The concept of loneliness (thanikama) invoked in the sccond pocm has mnny dilTerent senses hut 
among migrants is most often defined in tcnns of separation from kin. Mnny of my discussions 
with women in Amman led to tears whcn convcrsation tumcd to thc issue of their fllmilics, 
particularly children. More than once I stoppcd an intcrvicw whcn 8 wOlllun hcCUIllC too upset to 
continue, and over time I grew hcsitant to broach the subjt.'Ct if I kncw a womlln hud arrived in 
Jordan recently or had young childrcn. Migration oftcn entails severe emotionlll strain, and this 
may make the experience of being abroad unbearable. The amount of money a womnn cnm!! and 
the conditions of employment are important factors. Those whose employers do not allow them 
160 A more literal translation of'loku than wala' would be 'big positions', conveying a sense ofallluence 
and prestige. 
161 Th I't I I I I 
. e I era translation of the word referring to the 'Middle East is 'Suhura', n eomnllln rur uncc, IIC 
region may be referred to as durukanthara (faraway desert) or welikantlUlrci. (sandy desert), both of which 
convey a sense of barrenness. 
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time off, who are not pennitted to own mobile phones or who cannot afford to can home regularly 
may have only sporadic communication with their families, a pattern which has also emergl.'Ci 
amongst Filipina domestic workers (Parrefias 2005b: 329). This may heighten their sense of 
isolation and damage their relationships with kin at home. 
A language of sacrifice is central to the way many women conceptualise their experiences as 
migrants. The ideal migrant is one who remains firmly committed to her family and focused on 
her goals, does not spend money frivolously, sends all of her earnings home, and remains celibate 
during her time abroad. Many of the sermons given by the Sri Lankan priest, Father Gabriel, 
during Sinhala-Ianguage masses on Friday centred on the theme of fiscal prudence and filial piety 
and emphasised women's responsibilities to their families. Similarly, during a Wesak ceremony at 
the Sri Lankan embassy in May 2007, a visiting monk led a group of migrants in prayer before 
giving a speech in which he urged them to focus on why they had come to Jordan and the 
importance of achieving their goals. Migrants' evaluations of the successes and failures of other 
migrants affirm this discourse. Veteran migrants' advice to newcomers often includes lessons on 
how to prove one's self to an employer, how to show that you are 'good' by avoiding needless 
trips outside of the house, and the importance of saving. Young women are told to 'remember 
why you came' or 'remember your goal'. Migrants who have spent substantial periods of time in 
Jordan also warn newcomers about the dangers of running away from their employers and living 
alone. In their view, many of the rules employers impose help young women to avoid running 
amuck. Those who run away from their employers and start romances are portrayed as anti-heroes 
who set bad examples. Such is the view of fifty-five-year-old Chaturani. 'We came here to work. 
We have to listen to the madame, not be the madame,' she quipped, descrihing the nllitudc she 
tried to maintain. She is critical of younger generations of Sri Lankans arriving in Jordnn who are 
not serious about working hard. 'Now, the girls are coming and they don't want to work. They 
come just to run away and have fun.' Despite the low-status nature of their work, snlnries in 
Jordan provide access to consumer goods that otherwise would be unavaililble. But miJ:,'flmlli who 
splash out on new clothes or lavish gifts for their friends may be accused of 'showing on" or 
being careless with their earnings. 
Narratives about 'good' and 'bad' behaviour for domestic workers resemble plltriRreh,,1 discourses 
of kinship common in Sri Lanka, with the idea of the sacrifici"l wifc/mother/dllughh:r who mllkes 
sacrifices for her husband/children/parents as an important ideal (Murecek 20(0). These 
expectations are not always fulfilled. Future-oriented thinking is not always sustllinllble with the 
passage of time, particularly given that life abroad presents new opportunities fur rcllltiollshil)S 
and consumerism. There is a constant tension between home and away, between whu, mignllioll 
should be - a money-making enterprise - and reality. The mi~'I1111t ethic emphnsises thrift, hut 
many of those who do not have much money to begin with or who hllvc no immcdintc pillns to 
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return to Sri Lanka prefer to live well in Jordan. Kanthi, for example, insists on riding in taxis 
rather than taking the bus and spends a substantial portion of her monthly pay packet on mobile 
phone cards, clothing and socialising with other migrants during her free time. When asked how 
she could afford to take taxis, she said she saw no point in scrimping. 'You never know what will 
happen. I may die tomorrow.' She joked that as long as she had money for a coffin, there was no 
reason to save. Although said in jest, her comments express a feeling shared hy many migrants 
that life in Amman should he not just endured hut enjoyed. 
Boys, Booze and Baila Music 
One Friday in June 2008, several women and I made our way to an outdoor theatre to attend a 
concert. By the time we arrived, a mob of people had engulfed a small table where tickets were 
being sold. At 7 JD ($10) each, they were expensive for most of the workers present. The concert 
had been organised by a group of migrants, and a baifa band and singers from the popular 
television show Superstar had flown in to perform.162 The crowd was spirited, joyful and excited. 
t'igure 19: Concert at King Abdullah Gardens, Amman 
Apart from some Indian and Bangladeshi men and a handful of Filipina women. the conccrt-gocni 
were overwhelmingly young Sri Lankans. Most of those I knew worked as fl"\.'Clnnccrs. Mllny of 
the women Wore makeup and tight jeans. As dusk fel1 and the hand stnrtt.-d to plllY, the dancing 
and drinking began. Young couples embraced. dancing closely as music boolllcd out of the luud 
speakers. Bottles of cheap spirits were opened, and the smel1 of alcohol pcrcolllted through the air. 
162 Baila is a type of dance music popular in Sri Lanka. As its Portuguese name SUltl.lestM• it has eoloniul ro~ts and blends Portuguese, African and indigenous Sri lankan elements. Regarded a5 uncouth hy lome ~Iddle-class Sri lankans, baifa music is particularly popular among the youth and those from lower­
Income groups (Hewamanne 2003: 85). 
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As the evening wore on, some men became so intoxicated that they could barely walk. When one 
staggered over to a spot near me and passed out, his friends doused him with water to rouse him. 
The women sitting nearby shook their heads in disapproval but seemed unsurprised. Although 
considerably more men were seen to be drinking alcohol, some women also drank. 
In Jordan scenes of women consuming alcohol and dancing closely with men are typically 
restricted to nightclubs and bars of the super-rich. Jordanian women from modest buck grounds 
tend to avoid wearing revealing clothes, and public displays of affection between men and women 
are considered distasteful. Against this backdrop, the revelry at the open-air concert stunds in 
dramatic relief. This was a migrant oasis, a spot in which for a short period of time. 'guest' 
workers claimed part of the city as their own. The transgressive elements contrast not only with 
Jordanian norms of respectability but also with those prevalent in Sri Lanka. Prohibitions agninst 
consuming intoxicating substances apply to men as well as women, but according to villuge 
norms, respectable Sri Lankan women do not drink alcohol or smoke cigarettes (Gamburd 2ooRb: 
16,70_72).'63 Female abstinence is a marker of a woman's status and femininity (ihid: 71), nnd 
while of course some unmarried couples do have sexual relations, public displays of affection 
between lovers are generally looked down upon. 
This helps explain why the concerts are not viewed favourably by all migrants. Some women 
voice concerns on moral grounds, viewing them as part of a pattern of profligate behaviour to 
which too many youngsters fall victim when they go abroad. Others view getting dressed up nnd 
buying tickets for such events as a waste of money better saved for Sri Lanka. TIle scenes at the 
concert - and the reactions to them - resemble accounts of garment fuctory workers in Sri l.nnkn 
(Hewamanne and Brow 1999, Hewamanne 2003, Lynch 2002). Jlcwamunne (2003) d,,'Scrihes 
women working in textile factories in the Katunayake Free Trade Zone who weur heavy mukcup, 
drink beer and dance with men at parties (llewamanne 2003: 77-88). These nctivitics might he 
considered unremarkable among urban youngsters but provoke moral punic when pructiced by 
women from rural areas who are expected to uphold villuge traditions (lIcwamunne 2003: 91). 
Like migration to the Middle East, work in garment factories is associuted with nlmpllntscltunlity 
and loose morals. 
For those who do attend the concerts, however, the occasion provides a rare opportunity to hll\'c 
fun and a brief respite from otherwise tedious working lives. As one young man said, 'I Wlll'k 365 
days a year. This is the one time 1 can dance and have fun.' The concert!! nlso pnwillc nn 
opportunity to meet and flirt with members of the opposite sex. Public SlItherings such ns these 
are possible in Beirut and Amman to a greater extent than other parts of the region. Restriclion5 
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Alcohol Use among women is reportedly more common among Catholics, in urhnn IfC'RlI, 11111 In 
upcountry estates (Gamburd 2008b: 71). 
IRQ 
on women's mobility and alcohol use in Saudi Arabia, for example, mean that there are fewer 
opportunities for migrants to 'get into trouble', and thus many veteran migrants consider it a 
'safer' destination for young women. Jordan and Lebanon, which ofTer more opportunities to 
socialise with other migrants, can be more dangerous but also alluring to those seeking adventure. 
The presence of so many couples at the concert helps explain why the Middle East conjures up 
images of sexual licence in Sri Lanka. Many migrants - particularly those who live scpurntc\y 
from their employers - engage in extra-marital relationships while in Jordan, a path ..'TIl which hus 
also been described in Lebanon (Smith 2010). Such relationships can provide a modicum of 
physical and economic security, as well as a measure of social insurance against gossip that a 
woman engages in prostitution. Given that roughly eight out of ten Sri Lankan migrants in Jordan 
are women, romantic relationships are often formed with men from other South Asian or Arub 
countries. Outside of their home villages - the village being the moral core in Sri Lanka· some 
women abandon their /ajja (shame/restraint) and engage in practices thut would be consid\.."1'Cd 
shameful at home. As in Ventura's account of Filipino migrants in Japan (1992), the absence of 
traditional sources of authority is conducive to hedonism and a kind of utopia among mllny young 
migrants. The absence of older kin and the expectation that their stay in the host country will be 
merely temporary means that drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes and having boyfriends mny 
incur few social penalties. 
Views from Those 'Left Behind' 
How migrants' families assess the outcome of migration has not been explored in d\..'pth in this 
thesis. I have not made it the focus here because in comparison to studies of migrants' experiences 
in Arab host countries, a good deal more research has been done in South Asinn 'sending' 
contexts. It is, however, important to acknowledge the fact that family members oflcn nnrrnle the 
consequences of migration in ways which difTer from the accounts of those who hnve travelled. 
Decisions that may be cast in a language of sacrifice by mi~'Tants mlly be interpreted all 
abandonment by their children and husbands. This is reflc..'Ch...-d in scenes from the docul1lentllry 
film When Mother Comes l/omejiJr Christmas (directed by Nililn Vnchllni, 19%), whkh follows 
the story of Josephine Perera, a widow who leaves her three children in orphllnllgcs to work all a 
domestic worker in Greece. While taking care of someone e1se's child in Greece, J()sephinc 
misses her own son's childhood. She sends all of her earnings home, yct the letters she writcs to 
her daughter are left unanswered. When she finally returns home aftcr nellrly a d\.'Clldc nbn.llld, she 
finds that her youngest son has been caught stealing and is pcrfornling budly in btlllrding schoul, 
and her daughter has chosen to marry a man with poor financial prospc..'Cts. Iler children express a 
sense of reticence in relation to her lengthy absence. This theme also emerges in the film Anllk 
(directed by Rory Quintos, 2000), about a Filipina woman who leaves her fnmily to work as a 
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domestic worker in Hong Kong and returns after ten years to find that her children, who grew up 
without knowing her, deeply resent her for being gone and blame her for their own misfortunes. 
One of the motivations for migration most commonly cited by women is to earn money for their 
children's education, and so it is ironic that a connection is often made between women's 
migration and children's poor performance in school. Migrants as well as their children in 
Nilpanagoda and Watinapaha remarked upon this connection. Several returned migmnts in 
Nilpanagoda said their children began getting poor marks or dropped out of school shortly afk'!' 
they went abroad. Poor school performance is attributed to the child feeling lonely and dCprcsSl-d 
or not being encouraged to study, a task usually carried out by mothers. Girl children who have to 
look after siblings and do domestic work that otherwise would have been done by their mothers 
may also be forced to neglect their studies. Malini's family, with whom I lived in Wutinapuhu. 
provides an example. Malini has two older sisters and a younger brother. Their mother went 
abroad when Malini was doing her O-Level exams, at which point the older sisk-rs hud already 
completed their schooling and were doing further studies, one to become 8 nurse and the other to 
learn computer skills. Both sisters now have relatively well-paying jobs. Malini says thllt lx'Cause 
her mother wasn't around to encourage her, she didn't study and performed badly on her exams. 
Unlike the two older sisters, Malini and her brother dropped out of school after their O-level 
exams and later joined their mother in Jordan. They draw 8 connection between their nn-d to work 
abroad and their mother's absence at a crucial point during their studies. A number of women 
interviewed at training centres expressed similar views, attributing their own low mllrks ill sch\l(ll 
to the fact that their mothers were abroad and saying that the only option they hlld to cam money 
was to follow in their mothers' footsteps and migrate. Several studies have indiclIted a 
relationship between poor educational performance and migration. A study by Save the Chihlrcn 
(2006) found that the absence of mothers for work abroad negatively impacted children's school 
performance and attendance, particularly among boys. Children of mib't'ant mothers were also 
found to exhibit more emotional and behavioural problems. Gamburd (200R) examines four 
families affected by women's migration and concludes that while the children of migrants do not 
necessarily suffer more abuse and neglect, as is commonly cluimed by the mcdill, there is 
evidence that they fare less well in school. The link between educationnl rcrfonnllnce nnd 
migration is a complicated one, however. Women often decide to mib't'ate as a way of copins with 
financial problems and other strains which adversely affect their households, and so while a 
correlation may be drawn between poor school performance and migration, it is not alwnys dellr 
that these are caused by a migrant's absence. As Biao (2007: 179) hilS noted with rcsJX'Ct hl 
China, many of the problems of those who are left behind cannot be attributed solely tll • fllmily 
member's absence but have their roots in the material circumstances thllt give rise to migrution in 
the first place. 
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Conclusion 
Questions about the consequences of migration have no easy or obvious answers, but this chnpt~'I' 
should encourage us to avoid assuming that migrants are necessarily 'better olr in the long-run. 
Four narratives have shed light on the contradictions and ambiguities arising in relation to 
overseas employment and have drawn out some of the particularities of Sri Lankan mibtfation to 
the Middle East. While many women are aware of the potential difficulties associated with 
migrating, there is an expectation that they and their families will enjoy a better standard of living. 
These aspirations do not always materialise, however, and the failure to generate savings can be 
crucial in decisions about whether and when to return to Sri Lanka. The salaries domestic workers 
eam are relatively low, and many women must stay abroad for lengthy periods to generate cnough 
for large expenditures. Even this does not ensure an improvement in one's economic 
circumstances in the long-run. 
This chapter also indicates that an exclusive focus on the material aspects of mib'T'ation can 
obscure other sources of tension which may be just as important to how women judge the 
outcomes of migration. For some, migration can lead to familial estrangement as a result of yeurs 
of separation. The fact that women work inside private households and are typically discouraged 
if not altogether forbidden from venturing out means that life in Jordan can be lonely and 
alienating. But this chapter - much like the one preceding it - also reveuls the diversity of 
experience among Sri Lankan migrants. The description of the concert suggests that not nil 
domestic workers lead drab, cheerless lives. Despite the highly restricted and ost~'tlsibly 
temporary nature of their employment, some women manage to construct elements of stnbility 
and enjoy a greater sense of satisfaction in their homes away from home. Strongly fdt conccrn!! 
about those left behind are often interlaced with desires to enjoy life abroad, and opportunities for 
consumption and new relationships may compete with the ethic of sacrifice and thrift. Decisions 
about whether and to whom to send remittances can be fraught, and demands frolll kin oftcn 
interfere with women's own plans and projects. These elements reflect deep amhivnlence about 
the consequences of migration. By considering some of the emotional and social costs often len 
out of the migration equation, mixed and contradictory outcomes cmerge. 
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Conclusion: Unfree Labour, Old and New 
By way of concluding, I would like to return to two central questions: First. how should we 
analyse the position of migrant domestic workers in Jordan in relation to other labouring groups? 
Second, what implications does the material presented in this thesis have for a wider 
understanding ofcontemporary forms ofunfree labour? 
Slavery, indentured servitude and other variants of unfree labour are commonly thought of as 
relics of the past and as incompatible with modem capitalism. For Marx. free labour - or workers 
who are 'free' to sell their labour-power as a commodity to any capitalist - was thought to be: the 
sine qua non of capitalism. The destruction of feudal bondage was considl.'1'ed to be a necessary 
precondition for the creation of the working class (Patnaik 1997: 78). Labour could only 
participate in a truly capitalist economy, it has been said. if free from the bonds of slavery and 
serfdom. Unfree labour was thought to be 'an obstacle both to market formation and expansion. 
and to the installation of advanced productive forces' (Brass 2009: 743). This view hus been 
challenged. Consider, for example, Mintz's account of the history of sugar-cane plnntntions in the: 
British Caribbean. We are disposed to think that industry emerged in post-feudnl Europe, yet 
Mintz has argued (1985: Chapter 2) that the production of sugar - 'the first mass-produced exotic 
necessity of a proletarian working class' (1985: 46) - was in essence an industrinl enk't'prise 
which arose before European factory-based industry. That enterprise, Mintz shows, was run on 
coerced labour of various sorts rather than so-called free Inbour (1985: SI). This runs counter In 
ideas about early forms of industry being based on the use of proletarinn lubour. We might also 
consider the American context. Steinfeld has suggested thnt when forms of whllt we think of as 
'free' labour first appeared in the American colonies in the eighteenth century, ralher thlln 
displacing indentured labour, the two systems flourished alongside one another (199 I: 6). Up until 
the early nineteenth century in the United States, forms of apprenticeship and indentured luhour 
enforceable with criminal sanctions were used alongside 'freer' forms of lubuur. They were "II 
variants on what was considered 'normal employment'. 
If we conceive of unfree labour as an extreme form of attachment between worker Dnd CI1lI,loycr 
through the Use of economic and/or extra-economic coereion, many scholllrs would now agree 
that it has yet to disappear. Contemporary accounts show that unfree luhour continues to cll-cltist 
with so-called free labour to facilitate rather than hinder capitalist acculllullltillll (Brass 1997: 33R­
339). Examples include the use of ehild slaves in cocoa production in West Africa (Mant.n 20(5), 
forced labour in nut and mining industries in Bolivia (Sharma 2006), bondl.-d lubuur in agriculture 
in the Pakistani Punjab (Martin 2009), the brick industry in Nepal (GEFONT 2007), and the ~CI1\-
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cutting industry in South India (Kapadia 1995). Unfree labour is not restricted to 'developing' 
countries. Examples also can be found in the gangmaster system in the British food production 
industry (Anderson and Rogaly 2005, Brass 2004) and in prostitution, domestic work, agriculture 
and sweatshops in the United States (Free the Slaves and Human Rights Center 2004). Many 
contemporary cases involve migrant workers, suggesting a paradoxical relationship between the 
mobility oflabour and the absence of freedom (Bose 1988: 912). 
To the list we can add migrant workers employed in bonded labour in the Middle East. As 
demonstrated in this thesis, the use of the kafala system to tie workers to individual employers is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, having emerged in the last four decades. Although miJ:,'TIlnts mny 
enter into the kafala system at will, they cannot opt out until they complete their two-yenr 
contracts. They are prevented from selling their labour to the highest bidder or deciding when to 
quit, and those employed as domestic workers are prohibited from leaving their workplaces 
without permission. The fact that many abscond suggests that the system is not always effective, 
but the police, recruitment agency staff and in some cases even embassy staff can be rclk-d upon 
to enforce the bondage relation. From the employers' point of view the system is not problem­
free, but there are benefits in terms of imposing authority and reducing labour costs by preventing 
competition among employers. Physical violence is not always used, and not all workers are 
forcibly confined to the homes in which they work. But employers are structurally positioned to 
hold workers captive and use force with impunity. 
The thesis has focused on the example of women employed as domestic workers and hus 
discussed the ways their working conditions have been shaped by ideologies of gender and 
conceptions of the domestic space as a private arena which should not be subj'"-'Ct to government 
oversight. But it is important to bear in mind that women and men migrants who are employed in 
other sectors - for example Egyptian agricultural and construction workers and Indinn gunnent 
factory workers in the Qualifying Industrial Zones - are also subject to the 1(t~{i,lcl system nnd nre 
bound to their employers for the contract period. In relation to debates about free/unfree lllhour 
and capitalism, this context provides support for the argument that unfree lllbour is nut only 
compatible with but facilitates capitalism. As chapter 4 described, migrant workers employed in 
bonded labour have played an integral role in capital accullluliltion in the gunnent inllustry. 
agriculture, construction and the service sector. Moreover, unfree domestic workers contrihute III 
the reproduction of highly-educated elites, many of whom Inter leave the kingdom to tllke up 
highly-skilled jobs abroad and in doing so provide one of Jordan's most important links with 
global capital. Given the numbers of migrants employed through the kcVt,ltl system in the Middle 
East, the contribution that bonded labour has made to the accul11ullltion of capitlll in the regim\ 
should not be overlooked. 
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'Free' Versus 'Unfree' Labour and the Role ofthe State 
'Free' wage labourers are of course not completely free. Like bonded labourers, their decisions 
about when to take up or end employment are circumscribed by social obligations, expectations, 
economic realities and market forces (Ortiz 2002: 396). They may be subject to pecuniary as well 
as non-pecuniary pressures - the use of penal sanctions to prevent breaches of employmcnt 
contract for wage labour in nineteenth century England being one example (Stcinfeld 200 I). 
Another, from a contemporary context, is work permit schemes that prohibit non-citizcns from 
moving from one employer to another, or from one sector to another (O'Connell Davidson 20 I0: 
253). Labour relations usually involve a mixture of forms of freedom and unfrecdom. So-calkd 
free and unfree labour should be seen not as fundamentally sepnrnte but rather 8S part of a 
spectrum involving varying forms and degrees ofcoercion. 
Sri Lankan migrants employed in bonded labour differ from other labouring groups in Jordan in 
that they face more severe economic and extra-economic coercion backed up by the power of the 
state. Bearing in mind the dangers ofreifying 'the state' as a single agent, I use the tenn to denote 
a complex of powers, one of which is made manifest in bureaucratic processes. Central to the 
context at hand are those processes relating to the control and regulation of mib'f8tion. This 
includes agencies and individuals associated with the 'sending' state (i.e. stafT of the Sri Lankan 
embassy and Bureau of Foreign Employment) and the 'receiving' state (i.e. the Jordanian police, 
the courts of law, and staff of the Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of foreign 
Affairs). Coercion is evident in the use of brute force to perpetuate bondage, including forcibly 
returning women to homes or recruitment agencies. Tactics are used to keep workers inside their 
employers' homes and to prevent contact with the outside world. The failure to enforce laws thllt 
might give workers some autonomy, for example those prohibiting the confiscation of pnssports, 
facilitates coercion. Although the precarious situation of migrant workers is often conccived as a 
failure on the part of the state to protect them, in this instance it is at kast in pllrt the prod"ct (If 
state interventions aimed at control and discipline. The state is not mcrely turning 8 blind eye but 
actively enabling bonded labour. 
The state's role in brokering unfree labour is not the rcsult of 8 c\)tlllcious !It mIt'S)' but It 
confluence of interests. As outlined in chapters 2 and 3, the Sri Lankan stllte is well served by 
migration that generates a steady flow of remittances and provides a source of employment. 11lC~ 
main agency tasked with overseeing migration, the Bureau of Foreign Employment. is rnrtinlly 
controlled by recruitment agents, and some of its employt.'Cs themselves own recruitment 
agencies. This gives it a vested interest in the business of migration, (me thnt hilS yet tll he 
Seriously challenged. There are few mechanisms for migrant workers themselves to make their 
voices heard. Although their remittances provide the largest single source of foreign exchnngc fllr 
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the Sri Lankan economy, they have no representation on the Bureau's board of directors, and 
while abroad they do not have the right to vote in national elections. In Jordan, the influx of casily 
exploitable, low-paid migrant workers has suited the interests ofemployers. Although local NGOs 
and international organisations have called attention to human rights violations, there appears to 
have been relatively little opposition from citizens or trade unions in Jordan. It is not clear to whllt 
extent Jordanian policymakers have weighed or chosen to ignore the potentially negative impllcts 
of recruiting large numbers of workers from outside the kingdom, for example the loss of money 
to the Jordanian economy through remittances, or the loss ofjobs for citizens. 
Although migration is typically portrayed as an individual decision, a variety of factors at the 
household, local and national levels constrain migrants' options. Many Sri Lankans sec few 
alternatives to migrating to the Middle East. There is a tendency to assume that people who 
become involved in forced labour have been duped. Indeed, some migrants are d,,'Ccivcd by 
brokers or recruitment agencies promising higher salaries, and many are not informed of the ruk'S 
of the sponsorship system or the specific conditions under which they will be employed. But we 
have seen that many women migrating to the Middle East are not naive about the dangers. Many 
are prepared to work in bonded labour because, however unequal and exploitative, it provides a 
Source of income when few others are available. They are neither uniformly accepting of their 
working conditions, nor do they have to be forcibly constrained throughout tl;e employment 
period. Rather, they accept the situation when no better option is available. At the individulIllcvel, 
many are motivated by the hope of material improvement or social mobility for their families, 
whether through buying land, building homes, or paying for educational eXpt.'flses or do ....Tics. 
Many are also propelled to migrate in the aftermath offamily crises, such as the death or illness of 
a spouse or parent. Their decisions are not the result of a blind, unrelk'Ctive pcrfonllnnce of duty 
but rather of the way they understand themselves as social beings. Often, this is bound up with 
rights and duties vis-a-vis kin. 
If at a general level many Sri Lankans feel compelled to take up bonded labour in the Middle Ellst 
as a result of the scarcity of well-remunerated employment at home, understllndins whllt 
perpetuates unfree labour requires us to ask questions about political economy and models "f 
'development'. The circumstances fuelling Sri Lankan migration were brought ahout nt lellst in 
part by the tum towards neoliberal political-economic practices since the 1970s, including 
privatisation and the withdrawal of the state from many areas of socilll provision. 111e decades­
long civil conflict also played a role. It is not coincidental that the withdrawal of the Sri (..ank"l\ 
state from the provision of welfare went hand-in-hand with nn intensificatiun of its r\lle 
mobilising citizens to leave the country for overseas employment. A similar p"llem emerged in 
Jordan, where structural adjustment appears to have indirectly encourngcd Joronninll!! and 
Palestinians to migrate to the Gulf states. These trends are part of broader geopolitical dYllllmic!l, 
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including the power of the ideology of neoliberalism among organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
If unfree labour has endured and even thrived under global capitalism, what, if anything, is 'new' 
about contemporary forms? I mentioned my reservations about Bales' revision of the concept of 
slavery in chapter 5. But setting aside issues of vocabulary, if we speak more generally of unfree 
labour, Bales' reflections on the contrast between new and old forms is relevant. According to 
Bales, 'old' forms of unfree labour were based on legal ownership, required large investments, 
and tended to involve permanent or semi-permanent relationships (1999: 15). In contrast, 'new' 
forms do not involve ownership, can be arranged at relatively low costs, and are often temporary. 
Population growth and processes of impoverishment have created a glut of potential slaves who 
can be used and then disposed of; there is no need to maintain and invest in their upkeep (1999: 
14). My research generally supports these conclusions. Bonded labour in Jordan is contractual and 
arranged for a prescribed period of time rather than being life-long and hereditary. The 
employer's relationship is only with the worker and not members of her fmnily. Work is 
performed in exchange for wages, albeit low wages. It is more harsh in the sense thut workers can 
be easily banished and replaced. In this way it is in harmony with the wider trend of 
'flexibilisation' of labour. Another difference is that rather than being forcibly captured, workers 
are now pushed into unfree labour by poverty. 
I have doubts, however, about another aspect of Bales' conception of 'new' slavery. This is the 
element of illegality. Because slavery is thought to be repugnant to 'modem' society, nales 
argues, it must be hidden from view. 'Since slavery is illegal in all countries, it must be concealed. 
Even in places where the police work hand in hand with the slaveholders and shllre in their 
profits, no one wants to advertise the fact that he or she is a slaveholder' (1999: 26·27). ShIvery, 
according to Bales, is 'a shadowy, illegal enterprise' (1999: 8). What follows fmlll this assenion 
is that with improved oversight and regulation, new forms of unfree labour clln be erndicllted. 
Bales advocates taking steps to 'intercept' the slave trade. • At airports and border cl't)ssing!l 
around the world there should be officials searching for slaves. Investigators should be t",cing the 
flow of slaves and confiscating cars, trucks, boats, and aircraft' (1999: 25 I). In the next IIcction, I 
will ilJustrate why these assumptions are misleading . 
• 
Flanked by Fort Railway Station to the south and the Central Bus Stand to the north, the avenue 
known as Olcott Mawatha is one of Colombo's main arteries. It slices through a mille of 111111111 
lanes and narrow passageways comprising the bazaar district of Pellah. It is rerhlll's the most 
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crowded and frenetic area in all or Sri Lanka. Rickshaws, automobiles and exhnust-bckhing buses 
surge past. Commuters rush in all directions, and porters charge through the crowds pulling or 
carrying huge loads. Almost nothing stands still. But even amongst 1111 this activity, it is 
impossible to miss the giant billboard towering over the intersection. tn the spring and summcr of 
2008, when I was completing the Sri Lankan component of the research, the billbollrd displuycd 8 
poster with photographs of two men. The man on the len wns hllnging out of nn airplane, his fllce 
panic-stricken and his legs dangling in the sky. Below was a single word: 'Amdallflllmddl?' ('Arc 
you in danger?') To the right is another man sitting calmly on an airplane with the following text: 
'Sudhaanamdeh?' ('Are you prepared?') Small logos indicated that the poster was sponsored by 
the International Organisation for Migration (10M) and the British government. 
tlgure ZU: Billboard in "etlllh, Colombo in 200K 
The pos\(.'t' conveys the messnge thllt planned mignllioll through onicilllly l"Cl-llllllted, leg,,! 
channels is less trencherous. IM As pnrt of the snllle infonlllllitlll cllml'llil-tIl, 10M and the l\rili:;h 
government crenled 8 series of smllller posters in Sinhllhl and rnglish wilh a lIimilur mCllsn~c. 
Agllin, the posters fellturcd two men· one of a mlln holding (lut a PIISSJ'lort, nnd IUlothcr of II mlln 
in hllndcufTs. The phologrnphs were accompanied by the following text: 
Peril or Precaulion? Think twice before you choose your route 10 mi~nlliun. ()I) )'uu "r~"1ll of Illlllina 
a beller job and earning well" S()rnetime~ Ihe arrc'nl of Ihlll drenm hi IIU IItnlnll YIlU ",i~hl e\'~" ri~" 
your lire to mllke il come lrue. There are mnny who hnve lried 10 ellter a (un-ill" C(luntry Ihr\lllllh 
iIIeglll means, only 10 end up in prison, or even lusillillheir liVe!!. Their chil\\rCIl, wire a"ll allcJ 
parents who depend on Ihem end up in a worse position thnn ever bcfme. Think twice hcfllfC you ri~k 
I~ Sirnilllr slogans have been used in informntion call1rnillns chcwhcre. In I'cru, pO,ICI'1l used In an 10M 
cumruign fcutured a photllgru1"h (If a dOll. jU\\'5 us-nre "curing IlInS fllnll!!, ucctll1ll'unicJ hr Ihe le,l: ',...., tv 
orr/r.tXII('.f. Viaia por lalc·xal.' ('()un't rbk yourself. l'ru\,ellhnlus-h Iellal I1lcan~.') (10M 20OJ: Sq). 
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everything. You don't need to gamble on what's important to you. If you contact us, we will keep 
you informed ofjob opportunities suited to your qualifications and help you with the legal aspects of 
migration. 
The fact that these campaigns feature young men suggests the intended audience is men 
contemplating migration to Europe rather than domestic workers headed for the Middle East. But 
it is not unlike the approach adopted by the Bureau of Foreign Employment in promoting 
women's migration to the Middle East. While the Bureau's training courses do not pretend that 
domestic workers will be safe from abuse when they go abroad, women are still encouraged to 
migrate and are required to do so through officially-regulated channels. In both the poster 
campaign and the training programmes for domestic workers, migrants are constructed as a 
problem in need of 'management' by the state. The discourse of 'managing' migration has 
become hegemonic among policy-makers. Irregular migration - or that taking place outside 
regulatory norms - is seen as a security threat, and governments face increasing pressure to 
manage their borders and clamp down on unregulated flows. This discourse makes an explicit 
connection between irregular migration and the risk of exploitation and abuse (e.g. 10M 2003: 
60). Bizarrely, within this framework legal immigration controls are presented as a solution to 
human rights abuses (Anderson and Rogaly 2005: 9). 
In a similar vein, at a policy level much attention has been paid to the importance of eliminating 
human trafficking. What constitutes trafficking is debated, but the predominant view is that, like 
slavery, it occurs in zones outside of official oversight. 1M Within the conventional framework, 
traffickers must be 'exposed' and 'victims' rescued. As O'Connell Davidson suggests, trafficking 
is seen as part of a package that includes smuggling and 'illegal migration' which, when taken 
together, 'assume a neat line of demarcation between oppositional categories of migration ­
voluntary and consensual versus involuntary and non-consensual migration.,.' (2006: 9). The 
interpretation of who counts as 'trafficked' is so narrow as to exclude the vast majority of people 
actually involved in unfree labour. Also neglected in this framework is the fact that people may 
willingly enter into unfree labour if they see no other options to earn a living. 
The notion that legal, government-regulated migration is 'safer' may be hegemonic among 
policymakers but has not been incorporated into the way many migrant workers approllch 
16S Trafficking has been detined by the United Nations as: 'The recruitment, transportation. transfer. 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion. of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.' (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children, also referred to as the Trafficking Protocol, adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in November 2000) 
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migration. For perfectly good reasons, they may prefer to skirt the system and mib'Tate through 
trusted social networks involving relatives, neighbours and friends in lieu of government-licensed 
recruitment agencies. Migrating through informal channels may be cheaper and advantageous if a 
worker is at risk of abuse because personal contacts may be more inclined to intervene on the 
worker's behalf than recruitment agency statT with a financial interest in satisfying employers. 
This is not to say that unregulated migration is a solution to the problems migrant workers face. 
Rather, the point I wish to emphasise is that the discourse on 'regulating' migration is myopic at 
best: It appears to be driven by states' desires to control borders rather than concerns about 
workers' welfare. 
The assertion that 'planned', 'managed' migration is any less dangerous is perverse when we 
consider the realities of life for hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankan women in the Middle East. 
They migrate through legal channels only to find themselves in situations in which employers 
have absolute power. The fact that they arrive legally with valid visas and work contracts docs not 
lessen the risk of mistreatment. Their movement across national borders may be regulated, but the 
work itself seldom is. When it is regulated, it is done in ways that are heavily slanted in favour of 
the employer. One of the ironies of this situation is that the only way migrant domestic workers 
can escape SUbjugation is by illegally absconding from their employers. In this context, it is not 
unfree labour which is hidden. It is those who try to flee from the fetters of legal, state-sponsored 
bonded labour who must hide. 'Free' wage labour, not unfree labour, has been criminalised. Legnl 
migration may sound more respectable and orderly but in this instance is not any more humane or 
less risky for the worker. 
The situation of migrant domestic workers in Arab states is the result of both legal and extra-legal 
processes: legal in the sense that the terms of the ka/ala system bind workers to individual 
employers, and that employment contracts explicitly forbid leaving employers' homes without 
permission; extra-legal in the sense that legislation which could allow them to brenk free - for 
example prohibitions against slavery and trafficking - is ignored or interpreted so narrowly as to 
be irrelevant to most instances of unfree labour. In Jordun and elsewhere in the region, various 
sources of the law contradict one another. Unfree lubour is illegal according to the 1929 lllw 
prohibiting slavery, but the legal regulations and contracts comprising the kaJala system fllcilitnte 
it. Some forms of unfree labour are accepted, whereas others are not. 
The idea that states playa role in ennbling forms of unfree labour through tacit or active means is 
not new. What appears distinctive about this context is the production of bonded Inbour through 
migration policies which are presented as 'good' for the worker. The truth is that the state plays 
midwife to bonded labour because if otTers certain benefits, oftcn at the worker's expense. In the 
same vein, the material presented here challenges the myth that unfree lnhour occurs in an unsecn 
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world beyond legal oversight. This is simply not true. It is not just that the state overlooks unfree 
labour; it is that the state promulgates policies and legal processes that enable the practice. In 
assessing the contemporary variants of slavery, we must therefore consider the extent to which 
migration policies may create and nurture forms of unfree labour. 
201 
List ofIllustrative Material 
Maps 
Map 1: Sri Lanka 
Map 2: Jordan 
Map 3: Provinces of Sri Lanka 
Figures 
Figure 1: Coir processing in Nilpanagoda 
Figure 2: House in Watinapaha 
Figure 3: Home built with remittances from Jordan 
Figure 4: Learning to make a bed, Mount Lavinia, Colombo 
Figure 5: Cooking lesson, Mount Lavinia, Colombo 
Figure 6: Lesson on childcare, Mount Lavinia, Colombo 
Figure 7: Cleaning lesson, Mount Lavinia, Colombo 
Figure 8: Illustration from an SLBFE training manual 
Figure 9: Abu Mahjoob cartoon entitled 'Normal' 
Figure 10: Abu Mahjoob cartoon entitled 'Denial' 
Figure 11: Floor plan for an apartment in Amman as advertised by Damnc Properties 
Figure 12: A shop selling saris in downtown Amman 
Figure 13: A domestic worker holds one of the twins she looks after 
Figure 14: Church of St. George, Madaba 
Figure IS: Gold pendants and promissory notes adorn the shrine to the Virgin Mllry at the Church 
of St. George, Madaba 
Figure 16: Lighting candles in front of the Church of Saint Gl.'Orgc, Sult 
Figure 17: Saint Anthony'S Church, Kochchikade, Sri Lanka 
Figure 18: Friends enjoy a picnic lunch atop Mount Nebo 
Figure 19: Concert at King Abdullah Gardens, Amman 
Figure 20: Billboard in Pettah, Colombo in 2008 
202 
Annex A: Restricted Nationalities List 
The nationalities indicated here need to obtain an entry pennit prior to arrival in Jordan. This list 

was last updated on 8 March 20 I O. 

Source: http://www.hashweh.comlRestricted Nationalities List.pdf (Accessed 5 Jan 2010) 

Africa 

- Angola 

- Benin 

- Burkina Faso 

- Botswana 

- Burundi 

- Cameroon 

- Chad 

- Democratic Republic ofCongo 

- Djibouti 
- Eritrea 
- Ethiopia 
- Gabon 
- Gambia 
- Ghana 
- Ivory Coast 
- Kenya 
- Liberia 
- Madagascar 
-Mali 
- Mauritania 
- Central African Republic 
- Mozambique 
- Morocco (Females 18 - 35) 
- Namibia 
- Nigeria 
- Seychelles 
- Senegal 
- Sierra Leone 
- Somalia 
- Sudan 
- Tanzania 
-Togo 
- Uganda 
-Zambia 
Asia 

- Afghanistan 

- Bangladesh 

-Cambodia 

- Iran 

- Iraq 

-Malaysia 

- Nepal 

- New Guinea 

- Uzbekistan 

- Pakistan 
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- Philippines 
- Republic of Laos 
- Sri Lanka 
- Vietnam 
Australia 
None 
Europe 

- Albania 

- Macedonia 

-Moldova 

North America 
None 
South America 
- Belize 
-Colombia 
-Cuba 
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Annex B: Special Working Contractfor Non·Jordanian Domestic Workers 
Premises 
1. First Party:- A- (Employer) 

Name: ...................................... . 

Sex: ............................................ . 

Nationality: ........................... 1.0: ........ ..... .... ....... 1.0 nunlber: ........... . 

Profession: .............................. Work Tel: ............................................ . 

Work address: ............................... .. 

Residency address (city) .....................Street: .............................................. 

Residence no.: .................................. P.O.Box: ........................................... 

B- Special Agency for Bringing and Recruiting Non-Jordanian Domestic Workers 
Recruiting Agency.: ...................................... . 
Tel No. :.................................................. . 

Address: .................................................. 

Ministry of Labour License No.: ................................................ 

2. Second Party (Worker): 
Name: ....................................................... Place and Date of 

Birth: ........................................................ . 

Sex: Female! Male 
Nationality: .................................................. Marital Status: ....................... 

Passport Number: ..................................................... . 

Place and date of Issue: ............................................... . 

Date of Expiry: ........................................................ .. 

Address in the Country ofOrigin: ..................................... 

Phone no.: .............................................................. .. 

Worker's agent'In h'IS/her country ....................... . 
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Contract date: (Day).............(Month)...............(Year)....................... 

Contract period: Two years upon the Second Party's arrival to the Hashemite Kingdom of 

Jordan....................... The contract may be renewed for other periods with the agreement of 

both Parties and subject to the condition that the First Party obtains the required working and 

residency permits for the Second Party during the contract's duration in compliance with articles 

3 and 9 of the contract. 

As the First Party wishes to employ the Second Party to work in his/her residence, whose address 

is mentioned above, in the profession of.................. and as the Second Party is ready to fully 

perform this work, this contract has been signed with the approval and consent of the Two Parties 

to the following conditions: 

Terms and Conditions 

First: The introduction of this contract is an essential part of it and shall be read altogether. 

Second: 

A) The First Party shall provide the Second Party with a two-way ticket under the condition that 

the Second Party has spent no less than a period of two workingyears. The First Party shall 

provide the Second Party with a return ticket if he/she wishes to end the Second Party's work 

before the contract expires. The First Party shall not bear the responsibility of providing the 

Second Party with a return ticket in case of transferring the Second Party to another employer or if 

the Second Party does not complete the contract's duration due to reasons caused by him/her. 

B) In case of transferring the Second Party to work with a new employer and in order to complete 

the duration of this contract and following the approval of the concerned authorities, both parties 

and the new employer, an annexed contract shall be signed that will rel,'Ulate the commitments of 

each Party including the return ticket. 

Third: The First Party shall obtain the required working and residency permits at his/her own 

expenses for the Second Party. If the First Party fails to obtain the permits, he/she shall pay the 

penalties stated in article (34) of the Residency and Foreigners Affairs Law. 

Fourth: 

A) 	 The Employer shaH pay a monthly salary of......... JD or its equivalent in foreign 
currencies within seven days of the due date. Both parties shal1 sign a receipt verifying 
that the Employer has paid the salary and the Second Party has rL'Ceivcd it provided that 
both Parties shall keep original copics 
B) 	 The payment of the above mentioned salary To a Third Party shall not be considered 

quittance from paying the salary unless the Employer gets a written approval from the 

Second Party permitting himlher to pay the salary to a Third Party. 

Fifth: The Employer shall not employ the Second Party in any place other than the usulII address 
of the Employer's residence. In case of moving to another country, the Employer shal1 notify the 
concerned Embassy and shall get the approval of the Second Party. 
Sixth: The Employer shall not employ the Second Party in any work other than the one described 
in the premises. The Second Party shall faithfuHy and loyally perform hisfhcr duties without 
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violating the general social nOImS, morals and Laws. The Second Party shall not leave the 
Employer's residence or be absent from work without the Employer's approval. 
Seventh: The Employer shall provide the Second Party, and in a suitable way, with 
accommodation, meals, clothing and medical care. The Employer must not place any restrictions 
upon the Second Party's correspondence. 
Eighth: Both Parties shall treat each other in a humane way that complies with Jordanian Laws 
and the International Conventions ratified by Jordan. The Second Party shaH be given one rest 
day weekly provided that the Second Party shall not leave the residence without the penn iss ion of 
the Employer. 
Ninth: The Second Party has the right to nullify, without prior warning, the contract if the First 
Party does not abide by the Third and Fourth Articles. Therefore, the First Party shall bear the 
fuIl civil and penal responsibility for violating the two mentioned Articles or any of the contract's 
Articles with full obligation on the part of the First Party to what is stated in the Second Article. 
Tenth: The First Party has no right to withhold the Second Party's passport or any other related 
personal documents. 
Eleventh: The Recruiting agency (B-First Party), and in case the Second Party appears to be 
infected, before entering the Kingdom, by any of the contagious or dangerous diseases or if found 
to be unhealthy or physically unfit or if turns to be pregnant, shall bear any financial expenses that 
the Employer had to pay when bringing the Second Party or any other expenses caused by any of 
the aforementioned reasons and shall send the Second Party back to the Country of Origin. 
Twelfth: The First Party shall obtain a life and accidental insurance policy for the benefit of the 
Second Party, issued at an accredited insurance company recognized by the Second Party's 
Embassy, with an annual fee that shall not exceed JD 20, of which the Second Party shall pay half 
of the agreed amount to the First Party. In case the Second Party is from a nationality thllt its 
Embassy does not recognize any insurance company then the First Party shall insure the Second 
Party at any registered insurance company. 
Thirteenth: Any dispute between the Employer and the Second Party shall be resolved in a 
friendly manner with the involvement of the agent (B- First Party) mentioned in the premises, and 
where necessary using the good offices of the Embassy. Both parties have the right to refer the 
matter to the judicial authority in order to solve it according to relevant laws. 
Fourteenth: The First Party shall give the Second Party a grant equivalent to a 1 S- day salary at 
the end of the two working years at the same Employer. 
Fifteenth: Three copies of the contract will be issued to the First Party (AtE), Second Party and 
concerned Embassy in the Kingdom in, Arabic and English. The Embassy's copy shull be kept at 
its offices without any expenses from the First Party. 
Sixteenth: this contract has been executed in..................day............. 

Date.................. .. 

Additional Conditions that shall not violate any of the contract's articles: 
1. 
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2. 
3. 
First Party: Second Party 
A) Employer 
B) Agency ........ . 
Seal ofthe Ministry ofLabour Seal ofthe Concerned Emhassy 
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